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Foreword
This manual has been written to accompany course instruction in livestock policy analysis. Following
demand from NARS (national agricultural research systems) and bilateral and international agencies
working in sub-Saharan Africa, ILCA developed a training course for the livestock subsector within
the region (sub-Saharan Africa). The course is intended for senior and middle-ranking staff working
in policy analysis and related fields.
One purpose of the manual is to supplement the instructor-based learning for the ILCA training
course on policy analysis. The material used in this English edition was originally developed to meet
the specific needs of the ILCA course. However, on advice from our course participants, it has been
adapted for use by other institutions, particularly universities and regional training centres. Since the
manual has been prepared in a modular and learner-driven format, it also provides a self-learning
package to update the reader's knowledge and understanding of modern principles of policy analysis
and policy making. Another purpose of the manual is to assist in the transfer of ILCA's policy analysis
course to NARS.
Many individuals have contributed to the preparation of the manual. Mr Stephen Sandford, the
former Head of the Livestock Economics Division at ILCA, initiated the livestock policy course,
planned the preparation of the manual to back up the course and provided technical backstopping
and guidance in the development of the manual's content. Many others assisted, including Dr Martin
Doran, who prepared the main text of the manual; Mr Steve Staal rewrote the chapter on Marketing
and Distribution Systems; Dr John P Hunter revised the chapter on Livestock Production and
Marketing in Alphabeta—A Case Study; Professor Hartwig de Haen, Professor Stefan Tangermann,
Addis Anteneh, Ray Brokken, John Howell, Stephen Lawry, John Mclntire, Alexandra Shaw and
Valentin von Massow all made substantial contributions to the technical content of one or more course
modules.
As a training material specialist, Dr Bansh Tripathi, the former Head of Training at ILCA,
wrote the performance objectives, important points and feedback exercises to make the manual a
self-learning package. Dr Simeon Ehui, Head of the Socio-economic Sciences Division at ILCA, read
the manual for its correctness and provided valuable technical assistance. Ato Tekleab Habte Michael
typeset the text and prepared the camera-ready pages.
We recognise that the manual will benefit from further improvements and we will appreciate
comments and suggestions from users and future participants in the livestock policy course. However,
it is hoped that, even in its present form, the manual will prove helpful to the managers, researchers,
faculty members and students who are already involved or who intend to become involved in policy
analysis and policy formulation work. Suggestions and comments for improvement are most welcome.
Dr M E Smalley




This manual is part of ILCA's efforts to prepare appropriate materials for each of ILCA's training
courses. The manual has nine course modules, the main text of which serve as lecture notes for the
Livestock Policy Analysis Course. Reference lists have been included at the end of each module.
The nine modules deal with:
the definition of policy concepts
the identification of policy issues
production systems, supply and demand
market, price and trade policies
marketing and distribution systems
principles of budget and manpower planning
land tenure
report writing and communication
a central case study.
Several design features have been incorporated to make the manual easy to use. All modules
begin with a statement of performance objectives. This provides instructors and participants with an
overview of what participants are expected to have learned at the completion of each module. Second,
examples, practice exercises and important points are provided throughout. Third, at the end of each
module, feedback exercises are provided. These are intended to help participants gauge the level of
their understanding of key ideas contained in each module.
In addition, important concepts are highlighted in bold type. Boxes are used to develop some
of these concepts in greater depth. The main text is also punctuated by "hints to instructors". These
consist mainly of additional points that are interesting or important, but which, for reasons of
simplicity and space, are not dealt with at length in the text.
Module 9 contains a central case study of the hypothetical country Alphabeta. The module is
intended to provide a concrete illustration of the problems and concepts introduced in the lecture
notes. It uses data drawn from several African countries, and as such, is a composite. Some of the
boxes found within individual modules use material from the central case study to support points
made in the lecture notes. Exercises found in individual modules also use the central case study as
a reference.
It is hoped that readers find the manual useful and interesting.
In addition to scientists' contributions, several individuals contributed to the preparation of the
manual. My special thanks go to three secretaries, Sosena Tilahun, Brucktayet W. Mariam and Tsige
Amare and graphic artists Mandefro H. Giorgis and Abdulhakeem Mohammed for their valuable
assistance.




Module 1: Policy Concepts
 
1.1 Performance objectives
1.2 The importance of policy issues
1.3 Definition of policy
1.4 Elements in policy
1.5 Policy processes
1.6 Policy and politics
1.7 Priorities in policy formulation
1.8 The role of the policy analyst
1.9 Feedback exercises
1.10 References
1 .1 Performance objectives
Module 1 is intended to enable you to:
1 . Discuss the importance of policy issues in the livestock subsector of sub-Saharan Africa.
2. Generate an appropriate definition of the term "policy".
3. List two main elements of a policy.
4. Identify two important stages in the process of policy action.
5. Justify why politics and politicians are central to policy issues.
6. Describe appropriate applications of resources and priorities in policy formulation.
7. List seven important roles of the policy analyst.
1.2 The importance of policy issues
The performance of the livestock subsector and of agriculture in general in sub-Saharan Africa has
been poor over the past two decades, and is getting worse. Output of livestock products has grown
only slowly, exports and per caput consumption have declined and imports have risen, at a time when
sub-Saharan Africa can ill afford such trends. Table l.l provides performance data on the livestock
subsector by region of sub-Saharan Africa for the years 1975-87.














Beef 1.5 2.7 2.7 0.9 0.2
All meat 2.5 3.9 1.7 1.8 1.3
Cow milk (q) 3.1 1.5 1.3 3.7 3.0
Per caput consumption (q)
Beef -0.9 -0.2 1.6 -1.9 -0.8
All meat -0.4 0.7 0.4 -1.1 -0.4
Dairy products 0.2 -1.5 1.5 1.2 0.1
Imports (v)
Beef -0.4 -0.5 -1.4 !.[ 0.2
All meat -0.5 -0.5 -1.4 1.2 0.2
Dairy products 3.9 1.2 7.3 12.1 4.9
Exports (v)
Beef - - - - -
All meat -4.6 -22.2 -45.1 -14.3 -2.7
Source: JLCA (1993).
q = quantity; v = value.
The causes of this poor performance are complex, and differ from country to country. In
general, four conditions are essential for satisfactory progress in the livestock subsector:
• adequate resources, both physical (land, labour, good weather) and financial
• new technology to improve productivity
• suitable institutions (for research, extension, marketing, credit etc)
• appropriate policies, both in the economy as a whole and in the livestock subsector.
All or nearly all of these conditions have remained unfulfilled in most countries of sub-Saharan
Africa over the past two decades. This makes it difficult to pinpoint exactly how important a
contributory factor poor policies have been. Nevertheless, there is some evidence. A 1982 study of
30 livestock projects in sub-Saharan Africa financed by a major donor over the previous 15 years
revealed that for more than 75% of the projects, policy issues external to them had been major factors
leading to poor performance. In addition, two arguments may be adduced:
• Policy issues and approaches tend to be very similar in the livestock subsector to those in other
agricultural subsectors (food and cash crops). There is now a substantial body of evidence to
show that policies have been a major determinant of progress or the lack of it in these other
subsectors; it seems highly probable that the same will be true for livestock.
• An internal review by ILCA of the published evidence throughout the world on the factors
determining progress in livestock production indicated the very large influence of economic
factors such as prices (which are heavily influenced by policy) in comparison with technology
or other factors. What is true of the world in general is probably also true of Africa.
In short, inappropriate policies have not been the only cause of poor performance, but they
have been an important one.
1 .3 Definition of policy
The word "policy" is not a tightly defined concept but a highly flexible one, used in different ways
on different occasions. Webster's dictionary has a number of closely related definitions. They are:
• A definite course or method of action selected (by government, institution, group or individual)
from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and, usually, to determine
present and future decisions.
• A specific decision or set of decisions designed to carry out such a course of action.
• Such a specific decision or set of decisions together with the related actions designed to
implement them.
• A projected programme consisting of desired objectives and the means to achieve them.
In English usage, policies are "made" and "implemented" in the same way that decisions are
made and implemented. Yet it is possible to have policies that are not or cannot be implemented, so
that, conceptually, actions that implement policies need not necessarily be part of policy itself.
Although a policy is like a decision, it is not just a "one-off, independent decision. A policy
is a set of coherent decisions with a common long-term purpose(s). When decisions are one-off,
incoherent or opportunistic, complaints are made that a government or minister "does not have a
policy". Government policies are often supported by special legislation.
The terms "policy", "plan", "programme" and "project" are progressively more specific in time
and place. Policies are usually national policies (not district or provincial) and are not normally
limited in time: one does not usually speak in terms of "2-year policies" as one does of "2-year
programmes" or "5-year plans".
For the purposes of this manual, livestock policy will be defined as:
A coherent set of decisions with a common long-term objective (or objectives) affecting or
relevant to the livestock subsector.
In the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, livestock policy may mean either a complete package of
decisions covering all aspects of the livestock subsector or a particular set of decisions dealing with
a single aspect. Examples of the former are the Livestock Policy of Tanzania (1983) and the National
Livestock Development Policy of Kenya (1980). Examples of the latter are:
• Livestock-related land-tenure policies, such as the Tribal Grazing Land Policy of Botswana,
or the policies and related laws covering grazing reserves in Nigeria or group ranches in Kenya.
• Pricing policies, such as those embodied in the purchase prices established by the Cold Storage
Commission in Zimbabwe or the Meat Commission in Kenya.
• Disease-control policies, as for foot-and-mouth disease in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Kenya.
1.4 Elements in policy
When analysing government policy, it is often helpful to distinguish between two elements which
are essential parts of any policy. These elements are:
• Policy objectives. These are the "ends" of a policy and reflect the overall purpose or long-term
aim(s); they are what the policy is intended to achieve (e.g. more beef exports or fairer access
to grazing lands).
• Policy instruments. These are the "means" of a policy, the actions used to carry it out and
the methods by which its objectives are achieved (e.g. import tariffs on dairy products or a
subsidy on an artificial insemination service).
The distinction is useful because the same objective can often be served by several alternative
instruments. It is only by distinguishing between objectives and instruments that one can begin to
assess the relative efficiency of different instruments. Conversely, a single policy instrument may
affect several policy objectives. For example, an instrument used to raise dairy prices will normally
affect the welfare of producers and consumers as well as the level of milk production.
1.5 Policy processes
In order to define the role of policy analysis, we need to distinguish between two major processes.
These are:
• Policy formulation, defined as the process of considering alternative policy options and
deciding to implement one or several of them.
• Policy implementation, defined as the process of carrying out the policy (or policies) decided
on during the formulation stage.
Within policy formulation, we can further distinguish between policy analysis and policy
making. Policy analysis is the process of investigating issues and options, and of drawing up and
comparing different proposals. Policy making, on the other hand, is the act of deciding which
objectives should be met and selecting the instruments by which to do so.
Corresponding to these processes are the people who carry them out, namely:
• policy formulators: policy analysts and policy makers
• policy implementers.
These are not necessarily different people. The same person may analyse policy, make it and
then implement it. However, in doing so, he or she is carrying out distinct roles. Awareness of these
roles, and an ability to separate them, are important for everyone involved in policy work.
 
Important points (1.2-1.5)
• Performance of the livestock subsector in sub-Saharan Africa has been poor over the last
two decades.
• Four conditions are essential for satisfactory progress in the livestock subsector: resources,
technology, suitable institutions and policies. Inappropriate policies have been major factors
in the poor growth of the subsector.
• The term policy refers to a set of decisions and related action to implement them.
• Two basic elements of a policy are:
♦ policy objectives
♦ policy instruments.
• Policy processes involve two major steps:
♦ policy formulation
♦ policy implementation.
Policy formulation is further subdivided into policy analysis and policy making.
1.6 Policy and politics
The purpose of policy is to affect the real world. To do this, political realities must be fully taken
into account. While imagination—and even a degree of daring—may be vital ingredients at the policy
formulation stage, there is no point in proposing a policy which is bound to be rejected for political
reasons. Policy proposals will not be accepted—and policies will not be effective—unless they have
the support of prominent politicians and interest groups. Policy analysts must understand and take
into account the concerns of politicians if viable policies are to be formulated. Politics and politicians
are, in fact, central to policy issues and should not be viewed as irritating side-issues, to be ignored
whenever possible.
1.7 Priorities in policy formulation
The formulation of good policy is not a matter of random chance, but a skill which can be learned.
It is also a skill which requires scarce resources to practise. Three main types of scarce resources
are required:
• the ability and time of policy analysts to identify issues and options with an understanding of
their probable consequences;
• the ability, attention and time of policy makers who must understand the issues involved if
they are to make sound decisions;
• other political and bureaucratic resources to bring about necessary legislation and political or
financial support for a policy decision or its effective implementation, viz:
♦ bureaucratic resources such as "legal draftsmen" or "project planners" and
♦ political resources such as support from politically influential people or organisations.
For policy formulation to be effective, it is important to recognise at the outset that too many
policy issues cannot be tackled simultaneously. It is essential that the most important issues be tackled
first and that priorities be firmly established. The danger is that governments will utilise scarce
resources on issues which are relatively unimportant.
1 .8 The role of the policy analyst
In the case of the livestock subsector, the tasks of policy analysis can be described as follows:
to identify and prioritise policy issues
to clarify government policy objectives relevant to the livestock subsector and to identify
potential conflicts in terms of objectives and interests
to identify current policies and their consequences
to identify alternative viable policy instruments, their probable direct and indirect consequences
and the risk that these may not materialise
to develop criteria and indicators to assess progress towards objectives
to design viable policy packages, with associated strategies to obtain political support and to
ensure organisational effectiveness
to advocate these viable policy packages in a clear, brief and persuasive way.
In essence, the task of the policy analyst is to help the policy maker take difficult decisions
n areas that are often contentious. Senior policy makers must understand the issues involved if they
are to make sound decisions. The policy analyst must be able to create and convey that understanding
quickly and clearly.
 Important points (1 .6-1 .8)
• Politicians cannot be ignored while formulating implementable policies.
• Three important types of people during the policy formulation stage are:
♦ policy analysts
♦ policy makers
♦ politicians and bureaucrats.
• Prioritising policy issues is essential in utilising scarce resources effectively.
• Two major responsibilities of the policy analyst are to:
♦ review government policies and design viable policy packages
♦ help policy makers take appropriate decisions on sensitive issues.
1 .9 Feedback exercises
All answers can be found in the text.
I.
b.
It is generally stated that the performance of the livestock subsector in sub-Saharan





Two important conditions for satisfactory progress in agriculture are:
i) availability of appropriate technology
ii) existence of appropriate policies
What could be the two other conditions?
iii)
iv)
Circle T for True and F for False.
i) ILCA's review of published research shows that inappropriate policies have retarded
progress in the livestock subsector more than the lack of appropriate technologies.
T F
ii) Policy may be defined as a set of decisions with or without related actions designed to
implement them.
T F
iii) A policy is not different from a decision in a real sense; it is a "one-off independent
decision".
T F
iv) Two main elements of policy are policy objectives and policy instruments.
T F
v) Policy formulation constitutes the main step of policy processes while policy analysis is
just a formality.
T F
3. Fill in the blank spaces.
i) The formulation of good policy is not an easy task. It requires meaningful participation
of policy analysts, , political persons and .
ii) If policy issues are not properly prioritised, the danger is that government may utilise
resources on .
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Module 2 is intended to enable you to:
1 . Recall four guiding factors in identifying key policy issues on which to concentrate.
2. Discuss the importance of current livestock sector functions in framing new policies and suggest two
ways to classify these functions.
3. Explain the terms "non-economic motivation" and "economic motivation" in the context of framing
a new policy restricting herd size of agropastoralists and mixed farmers.
4. List three approaches to differentiating between economic and non-economic reasons for a farmer
to increase herd size.
5. Describe five main categories of economic policy objectives common to all governments.
6. Differentiate between declared and undeclared government objectives by citing specific examples.
7. Explain the role of policy analysts in resolving the complexities ofdeclared and undeclared objectives
and also in guiding the policy maker to choose sound objectives.
8. Recall a simple qualitative method to assess the livestock sector's current performance in terms of
each of the five broad policy objective groups.
9. Describe three main steps involved in monitoring quantitatively the performance of each policy
objective.
10. Discuss identification of policy instruments used to tackle policy issues or problems.
2.2 Introduction
Module 1 stressed the need to identify the most important policy issues on which to concentrate.
Module 2 provides guidance on how this can be done. Every African country has, to some extent,
its own particular problems and priorities. Nevertheless, there is sufficient similarity amongst them
to make it possible and useful to draw up common principles for prioritisation.
The simple principle for prioritisation is that one should concentrate on those issues which are
inherently most important and where changes in policy are likely to have the most effect. In the end,
selecting particular policy issues to concentrate on must be a matter of judgement rather than a wholly
objective calculation from facts. Nevertheless, exercising judgement will be less arbitrary and more
efficient if the factual groundwork has first been well done. Essentially, this is a matter of knowing
one's livestock sector, particularly in terms of its current functions, its future roles, how well it will
perform without policy change and the scope for policy change.
For any particular country, we can tackle this in a straightforward way by systematically asking:
• What function(s) is the livestock sector currently serving, and are there major functional
differences among regions, ethnic groups or social and economic classes?
• What objectives is the livestock sector expected to achieve in the future? Are there major
incompatibilities between present functions and future objectives or among the objectives of
different interest groups, e.g. government and pastoralists?
• How well is the livestock sector performing in terms of its present functions or objectives?
• If performance is already, or is likely to prove, inadequate, what alternative policy instruments
are available to improve it?
It is not possible to formulate just one single rule or procedure for deciding whether a particular
issue is more important than another; but by asking and answering the questions set out above, the
scope for disagreement or uncertainty about relative importance can be reduced. In doing so, one
can add greatly to the clarity of the debate about policies. For example, a discussion about the relative
priority to be given to milk or beef production will be much better focused if all parties know in
which regions of the country the growth of milk output in recent years has outstripped beef production,
and vice versa.
2.3 Functions of the livestock sector
It is necessary to know the present functions of the livestock sector in order to gauge how well it
is performing in relation to policy objectives, and to ensure that new policies designed to achieve
new objectives do not, unintentionally or to an unexpected degree, disrupt the performance of existing
socially desirable functions. Analysts should be aware of the multiple functions of livestock and of
the complex relationships between those functions. They should know which functions are important
to which social classes or ethnic groups in which areas of their country. They should understand the
different kinds of production systems found in their country and how those systems are changing
over time. Finally, they should understand that expanding the output of one function may diminish
the output of another.
2.3.1 Two ways to classify livestock sector functions
A first step in the classification process is to quantify the relative importance of different present
functions as a prelude to judging how much they may be disrupted by new policies. Livestock sector
function(s) can be classified in several ways. However, two widely used classifications are
conceptualised in terms of:
• kinds of output produced
• uses to which these outputs are put.
l()
Among the kinds of output produced are: food (i.e. meat, milk, eggs); inputs to cropping (i.e.
manure and farm power in the form of animal traction); and raw materials (e.g. wool and skins to
make other goods). Among output uses are: subsistence consumption by the livestock holder's
household; direct supply of inputs (e.g. traction and manure to crop production); cash income through
sales of live animals or their output; savings and investment through increasing the size and quality
of the herd; and social functions such as paying bride wealth, helping destitute families by lending
them livestock or providing animals for communal feasts or sacrifices.
2.3.2 Relative importance of livestock sector functions in sub-Saharan
Africa
Table 2.1 shows, for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and for different geographical regions within it,
the relative importance during the late 1970s of different kinds of outputs when these are calculated
in terms of monetary value. The table shows that for sub-Saharan Africa, meat is the most valuable
output, accounting for 47% of the total. Of this meat, beef accounts for 57% and small ruminant
meat for 22%. The second most valuable output is animal traction, accounting for 31%; milk, the
third most valuable output, accounts for 15%. At the same time, regional variations in terms of the
relative contributions of outputs can be noted. For example, animal traction is very important in East
Africa but is much less so in other regions.
Table 2.1. Share ofdifferent kinds ofoutput ofthe total livestock output in sub-Saharan Africa and its regions.
Kind of output1











Animal traction 21 3 39 26 31
Manure 4 1 3 2 3
Meat 56 79 38 58 47
Milk 11 12 17 9 15
Eggs 8 5 3 5 4
Total % 100 100 100 100 100
Total value (US$ millions) 1460 349 3747 930 6486
Source: Addis Anteneh et al (1988).
1 Excludes hides, skins, wool and slaughterhouse by-products.
2 Share of output in 1975 US$ at uniform continent-wide prices.
Table 2.2 presents sample-based data on types of output in a mixed peasant farming system
in the Ethiopian highlands. It also presents data on the use to which livestock output is put. Note
the importance of livestock in generating cash for the farm (responsible for 87% of farm cash income),
even though only a small proportion (24%) of the gross value of livestock output is sold for cash.
Note also the importance, in overall livestock output, of the value of its contribution of inputs, in
the form of animal traction and manure, to cropping. As stated earlier, policies can have unintended
(and potentially adverse) effects. The data provided in Table 2.2 indicates how policy could negatively
affect the welfare of certain groups. For example, policy changes intended to produce higher quality
meat for export, which ignored the role of livestock in providing inputs into the farm and generating
cash, could run into severe problems in terms of both peasant acceptance and domestic food security.
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Table 2.2. Types and uses of livestock output in the Ethiopian highlands, 1979-83.
Gross value of livestock output
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Annual
average
2Food output of ruminants 301 340 397 401 427 373
Crop inputs 584 621 591 661 788 649
Raw materials 19 22 33 26 30 26
Others5 330 249 542 424 341 377
Total 1234 1232 1563 1512 1586 1425
Uses of livestock output
Sold for cash 230 412 432 274 334 336
Crop inputs used on farm 552 589 542 612 739 607
Raw materials used on farm 7 7 15 15 15 12
Other outputs consumed or retained on farm 445 224 574 611 498 470
Total 1234 1232 1563 1512 1586 1425
Investment in livestock
Value of livestock held 1343 1375 1491 1522 1850 1516
No. livestock held (TLU)6 5.9 6.6 6.8 7.3 7.9 6.9
Some ratios (%)
Livestock gross output/farm gross output 60 43 50 55 50 51
Livestock cash income/farm cash income 90 84 82 85 96 87
Livestock cash income/livestock gross output 19 33 28 18 21 24
Source: Gryseels (1988).
1 Value in Ethiopian Birr per farm.
2 Milk, butter, meat and live animals sold.
3 Manure and animal traction including transport of products and feed.
4 Wool, hides and skins.
5 Residual category includes eggs, chicken, value of young stock born and unidentified items.
6 TLU = tropical livestock unit of 250 kg live weight. The TLU is a common unit in which different kinds of
livestock (cattle, small ruminants etc) can be compared.
Box 2.1: Construction of regional output tables.
It would be relatively simple to construct tables similar to Table 2.1 for different regions within
a country. To do so, one would need to have data for the different regions on:
Size (numbers) of total regional herds (flocks).
Sex and age composition of herds (flocks).
Offtake rates for slaughter of different ages/sex.
Live weights at slaughter of different ages/sex and dressing-out percentages.
Milk yields per lactation.
Calving rates and lengths of lactations; or, if there is no marked seasonality, proportion of




• Meat or liveweight and milk prices (see module 4 for further discussion of which prices to
use).
• Area (ha) cultivated by animal traction and the per ha rental cost of such cultivation; or
number of ploughing animals (e.g. oxen), number of days on average worked per year and
daily hire charge per animal.
• Value of manure; this might be expressed in terms of quantity of manure (e.g. US$ per
half-tonne cart-load) or of animal-nights, where, under contractual arrangements, for a fee,
animals are kept in night enclosures to fertilise fields.
It is more difficult to construct reliable tables, such as Table 2.2, showing how total output is
allocated to different uses. However, while accurate data are always desirable, even quite rough
guesses yield interesting insights. Table 2.3 shows examples where the mixed farming system
of the Ethiopian highlands is compared to a pastoral system. Such regional comparisons are
useful not only in terms of identifying functions of various outputs across different production
systems, they also help analysts define the potential impact of their policies amongst these
varied systems.
Table 2.3. Types and uses of livestock output in two systems in Ethiopia.
Highland system Pastoral system




















Uses of livestock output by value (%)
Sold for cash
(within which exported)
Crop inputs used on farm
Other raw materials used on farm
Other outputs consumed or retained on farm
Total
Some ratios (%) by value:
Livestock gross output/farm gross output
Livestock cash income/farm cash income
Livestock cash income/livestock gross output
Source: Table 2.2 and ILCA (unpublished data).
2.3.3 Farmers' tendency to increase herd size: An important policy issue
Non-economic motivation vs economic motivation
One issue with policy implications is the tendency of African pastoralists and mixed farmers to invest
their savings in increasing herd size. This investment may take the form of purchasing additional
animals or allowing "natural" measures (i.e. births into the herd exceed deaths and other exits) to
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take their course. The tendency to increase herd size is often attributed to "non-economic motivation",
in particular to the prestige and status which large herds imply and to the need for large payments
of bride wealth. Because governments are worried about desertification caused by overstocking, they
tend to be unsympathetic to these non-economic motivations and to feel they should compel
stockholders to limit their herd sizes.
Let us, for the moment, accept that some individuals or groups increase their herd size for
"economic reasons" and others for "non-economic motivations" and that governments may be more
justified in interfering to control the latter than the former. In a particular situation, how do we decide
the relative importance of different forms of motivation? The first step is to find out the actual size
of the herd. Knowing the average herd size is not very useful since herd sizes often vary enormously
between families and the motivations of the wealthy may be quite different from those of the poor.
Thus, we need to know the statistical distribution of herd sizes.
Because households with large herd sizes often have more persons than households with small
herds, it may also be useful to know the distribution of herd sizes per person as well as, or instead
of, per household. Table 2.4 presents examples of herd size distributions per household and per
person. The appendix of this module shows how to compare the relative distribution of herd sizes
in two situations, using Lorenz curves.
Table 2.4. Household size and distribution ofcattle holdings in north-eastern Senegal.
Herd size group (number of cattle)
0-9 10-24 25^19 50-99 100+ Total
Percentage of households 21 27 22 17 13 100
Percentage of people 19 26 22 18 15 100
Percentage of cattle 1 9 17 27 46 100
Average number of people/household 7.6 7.9 8.3 9.2 9.4 8.3
Average number of cattle/household 3 15 33 71 146 43
Source: Sutter (1987).
One reason why pastoralists and farmers in Africa invest their savings in livestock is that,
because of unreliable weather, their farm output fluctuates enormously from year to year. Therefore,
part of the income made in good years needs to be kept in an easily cashable form (in "liquid assets")
so that, in bad years, it can be used to purchase essential food for the family. Banking services are
not well developed in rural Africa and investment in livestock is often the next-best alternative.
Livestock can easily be converted into cash and earns a return. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship,
over six years, between the yields of the main cereal crop (barley) and the number of small ruminants
kept by peasants in the Ethiopian highlands. The figure demonstrates that, in the year after a poor
barley yield, the number of small ruminants declined as lambs were sold in order to generate cash
to purchase grain. In deciding whether investment takes place for economic or non-economic reasons,
one needs to take into account this pattern of offsetting investment and encashment.
Approaches to determine non-economic and economic motivations
Three main approaches may be used to help us decide whether investment in increasing herd size
arises from economic or non-economic motivations. Specifically:
• Assess the minimum herd size necessary to support the dependent population at a particular
standard of living.
• Examine herd management efficiency and ratio of return.
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Figure 2.1. Crop yield and holding ofsmall ruminants in the highlands ofEthiopia, 1979-85.


























• Verify, by surveys, the validity of claims that herd-size increases are for non-economic (e.g.
social, political, cultural) reasons.
Each of these will be discussed in turn. However, it should be noted that economic and
non-economic motivations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Both may be operating at the same
time. In addition, as the following points will demonstrate, it is not always easy to identify whether
economic or non-economic motives are guiding farmer decisions to increase herd size.
Minimum herd size. Dahl and Hjort (1976) showed that in a typical pastoral society, wholly
dependent on food obtained from their own herds, a minimum of 10-11 cattle (or their equivalent
in other kinds of livestock) per person is required to provide the necessary calorie intake to support
life. Sandford (1982) estimated that in mixed farming systems in Zimbabwe, where it is difficult to
buy draft oxen, a minimum herd size of 8-10 cattle is required by a household. With this number,
the household can breed replacement oxen so that it can survive as an independent farming unit.
This suggests that households which are striving to increase their herd size, but have yet to reach
the minimum required, are operating from purely economic motivation. Conversely, for those whose
herd size exceeds the minimum, non-economic motives may be operating. Table 2.5, showing the
proportions of households to cattle in a farming system in Zimbabwe, demonstrates who, by this
criterion, are subject to economic or non-economic motivation, respectively. Obviously this criterion
is an extremely severe one in restricting the definition of economic motivation.
Table 2.5. Distribution ofcattle holdings in Wedza District, Zimbabwe, 1982.
Herd size (head of cattle)
1-3 4-6 7-9 10-19 20-29 30+ Total
Proportion of cattle holders with this size herd 36











The box within Table 2.5 indicates the proportion of cattle holders who may be operating for
non-economic reasons.
Herd management efficiency and ratio of return. This approach examines the way in which herds
are managed and the returns to investment they offer to the owner. Evidence from Kenya, as shown
in Table 2.6, can be used to illustrate this point. The table indicates that wealthier households (i.e.
those with more livestock per household member) with larger herds milk their animals less intensively
and extract less output from them than medium and poor households. This provides, at first sight,
some evidence that wealthier families may be less "economically motivated" than medium or poor
households. Yet the complexity of the issue is illustrated by the lower half of the table which shows
that, although less time per animal is spent on livestock management by wealthy than by other
households, the actual time spent per person in managing animals is more. It is possible, therefore,
that the lower economic output of the wealthy households' herds reflects not so much lack of economic
motivation as an acute labour constraint.
Table 2.6. Economic output and labour input by wealth ofhousehold among the Maasai in Kenya, 1981-83.
Household wealth category
Pc
Mean herd size (no. of TLU )
Percentage of lactating cows actually milked
Gross value of output per TLU in the herd (Kenya shillings/year)
Net return (% yearly) on capital invested in livestock
(result of long-term simulation model)
Hours spent managing livestock:
per TLU
per male adult worker
per household
Source: Solomon Bekure et al (1991).
1 TLU = tropical livestock unit of 250 kg live weight.
Verification of non-economic motivations. One way to test the validity of claims that large herds
are kept for non-economic reasons, such as payment of bride wealth, is to examine what proportion
of the herd has actually been subjected to these transactions. Evidence from Zimbabwe (Sandford,
1982) suggested that bride wealth (lobola) accounted for only about 5% of transactions in male cattle











• In prioritising policy issues, knowledge of one's livestock sector is essential in terms of:
♦ its current functions
♦ its future objectives
♦ its current performance and problems
♦ the scope of policy change.
• Knowledge of current functions helps ensure that new policies do not disrupt the
performance of existing desirable functions.
• Livestock sector functions are classified in terms of:
♦ kinds of outputs
♦ the use of these outputs.
♦ Important points (2.2-2.3) cont...
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 Important points (2.2-2.3) cont.
The relative importance of the livestock sector's present functions in sub-Saharan Africa in
terms of kinds of output and uses of outputs are:
♦ kinds of output: meat, traction and milk
♦ uses of outputs: crop inputs used on farm, household consumption, cash income through
sale and raw material.
Restricting the tendency of farmers to increase herd size is an important policy issue for
African governments.
The tendency of farmers to invest savings in increasing the size of their herds could be due
to both economic and non-economic motivations.
Three approaches to deciding if the tendency for farmers to increase herd size is due to
non-economic or economic motivations are:
♦ assessing the minimum herd size needed to support the dependent population
♦ calculating herd management efficiency and ratio of return
♦ verifying, by surveys, the validity of claims that herd increases are for non-economic
(e.g. social, political, cultural) reasons.
2.4 National policy objectives
A key step in identifying the most important policy issues on which to concentrate is to identify the
government's own policy objectives and to gain some idea of the relative importance of each of these
objectives. While they are sometimes difficult to prioritise, a rough ranking is both possible and
essential if overall policy is to be effective and not deflected by internal or external interest groups.
Government objectives for the livestock subsector are determined partly by an overall political
philosophy and partly through an assessment of the direction and speed at which change in the current
functions of the subsector is desired.
2.4.1 The broad groupings of government policy objectives
The terms in which governments state their objectives vary in each country. However, most objectives
can be classified as falling into one of five broad groups:
• independence objectives
• economic efficiency objectives
• resource conservation objectives
• stability objectives
• equity objectives.
Independence objectives are concerned with obtaining and preserving a satisfactory degree
of political and economic autonomy. Independence implies that a country neither depends on foreign
aid to meet the basic needs of its population nor is susceptible to external political interference (the
former is often linked to the latter). Meeting the independence objective requires a high degree of
self-reliance, in the sense that a country will wish either to be entirely self-sufficient in basic food
commodities or to dispose of sufficient foreign exchange to meet part of its demand through imports.
"Self-sufficiency" in all basic foodstuffs, meaning that the country produces domestically enough to
meet its entire demand, is sometimes advocated. But self-sufficiency in this sense can involve very
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high costs if the country does not have the natural or other resources to produce a particular food
commodity at low cost. It may be better to produce some other (e.g. non-food) commodity for which
it does have the appropriate resources and to sell that to raise the foreign exchange to buy the food
commodity. This point is dealt with in more detail in module 4.
Economic efficiency objectives (hereafter just "efficiency") are concerned with increasing the
level of real national income and its growth rate over time. Economic efficiency is a very complex
concept and only some aspects of it will be discussed in this manual. Efficiency implies that a country
use existing, and generate new, technology to minimise costs per unit of output, and seek a
combination of outputs consistent with its comparative advantage in the international market.
Efficiency will usually be closely related to the appropriateness of price signals conveyed through
the market mechanism. Government intervention often distorts these signals, resulting in a
mis-allocation of resources within the economy. However, the market mechanism alone will not
necessarily lead to optimum long-term development. Carefully thought out government interventions
are often needed to ensure that the conditions for long-term efficiency are fulfilled.
Resource conservation objectives are concerned with preserving the natural resource base in
order to ensure long-term efficiency and independence. These objectives are of particular importance
to African livestock policy makers because of serious environmental problems, such as overgrazing,
often attributed to livestock.
Stability objectives are concerned with avoiding abrupt and large changes in incomes, in the
price and availability of domestically produced basic commodities and inputs, and in the consequent
need for foreign exchange to buy essential imports. Since stability is rarely secured without cost,
absolute stability of prices and quantities should not be the aim. Indeed, absolute price stability when
production is inherently unstable can worsen both supply problems and farmer viability. Nor should
food security be confused with self-sufficiency in the production of all food types. Agricultural
markets, in particular, are inherently unstable. As a result, agricultural policy should be directed
towards achieving an adequate degree of stability.
Equity objectives are concerned with the fair distribution of income and wealth within society.
Important equity considerations in relation to agriculture and livestock include the distribution of
income and assets among different types of farms within and among regions, and the allocation of
land use rights between producers. The equity objective also concerns the relative well-being of
producers and consumers, the distribution of purchasing power between different groups of consumers
and the availability of employment opportunities. The market process alone will not normally lead
to greater equity. Indeed, it may actually increase inequity, especially when the status quo is already
inequitable or when economic power is becoming increasingly concentrated. Improving equity is,
ostensibly, considered essential to policy formulation in many African countries.
These five broad classes will account for the declared objectives of most governments and can
be gauged from public statements and documents such as national development plans. Table 2.7
shows the results of one investigation into what goals the governments of selected African countries
claim to be pursuing in their livestock sectors. In the second column of Table 2.7 these goals have
been reclassified to match the broad groups of objectives set out above. However, analysts will often
find that specifying the real objectives underlying current policy is not as simple as this. The objectives
actually pursued by policy makers may differ from the government's declared objectives. These real
or undeclared objectives can often only be identified from the day-to-day decisions made by
governments.
Perhaps the most frequently encountered and best known example of an undeclared objective
is evinced by fixing food prices at levels that favour urban consumers rather than rural producers.
While governments publicly espouse equity, efficiency or independence, their real objective may be
self-preservation which could favour the interests of certain groups over others.
A government's real objectives may thus be at variance with its declared objectives. Moreover,
whether declared or undeclared, governments' objectives may be incompatible with those of certain
social groups or classes, whose interests may, in turn, also clash. Political reality is such that
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governments are frequently "captured" by interest groups which, through their superior wealth, power
or ability to organise, have developed greater political leverage. Thus, in Africa, urban consumers of
livestock products often have greater leverage than rural mixed farmers who account for the bulk of
production. These, in turn, tend to have more influence than the pastoral groups, who produce less,
are fewer in number and inhabit more remote areas.







babweEthiopia Mali Nigeria Sudan
Self-sufficiency (a) X X X X X X
Export promotion (b) X X X X
Stabilisation and inflation control (d) X X X X X
Government revenue generation (b, X X X X X X
Improved nutrition (c) X X
Employment creation (e) X X X
Source: Williams (1993).
1 Broad objective categories: (a) independence; (b) economic efficiency; (c) resource conservation; (d) stability;
e) equity.
2.4.2 Ranking policy objectives
It will frequently fall to the livestock policy analyst to unravel the complexities resulting from the
co-existence of declared and undeclared objectives. For instance, the analyst may find that one set
of policy instruments, geared to a declared objective, has been overlaid by another, geared to an
undeclared objective. Both sets of instruments are in force, but each counteracts the other.
The analyst's job will be to clarify, by specifying which instruments are directed towards which
objectives, by pointing out the incompatibility between government objectives and those of specific
groups/classes and by identifying the extent of any conflicts. The analyst may also be asked to find
ways in which conflicts can be reduced. For example, he or she might suggest that government stop
pursuing a universal low-price policy favouring all consumers and develop instead a system of direct
transfers in cash or kind to particularly vulnerable consumer groups.
In some cases, conflicts between different interest groups may appear more pronounced than
they really are, owing to the use of inappropriate past policies. Conflicts of this kind can sometimes
be redressed through policy reform. In other cases, giving one group what it wants will inevitably
mean taking something away from another group, and difficult choices will have to be made.
It is the policy maker's job to make these choices. The analyst's role is to present the policy
maker with alternatives, showing the costs and benefits to different groups implied by each alternative
and pointing out the trade-offs between different objectives. For instance, one alternative might imply
meeting the resource conservation objective, but at great cost in terms of equity; another alternative
might imply enhanced independence in the short term, but depleted resources (and hence reduced
independence and efficiency) over the longer term. It is also the analyst's role to try to identify the
policy makers' rough ranking in respect to the different objectives. Experienced politicians may be
able to state these explicitly in private. The less experienced may be either unable or unwilling to
specify priorities. A skilful analyst is one who can deduce the policy makers' real preferences, either
from analysing their past decisions or by presenting choices in a sufficiently concrete way for policy
makers to see the necessity and implications of their choices.
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2.5 Current performance and problems
The logical next step in identifying the most important policy issues is to assess the sector's current
performance in terms of each objective. At this stage, no particularly complex or detailed analysis
is required; that may come later when the key issues have been identified. Rather, a broad monitoring
system that keeps an eye over the whole field will suffice.
2.5.1 Qualitative monitoring
At a very basic level, performance can be monitored simply in terms of the presence or absence of
easily identifiable "problems" formulated mainly in qualitative rather than in quantitative terms. Since
most people and politicians conceive of policy issues in terms of "problems" rather than "unfulfilled
objectives", this approach has much to recommend it. We list below some of the most commonly
perceived problems. Table 2.8 sets out the probable relationship between these problems and the
broad groups of objectives already discussed.
• inadequate supplies of livestock products to the consumer (queues and empty shelves at shops,
black markets, sky-rocketing prices)
• excessive dependence on imports of livestock products
• unproductive resources (under-utilised or low yielding land or livestock)
• desertification (erosion, overgrazing etc)
• unstable supplies and consumption (due to weather conditions, disease outbreaks etc)
• inefficient livestock services (e.g. animal health, feed supplies, artificial insemination, water
supplies)
• distorted prices (too high or too low, discriminatory, excessive marketing margins)
• inadequate market outlets (too few, unreliable, do not cater for some products)
• undesirable concentration of livestock ownership
• unfair pattern of access to land (between livestock holders, or between pastoralists and
cultivators).
Table 2.8. The probable relationships between policy problems and policy objectives.
Problems
Objectives Indepen- Effi- Resource
dence ciency conservation Stability Equity
Inadequate supplies -' 2 -
Excessive imports — +/-3
Unproductive resource +/-
Desertification —
Unstable supplies - -
Inefficient services - -
Distorted prices -
Inadequate markets - -
Concentrated livestock ownership +/- +/-
Unfair access to land +/- +/-
1 One negative(-) indicates a negative relationship.
2 Double negatives (—) indicate a strong negative relationship.
3 Positive and negative signs together (+/-) indicate that the relationship may be either positive or negative.
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2.5.2 Quantitative monitoring
More sophisticated performance monitoring of the livestock sector is both desirable and possible. For
each broad group of policy objectives, there are three main steps to monitoring performance:
• Set up one or more fairly simple quantifiable criteria for evaluating performance.
• Establish a minimum level of performance which is regarded as "acceptable", i.e. one which
does not require priority attention to rectify.
Identify existing sources of data, or generate new data, with which to measure the performance
of a particular country's livestock sector.
Setting up quantifiable criteria
Box 2.2 gives an example of how a particular criterion could be made to work. Tables 2.9-2.13 list
summary suggestions for appropriate quantified criteria for each broad objective group.
The objectives set, especially in the case of the economic efficiency objective, often involve
a complex group of concepts and considerations. These can only seldom be fully captured by a single
quantifiable criterion. It is usually preferable to use criteria which can be made to work in practice
and then to make subjective adjustments in one's evaluation, knowing that the criteria chosen may
not capture the full complexity of an objective or may even distort it. For example, in Table 2.9 we
suggest "changes in per caput production" as one criterion by which to evaluate performance in terms
of the efficiency objective. In most situations this is correct, e.g. increasing meat output increases
national income. But there are cases where the opposite may be true, i.e. increasing meat output
decreases national income. Such would be the case if domestic meat production was heavily protected
or subsidised and if the cost of imported inputs (e.g. feed, fencing etc) exceeded the cost of importing
the meat. The use of several criteria simultaneously can help to mitigate the effects of such situations.
Box 2.2: An independence criterion.
A possible quantified criterion for assessing performance in terms of the independence objective
would be the self-sufficiency ratio in the main livestock products, i.e. meat of cattle, goats,
sheep, pigs and poultry, and fresh, powdered, condensed and evaporated milk plus butter. The
self-sufficiency ratio is defined as the ratio:
domestic production/domestic consumption.
Domestic consumption is assumed to be equal to domestic production plus net imports
(including imports of live animals). Net imports are gross imports minus gross exports. We can
calculate self-sufficiency ratios separately for different commodities in quantity terms (e.g.
tonnes). But, if we want to do it for all the main food commodities (i.e. meat, milk, dairy
products) together, it is better to do so in value terms (i.e. dollars). However, both domestic
production and net imports (of similar quality) of any one commodity (e.g. beef) must be valued
at the same prices (for example at the price of imports—the issue of the appropriate prices to
use is discussed in module 4). If we do these calculations, for example in the case of Nigeria,
we find that total domestic production of the commodities concerned in 1985 had a value (at
import prices) of about US$ 1033 million, and net imports had a value of US$ 175 million.
Thus the self-sufficiency ratio in the principal livestock products is 1033/(1033 + 175) x 100,
or 86%.
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Table 2.9. The independence objective: Some quantified criteriafor evaluating performance.
Summary formulation of criterion Point of reference Possible data source
Self-sufficiency ratio (S.C.)
Per caput imports (S.C.)
Ratio of livestock imports to agricultural exports
(by value)




FAO P. and T.Y-B
FAO T.Y-B
FAO T.Y-B
Own past performance FAO T.Y-B
S.C. = selected commodities only (e.g. beef and milk).
FAO P.Y-B = FAO Production Year-Book.
FAO T.Y-B = FAO Trade Year-Book.
Table 2.10. The efficiency objective: Some quantified criteriafor evaluating performance.
Summary formulation of criterion Point of reference Possible data sources
Change in per caput domestic supply (S.C.)
Change in per caput domestic supply (S.C.)
Change in per caput domestic supply (S.C.)
Domestic/international price ratios (S.C.)














S.C. = selected commodities only (e.g. beef and milk).
FAO P.Y-B = FAO Production Year-Book.
Table 2.1 1. The resource conservation objective: Some quantified criteriafor evaluating performance.
Summary formulation of criterion Point of referenceii r iu ui icicic
Vegetation composition and cover on monitoring sites Own past performance




Table 2.12. The stability objective: Some quantified criteria for evaluating performance.
Summary formulation of criterion Point of reference Possible data sources
CV of annual output (S.C.)




FAO P. and T.Y-B
CV = coefficient of variation, defined as: (standard deviation/mean) x 100.
S.C. = selected commodities only (e.g. beef and milk).
FAO P.Y-B = FAO Production Year-Book.
FAO T.Y-B = FAO Trade Year-Book.
Table 2.13. The equity objective: Some quantified criteria for evaluating performance.
Summary formulation of criterion Point of reference Possible data sources
Lorenz curve of livestock holdings (selected species)
Lorenz curve of livestock holdings (selected species)
Ratio of winners in pastoral/cultivators crop damage
cases
Ratio of retail and producer prices to international
prices (S.C.)
Ratio of retail and producer prices to international
prices (S.C.)













S.C. = selected commodities only, e.g. beef and milk.
CV = coefficient of variation, defined as: (standard deviation/mean) x 100.
Lorenz curve = A graphical device to demonstrate equity ofdistribution. See the appendix for a detailed explanation.
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Establish minimum level of performance
We need to consider what minimum standard should be set for the level of acceptability of
performance. Remember that the point of the whole exercise is to identify priority issues. If standards
are set too high, performance in every respect becomes unsatisfactory and everything then becomes
a priority issue. If set too low, then everything is acceptable and there is no priority to change
anything. We need to set standards at a level that draws attention to a small number of really poor
performances. The "setting of standards" may not be a formal, public or long lasting exercise. It is
more likely to be one of continuous informal discussion amongst the few policy makers and analysts
most concerned.
Broadly speaking, there are three types of reference points in relation to which some minimum
acceptable standard can be set. Let us take as an example the efficiency objective and use as a
criterion "growth in per caput domestic beef supply". One possible reference point would be an
absolute one. We might set a 1% annual increase in per caput domestic beef supply as the minimum
acceptable level. Another reference point could be one that is relative to the performance of similar
countries. We might, for example, set the average annual change in per caput beef supplies,
experienced by all sub-Saharan African countries, as the minimum acceptable level. The third
reference point would be one that is relative to that country's own past performance. For example,
we might set the minimum acceptable level as being at least equal to the country's own average
annual performance over the last decade.
Identify existing sources of data
Performance monitoring on the basis of quantifiable criteria requires available and pertinent data.
The FAO Production and Trade Year-Books include FAO estimates for some national-level data (e.g.
livestock populations, production, imports and exports). Some of the data, however, are not reliable.
As well, while national data is important, it is often the case that regional and/or social group
within-country data is also needed. It is unlikely that many countries will be able to adopt immediately
all the criteria (and their attendant data requirements) listed in Tables 2.9-2.13. However, unless
progress is made towards adopting many of them, governments concerned will remain vulnerable to
internal and external pressure to adopt someone else's priorities in the policy making arena.
2.6 Policy instruments and options
The final step in laying a factual groundwork for choosing key policy issues is the identification of
policy instruments by which a given situation could be improved. Three general points should be
made. First, sometimes there are no feasible policy instruments available to a national government
with which to tackle policy issues or problems. In some cases, e.g. with land reform, entrenched
domestic interest groups may be simply too strong for effective action. In other cases, e.g. with the
price of export or import commodities, it may be international market forces that override the efforts
of national governments. Change, in such cases, may be very slow.
The second and third general points repeat what was said in module 1. The same objective
can often be served by several alternative policy instruments; and the same policy instruments can
affect the attainment of several policy objectives.
It is very easy to believe that there is only one way (instrument) to tackle a problem or set
an objective. This can lead to governments fruitlessly trying to do things they have no resources or
advantage in doing. For example, suppose the "problem" is that consumers in country A cannot buy
as much milk as they want. The "obvious" solution is for country A to produce more milk. But if
country A has serious livestock disease problems and an unfavourable climate, it may make much
more sense for it to grow and export agricultural products which its climate does favour and to use
the foreign exchange earned by those exports to buy the milk it needs.
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To prevent ourselves from getting caught in the "single instrument" trap, it is useful to search
systematically for alternative instruments. This search can be assisted by grouping the possible
instruments into broad categories. Tables 2.14-2.15 provide alternative ways of categorising
instruments. Table 2.14 categorises the instruments in two ways: first, at the level of direct impact
(border, domestic market—i.e. retail or wholesale, the point of production on farm or on range); and
second, by whether the instrument has its entry point through input/production activities or the outputs
and their processing.
Table 2.14. Policy instruments classified by level ofdirect impact and entry point.
Level of direct
impact
Associated with entry points through
Border level
(International trade)
Inputs or production activities
• Procurement through aid funds
• Bulk buying by government to achieve
economies of scale
• Allocation of foreign exchange
Outputs or output-processing activities
Export subsidy (tax)
Inter-government export contract or
similar agreements (e.g. Lome)
Parastatal export-oriented abattoir
Protectionist import tariffs or quotas on
competing imports
Food aid






• Licensing of trader (e.g. pharma
ceutical firms)
• Input subsidies
• Quality control regulations
• Input rationing systems
• Special credit systems for inputs (e.g.
loan to purchase half-bred heifers)
• Government provision of direct
services (e.g. veterinary, artificial
insemination)
Auction or other regulated market
Infrastructure/regulations to ensure
purchase by grade and/or weight
Price control regulations
Market information service
Credit scheme to livestock trade




Provision of transport infrastructure
(e.g. stock routes)
On farm/on range Land tenure legislation




Progeny testing, bull culling and similar
schemes for genetic improvement
Range management regulations
Research and extension in on-farm
processing
The list is illustrative and not intended to be all-inclusive.
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Table 2.15 looks back at the problems listed in Table 2.8 and categorises the instruments which
might be used to tackle each of these in terms of the nature of the instruments themselves, e.g.
whether they are legal/institutional, involve public investments etc. Both Tables 2.14 and 2.15 are
intended essentially to act as check-lists or memory-aids. The method of categorisation is only good
or bad insofar as it helps people identify different ways of tackling the same problem or objective.





















































































































 Important points (2.4-2.6)
• Information about a government's policy objectives and the ranking of these objectives is
essential in prioritising policy issues on which to focus.
• Government policy objectives for the livestock subsector are guided by overall political
philosophy and the envisaged changes in the present functions of the subsector.
• Government policy objectives are broadly classified into five groups:
♦ independence objectives
♦ economic efficiency objectives
♦ resource conservation objectives
♦ stability objectives
♦ equity objectives.
• Often, policy objectives pursued by a government differ from the declared objectives.
• Policy analysts must resolve the problems arising from conflicts between declared and
undeclared objectives and present sound choices to the policy maker.
• The analyst should try to identify the policy maker's rough ranking of policy objectives.
• After knowing and ranking policy objectives, the next step in identifying key policy issues
is to assess sector performance with respect to each objective.
• Sector performance can be judged qualitatively in terms of problems rather than "unfulfilled
objectives".
• Quantitative performance monitoring of the livestock sector will require appropriate
quantifiable criteria, an acceptable minimum standard and pertinent data.
• The final step in prioritising policy issues is the identification of policy instruments by which
a situation can be improved.
• Three points to remember in identifying policy instruments to tackle policy issues or
problems are:
♦ Sometimes, no feasible policy instruments may be available to a government to tackle
the problem.
♦ The same objective can often be served by several alternative policy instruments.
♦ The same policy instruments can assist in the attainment of several policy objectives.
2.7 Feedback exercises
All answers can be found in the text.
1. Tick (• ) the correct answers.
Adequate knowledge of one's own livestock sector is important in prioritising livestock policy
issues on which to focus because this enables us to know:
i) its current function.
ii) its future objectives.
iii) its importance in relation to the total agricultural situation.
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iv) its performance in terms of its current functions,
v) the scope of policy change.
2. List two major ways of classifying the livestock sector's function in sub-Saharan Africa.
i)
ii)
3. Column I lists three major outputs of the livestock sector. Match each with the appropriate
per cent contributions of the outputs towards the total output given in Column II:




Name three approaches to deciding whether the tendency of a farmer to increase herd size is




5. Fill in the blanks.
i) The independence policy objective of a government is concerned with preserving political
and autonomy.
ii) The economic efficiency objective aims at increasing the real national
and its growth rate over time.
iii) A government's objective to preserve natural resources such as soil, water, plants and
animals is known as the objective.
iv) The equity objective is concerned with fair of income and wealth
within society.
v) Besides declared policy objectives, governments often have objectives.
6. Circle T for True and F for False.
i) Most politicians conceive of policy issues in terms of problems rather than "unfulfilled
objectives".
T F
ii) Three elements in quantitative monitoring of livestock sector performance are quantifiable
criteria, a minimum level of performance and data source.
T F
iii) A possible criterion for assessing performance in terms of the economic efficiency
objective is the "self-sufficiency" ratio.
T F
iv) The change in per caput production of milk or meat would be a suitable criterion for
evaluating performance of the livestock sector in terms of the independence objective.
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Appendix: The Lorenz curve
Introduction
The Lorenz curve is a graphical device used to demonstrate the equity of distribution of a given
variable such as income, asset ownership or wealth. For example, one might be interested in the
equity of cattle ownership since this is often taken as an indicator of the distribution of wealth,
particularly for pastoral and agropastoral societies. The distribution of cattle ownership is, however,
often extremely difficult to determine so that the cattle holding per household (or per holder) is
often used as the proxy measure of wealth in the derivation of a Lorenz curve. Holding implies the
right and responsibility to manage on a day-to-day basis but not necessarily to dispose of (e.g. by
slaughter, sale or gift).
In the following example, a Lorenz curve for cattle holdings to households holding cattle is
therefore constructed. The principles outlined in the derivation of the curve can be applied to any
data set in which the equity of distribution for a given variable is being calculated.
Derivation of the Lorenz curve
In the derivation of the example Lorenz curve, the following procedure has been adopted:
• All individual units (households) are ranked from the lowest to the highest according to the
number of cattle held (Column 1, Table 2.A1) and the number of households in each
cattle-holding category is given (Column 2).
From this data, the percentage of households falling into each cattle-holder category is derived
(Column 3).
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• The cumulative percentage of households in each cattle-holder category is then estimated
(Column 4).
• By multiplying the number of cattle in each category by the number of households holding
those cattle (Column 1 x Column 2), we then obtain the total number of cattle held within
each category (Column 5).
• From this latter figure, the percentage of total cattle held (Column 6) and the cumulative per
cent of cattle held in each category (Column 7) are obtained.
• The cumulative percentage of cattle held in each category (vertical axis) is then plotted against
the cumulative percentage of households for each category (horizontal axis) to derive the Lorenz
curve (Figure 2A.1).
• This plotted curve is then compared with the line of perfect equity (drawn at 45° from the
origin of the graph) to provide an indication of the equity of distribution of cattle holdings
within the area concerned.
Table 2A.1. Data requiredfor derivation ofthe Lorenz curve ofcattle holdings to households.





% households Cumulative % Total no. of % total cattle Cumulative %
category holding cattle of households cattle in each within each of cattle
(no. of cattle in each in each category category within each
held) category category category
0 30 23.07 23.07 0 0.00 0.00
1 5 3.85 26.92 5 0.73 0.73
2 5 3.85 30.77 10 1.46 2.19
3 5 3.85 34.62 15 2.20 4.39
4 7 5.38 40.00 28 4.10 8.49
5 8 6.15 46.15 40 5.86 14.35
6 10 7.69 53.84 60 8.78 23.13
7 12 9.23 63.07 84 12.30 35.43
8 15 11.54 74.61 120 17.57 53.00
9 15 11.54 86.15 135 19.77 72.77
10 12 9.23 95.38 120 17.57 90.34
11 6 4.62 100.00 66 9.66 100.00
130 100.00 683 100.00
Exercise 2.A: Drawing and interpreting a Lorenz curve (estimated time required: 20 minutes).
Question 1. Using the data in Table 2.3, draw, on the same piece of paper, Lorenz curves for the
distribution of cattle per cattle-owning households and per cattle-owning person.
Question 2. Is the distribution of cattle per cattle-owning people more or less inequitable than the
distribution per cattle-owning household? Use the Lorenz curves drawn in response to
Question 1 and the note to Figure 2A.1 to provide you with the answer.
Note to Figure 2A.1: The 45° line drawn from the origin of the graph represents the line of perfect
equity where the percentage of cattle held corresponds exactly to the percentage of households in
the area, where each household has the same number of cattle, i.e. where 10% of the households
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hold 10% of the cattle etc. The more bowed the Lorenz curve from this line (indicated by the hatched
area in Figure 2A.1), the more inequitable is the distribution of cattle holdings. The calculation of
equivalent Lorenz curve data for two different areas, regions or countries can provide a useful basis
for equity comparisons.














Per cent households holding cattle
Exercise 2.1: Group exercise: Identification of policy issues: Central case study (estimated time
required: 1.5 hours).
Question 1. Read the central case study carefully and list the various criteria/problems confronting
the livestock sector in Alphabeta. Where possible, cite evidence from the report for the
criteria/problems you have identified.
Question 2. What evidence can you obtain from the report to demonstrate that the government's
objectives are similar to those given in the lecture notes?
Question 3. On the basis of your previous answers, what policy issues (criteria/problems) would you
now isolate for more detailed analysis? Why?
Question 4. For the particular issues you have isolated as most important, what broad policy
strategies/instruments could be appropriate? How would you make a start in an
evaluation/analysis of these alternative strategies? What strategies/instruments has the
government of Alphabeta adopted? Are they effective? If not, why not?
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Exercise 2.2: Identification of policy issues — Country specific study (estimated time required: 1 hour).
Question 1. What are your country's broad objectives for the livestock sector? Whose objectives are
they?
Question 2. In what document, or equivalent, are these objectives set out? How do you know these
are your country's objectives? Are they declared or undeclared objectives? Which are
more important?
Question 3. In your country, are there specific goals or targets set for the livestock sector? How?
Where?
Question 4. Which of the criteria/problems listed in the lecture notes are relevant to your country?
Are there problems which you consider urgent in your country? Could you assign
priorities to your country's problems in the livestock sector?
Question 5. Which policies/instruments does your country pursue in order to solve the most urgent
problems listed in your answer to Question 4? Are these instruments appropriate? Identify
some other instruments which might be used instead to solve the same problems.
Question 6. What is your professional responsibility? How does it relate to overall policy objectives?
What particular policy issues would you prefer to see discussed in this manual and why?
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Module 3: Production Systems, Supply and Demand
 
3 . 1 Performance objectives
3.2 Introduction
3.3 Major livestock production systems in Africa
3.3.1 Production systems and market integration
3.3.2 Basic relationships within a farming system
3.3.3 Policy entry points at farm level
3.4 Describing production systems: Input-output tables
3.4.1 Format of the table
3.4.2 Relevant exercises
3.5 Household income, subsistence consumption and expenditure
3.5.1 Computation equations for consumption, net income and cash income
3.5.2 Relevant exercises
3.6 Responses to policies and market signals
3.6.1 Production response
3.6.2 Relevant exercises




3.7 Rough approaches to forecasting production and consumption






Module 3 is intended to enable you to:
1 . List and describe major livestock production systems in Africa in terms of their market integration,
basic economic relationships within a farming system and policy entry points at the farm level.
2. Discuss the use of input-output tables in characterising production systems. This should include
drawing an input-output table using hypothetical data.
3. Name two indicators to evaluate the performance of a production system and demonstrate how these
indicators can be computed from a given input-output table.
4. Recall two main types of price-production responses and discuss three adjustment mechanisms to
increase agricultural production under positive price-production response.
5. Given hypothetical data from a case study, demonstrate proficiency in working out responses in farm
production and farm income to price changes.
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6. Discuss three key propositions of the economic theory of consumption.
7. Describe the distinguishing consumption characteristics of producing households and non-producing
households.
8. Discuss the nature of market supply response to price signals in different production systems. This
should include both individual and aggregate supply responses.
9. Describe the relationship of price with supply, demand and market equilibrium. Explain relevant
concepts.
1 0. Describe techniques for forecasting future production and consumption of a particular product.
3.2 Introduction
In order to assess the likely effects of agricultural policy on production, market supply and demand,
it is important to have a basic understanding of the different farming systems which exist in a country.
Farming systems respond to government policy interventions according to their degree of market
integration and the factors which influence individual household goals and aspirations. Accordingly,
this module is devoted to understanding major livestock production systems in Africa and how policies
and market signals govern production, consumption and supply in different production systems.
3.3 Major livestock production systems in Africa
In most African countries, the livestock subsector comprises several or all of the following major




♦ mixed smallholder farming.
• Large-scale:
♦ ranching
♦ large-scale commercial farming
♦ co-operative farming
♦ state farming.
The large-scale system, introduced only during this century, still accounts for a relatively small
proportion of agricultural output in sub-Saharan Africa. The bulk of production occurs in the
traditional small-scale system. Devising appropriate policies for such systems is therefore of utmost
importance in increasing African food production.
3.3.1 Production systems and market integration
Smallholder farming in Africa is predominantly carried out by small, autonomous family units with
a labour force averaging between one and three adult-equivalents, cultivating an area ranging from
0.5 to 5 ha (somewhat larger in drier parts of the Sahel) under an individual land tenure system
(module 7). The degree to which each farm is integrated into the market economy varies according
to a host of factors, perhaps the most important of which is geographical location.
The influence of geographical location on market integration is twofold: partly agro-ecological
and partly infrastructural. Some areas may have a higher degree of market integration because rainfall
and soil conditions are conducive to cash cropping and the production of surpluses; others may lack
one or both of these advantages but are compensated by their relative proximity to urban markets
and other facilities. In terms of market integration, three broad subsystems of the mixed smallholder
farming system may thus be described:
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• Mainly subsistence-oriented producers. Such producers are typically remote from urban
markets and more than half a day's walk from a main road. Often they are resource-poor
farmers inhabiting drier areas where crop production is risky. The bulk of their production is
consumed at home, but small surpluses are sold or bartered locally in good years. Access to
purchased inputs is low or non-existent and demand for them is also low (for reasons of risk
aversion).
• Semi-subsistence producers. These producers are typically closer to main roads and urban
markets. Subsistence cropping remains the major enterprise, but surpluses of a wide range of
products are more frequently available for sale and significant efforts may be devoted to a
minor cash-crop enterprise. Such farmers are somewhat wealthier and tend to inhabit more
productive areas, but access to inputs and credit remains low. They continue to spread risk
through diversification.
• Mainly commercial, specialised producers. Such producers are typically close to (or within)
major urban markets. Most of what they produce is sold at market, but small amounts are
consumed at home. Most labour is devoted to a specialised enterprise such as feed, dairy,
coffee or vegetable production, for which purchased inputs are available. If they inhabit dry
areas, such farmers usually have access to irrigation. Typically, however, they inhabit
high-potential subhumid, humid or highland areas where both soils and climate are favourable.
Pastoralism in Africa is also practised predominantly by small family units. Herds and flocks
are raised that vary considerably in size, from a few sheep and goats in the poorest families to many
hundreds of cattle and/or camels in the wealthiest. The size of the herd/flock determines the share
of feed resources obtained from pastures grazed communally under an open access or common
property tenure system (module 7) characterised by mobility (nomadism or transhumance) as a
survival strategy. The degree to which each family unit is integrated in the market economy varies
according to a host of factors, but is generally less related to geographical location than in the case
of smallholder farming. There may be forced integration in the market economy during times of
drought, as herders are compelled to sell for slaughter animals which might die of natural causes.
Agropastoralism in Africa is carried out by pastoral families or their descendants who have,
to varying degrees, settled and taken up cropping. Often inhabiting dry areas where cropping is a
high-risk enterprise, agropastoralists live under conditions resembling those of the mainly
subsistence-oriented smallholder farmer. Apart from ethnic differences, the only major difference
between the two groups in terms of production is the emphasis on livestock, which will be greater
among agropastoralists, who frequently retain some degree of mobility as a survival strategy. The
degree of market integration will be similar to that of the mainly subsistence-oriented producer, but
again there may be emergency sales of livestock during droughts.
There are exceptions to the general rule that the market integration of agriculture increases
with proximity to urban centres. Sometimes the reverse is true: the closer to the city, the more its
superior employment opportunities draw labour (usually male) away from agriculture. In such cases,
surplus production for market may be almost non-existent, but some subsistence cropping around the
homestead may be continued as before (usually by women and children). This tends to happen
particularly in economies where agriculture is disadvantaged compared to the manufacturing sector.
Moreover, in the case of livestock, the city may act as a magnet for the sale of animals trekked over
longer, rather than shorter distances, as urban and peri-urban dwellers increasingly turn to livestock
as a way of investing their cash savings.
As infrastructure and markets expand with rising population, the degree of market integration
varies through time and in space. Thus, each producing household occupies a point in a continuous
transition through time from pure subsistence to pure commercial production. Pure subsistence
production is now virtually non-existent in Africa, a greater or lesser degree of market integration
having occurred almost universally in areas where cropping is practised, as well as in those areas
where livestock only are raised. Pure commercial production is also still rare, however, and the vast
majority of households occupy an intermediate point in the continuum. Within the long-term trend
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towards increased market integration through time, there are substantial short-term fluctuations
according to year and season.
3.3.2 Basic relationships within a farming system
Figure 3.1 depicts the main economic relationships governing activities in mixed smallholder farming
systems. Two major circuits can be identified: the physical circuit, with flows of factor services and
products and the cash flow or monetary circuit. Each will play a different role in determining a
household's response to policy measures, depending on the point the household occupies in the
continuum between subsistence and commercial farming.























































Mainly subsistence-oriented production systems
For the subsistence-oriented household, land and labour are the principal factors of production. Capital
investment is limited to non-monetary self-produced equipment, land improvement and livestock
raised through natural reproduction. Increases in production are mainly dependent on the weather
and on the quantity and quality of those factors of production controlled by the household. These,
for example, may include:
• use of surplus labour for bush clearing and erosion control
• use of animal manure to raise soil fertility
• better livestock management practices.
Progress in production is likely to be slow but improvements are possible through farming
systems research, education and extension programmes. There are few local off-farm employment
opportunities. The monetary circuit plays little role in the economy of the mainly subsistence-oriented
household. For the subsistence-oriented farm, output and consumption are identical. Such households
thus remain largely (but not wholly) unresponsive to price and market signals.
Families living under these conditions rarely aim to maximise production, since this would
imply specialisation, with its attendant risks. Rather, the goal is to maximise the chances of survival.
A mainly subsistence-oriented farmer will be reluctant to shift from a traditional practice to a new
technology if doing so incurs greater risk of failure (Box 3.1).
Box 3.1: Subsistence, risk and innovation.
Figure 3.2a depicts a case where a new technology is associated with both higher potential
production and higher risk of failure. The new technology in Figure 3.2b, on the other hand,
both reduces the risk of failure and raises mean production above the level of the traditional
technology. To mainly subsistence-oriented farmers, this technology will be preferable, although
its potential is not as high as the new technology in Figure 3.2a.
Figure 3.2. Income and risk of innovation.
a. Innovation with higher mean production,
but higher probability of failure below
minimum consumption.
b. Innovation with higher mean
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minimum mean value under traditional production system
maximum mean value under traditional production system
expected mean value under new production system
Attitudes towards risky innovations will depend on how close to bare survival current
production lies. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Farm A, due to its limited production potential,
has always produced close to its minimum consumption requirement (MCR). Farm B, on the
other hand, has operated closer to (though always below) its minimum desired consumption
level (MDCL). Farm A will have more incentive to minimise risk than farm B, which is more
likely to innovate because the chances of falling below its MCR are relatively low. Despite its
higher yield variability, the new technology will be attractive to farm B provided adoption
increases output above MDCL.
Whether or not it adopts new technology, farm A is unlikely to produce a surplus for
sale. Farm B, on the other hand, is much more likely to do so, and may eventually move out
of the mainly subsistence-oriented group of producers to become a semi-subsistence farm.
















Source: Adapted from Miracle (1986).
Semi-subsistence production systems
A semi-subsistence household produces a considerable proportion of its consumption requirements
(60-80%). In addition, it will produce cash crops such as vegetables, coffee and tea and keep livestock
for sale. The semi-subsistence producer will therefore be confronted with the risks associated with
price fluctuations and with variations in the natural environment. The monetary circuit thus assumes
an important role in the semi-subsistence production unit (Figure 3.1). Such units tend to be more
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responsive to market and price signals than the subsistence-oriented producers. The higher the share
of output being sold on the market, the greater the importance of the monetary circuit in the
semi-subsistence production system. The impact of market and price signals will ultimately depend
on the degree of market integration.
What are the reasons behind a household's desire to enter the monetary circuit? Answering
this question will help us understand the factors which influence production responses. The first step
in the transition process from subsistence to more commercialised production may be a need to obtain
cash to meet legal or social obligations, such as the payment of school fees or the hosting of a
wedding reception. Insofar as such needs are the only purpose of sales, there will be a negative
relationship between price and market supply. In other words, the higher the market price, the smaller
will be the amounts that need to be sold and vice versa.
As the transition process continues, market supply responses become positive as producers
recognise that increasing their cash income enables them to buy other consumer goods which improve
their welfare. If these goods are regularly available at local markets, income growth may become an
important family goal. Higher income also enables a household to purchase more external inputs
(fertiliser, seeds etc), thus increasing output still further in the future. Finally, cash can also be used
to pay interest and principal on credit, opening up greater opportunities for investment and hence the
development of new enterprises.
Thus, the transition from pure subsistence, through semi-subsistence to more commercial
farming will have two interrelated effects on consumption and production in the rural household,
namely:
• the direct acquisition of consumer goods and services
the further growth of income through increased use of external inputs.
For families living under these systems, risk aversion remains an important determinant of
household decisions. These producers confront the risks associated with price fluctuation as well as
those resulting from climate. Sometimes these will offset one another, as when low yields lead to
scarcity, causing market prices to rise, and vice versa. At other times, factors bearing no relationship
to yield variations will influence prices. For semi-subsistence producers, innovations with minimal
input of external factors of production could be offered.
Mainly commercial, specialised production systems
In these systems, the monetary circuit becomes more important than the physical one, which may
become less complex as a result of specialisation. These production units tend to be highly responsive
to price and market signals, switching enterprises and increasing or decreasing their market
involvement in accordance with them. Increases in production are almost certain to involve the use
of external inputs and services. Progress in production can be rapid, but dramatic setbacks may
occasionally occur. Off-farm employment opportunities are more common and are found nearer home.
For families living under these conditions, the allocation of resources will be determined largely
by the profit rather than the survival motive. However, although risk aversion plays a smaller part
in decision making, households will tend to refrain from fully commercial production if markets are
unreliable or if institutional support (access to credit, price stabilisation schemes, animal health
services etc) is inadequate.
3.3.3 Policy entry points at farm level
The number of effective entry points for policy interventions increases as we move across the
continuum from subsistence to commercial farming. For mainly subsistence-oriented producers,
interventions should be geared to making it both possible and attractive to enter the market.
Convenient market outlets for their products, easy access to consumer goods and the rapid payment
of good prices against sales would help achieve this. In the case of producers whose degree of market
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 integration is unlikely to increase, equity-oriented interventions such as improving rights of access
to water may be beneficial. Guaranteeing the provision of famine relief or wage employment in hard
times may reduce the need to keep large herds in pastoral societies and persuade resource-poor
producers to take the risk of adopting new technology.
For semi-subsistence producers, interventions geared to the producer prices of outputs are
probably more important than measures concerned with the price of inputs. This is because the value
of purchased inputs still forms a relatively low proportion of the total value of outputs in
semi-subsistence systems. Interventions increasing labour productivity, which accounts for a relatively
high proportion of the output value, would also be important. The provision of a wider range of
goods and services on which to spend cash earned should stimulate further market integration.
For commercially-oriented producers, the relative prices of both inputs and outputs are crucial
determinants of profitability, since purchased inputs account for a much larger proportion of the total
value of output. Stable supplies of inputs and reliable services will also be important.
Important points (3.2-3.3)
• Livestock farming in Africa can be divided into two broad categories: small-scale and
large-scale. Traditional small-scale production systems still account for most agricultural
output on the continent.
• Small-scale production systems comprise pastoralism, agropastoralism and mixed
smallholder farming.
• In' terms of market integration, mixed smallholder farming systems are divided into: mainly
subsistence-oriented systems; semi-subsistence systems; and mainly commercially-oriented
systems.
• Location is one of the main determinants of market integration. The influence of
geographical location is twofold, being partly agro-ecological and partly infrastructural.
• With the expansion of infrastructure and markets, there is more or less continuous transition
of farming systems from pure subsistence through semi-subsistence to commercially-oriented
systems.
• Farm household responses to policy initiatives can be explained in terms of physical factors
and monetary factors.
• The higher the share of output being sold on the market, the greater the importance of the
monetary circuit in farm household systems. The impact of market and price signals will
thus depend on the degree of market integration of the household.
• Policy entry points at the farm level differ according to the farming systems being examined.
3.4 Describing production systems: Input-output tables
3.4.1 . Format of the table
In order to gauge their probable response to interventions, smallholder production systems can be
characterised in terms of a simple input-output table, as shown in Table 3. 1 .
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Table 3.1. A standard production input-output tablefor a mixed smallholderfarming system.
Farm activity Input utilisation
Total Total












Each farm enterprise (maize, coffee, livestock etc) provides one or more outputs and requires
various inputs. The inputs used for each enterprise can be added to give total inputs used (by category)
for each year, which can then be compared with the total level of inputs available. The balance
obtained will indicate whether there are resource deficits or surpluses. A resource surplus may not
necessarily imply a potential to increase production. For example, unused land may need to remain
fallow or unused labour may be required for social activities or communal work. Nevertheless,
resource surplus and deficit figures will often provide useful information about the potential for
increasing production, with or without changes in technology.
For production systems dependent on the use of communal resources (pastoral and agropastoral
systems), household-level input-output tables will not provide a complete picture of the factors
constraining the expansion of production. Regional input-output tables may need to be computed as
well.
3.4.2 Relevant exercises
Exercise 3.1 : Input-output tables.
Example: The following data apply to an agropastoral household in a semi-arid region.
Household characteristics:
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Size and structure: nine people, consisting of four adults (two male, two female), and five children
(two male and three female).
Location of members: three adults on farm, one adult in off-farm employment; five children on farm
(four in school).
Crop production:




Maize Beans Groundnuts Sorghum
Area (ha) 3.0 0.5 0.5 1.0
Yields (kg/ha) 250 200 150 300
Labour (p.d./ha)
Male 3 2 2 1
Female 15 60 60 20
Input levels
Fertiliser (kg/ha) nil nil nil nil
Seed (kg/ha) 30 90 90 10
p.d. = person-days.
Livestock production:
The household owns 10 cattle and 4 goats; the cattle herd consists of 4 cows, 2 calves, 2 oxen, 1
heifer and 1 young bull. Milk production is 150 kg/year per cow but half of this is consumed by the
calves and the other half is extracted by the household. The offtake rate of animals for sale is 10%
of the total herd. Mature oxen and cows dress out at 50% of body weight (i.e. 50% of 250 kg). The
offtake rate for smallstock is 25%; a mature goat dresses out at 20 kg. The average production of
dry manure from cattle (excluding calves) is 0.75 t/year per animal. The herd requires 145
person-days/year for herding, watering and other tasks, 100 of which are allocated to male household
members. Both cattle and smallstock are grazed on communal pasture. Veterinary costs amount to
$ 5.00/year.
Total labour availability:
The total amount of labour available for farming operations is:
Males: 350 person-days
Females: 350 person-days
Study the input-output table (Table 3.2), making sure you understand the reason for each of
the figures entered. This table will be used as a basis for the subsequent exercise.
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Table 3.2. Sample household input-output tablefor an agropastoral production system.






availableItem Maize Beans Sorghum Livestock Residual
Inputs:
Arable land (ha) 3.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 5.0 5.0 nil
Grazing land (ha) Communal
Labour (p.d.):
Male 9 1 1 1 100 112 350 238






















Exercise: (estimated time required: 2 hours).
Question 7. Draw an input-output table for the following data set obtained from a 2-ha,
medium-intensity dairy operation in the Kenyan highlands:
Household characteristics:
Size and structure: seven people, consisting of four adults (two male, two female), and three children
(one male and two female).
Location of members: three adults on farm, one adult in off-farm employment; three children on




Maize Beans Groundnuts Coffee
Area (ha) 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2
Yields (kg/ha) 2200 400 400 500
Labour (p.d./ha):
Male 4 2.5 5 100
Female 38 80 80 50
Input levels
Fertiliser (kg/ha) 100 - - 200
Seed (kg/ha) 30 100 100 -




Dairying is the only livestock enterprise on the farm. The enterprise consists of one cow plus one
calf and one heifer. Artificial insemination is used and the calving interval is about 15 months. Feed
resources consist of one ha of fertilised pasture, supplemented by maize stover, concentrates and
minerals. Bull calves are slaughtered for home consumption. Inputs and outputs are as follows:
Item Annual level
Outputs:
Milk (net of calf) 1500 kg





Concentrates 1 50 kg
Calf rearing costs $10
Veterinary costs $ 10
Labour: male 50 p.d.
Labour: female 50 p.d.
p.d. = person-days.
Total labour availability:
The total amount of labour available for farm work is:
Male: 350 p.d. (one man full time)
Female: 350 p.d. (two women half-time each; the other half spent on
household work)
3.5 Household income, subsistence consumption and
expenditure
Input-output relationships alone are not sufficient to evaluate the performance of a particular
production system. The information contained in an input-output table needs to be converted to
indicators which demonstrate how production and the use of resources contribute to a family's goals.
Two such indicators are: the direct contribution made by production to home consumption and the
income generated on and off the farm.
3.5.1 Computation equations for consumption, net income and cash
income
As the example given in Exercise 3.2 demonstrates, the two indicators can be computed using data
from an input-output table together with additional information on subsistence consumption and prices.
First we must calculate what is called a supply disappearance equation for each product produced
on the farm:
TC = TP + P - S or TP = TC + S - P
SC = TC - P + S
where:
TC = total consumption
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TP = total production
P = gross purchases
S = gross sales
SC = subsistence consumption
P - S = net purchases if P > S.
Net purchases are treated as negative net sales and appear in brackets ( ) in Table 3.3.
For simplicity, internally produced inputs produced on farm, e.g. seed, feed or milk are treated
as if they were first sold and then repurchased.
The first part of Table 3.3 shows how the total value of output is calculated by multiplying
the quantity of each commodity produced by its price and summing the results. Note that the total
output value consists of both the value of cash sales and the value of subsistence consumption. In
order to compare incomes earned by different farm groups (and between farm and non-farm sectors),
it is necessary to ensure that both components are properly accounted for, since estimates based on
sales and cash expenditures alone would bias results.
The common practice of using producer prices to value farm output is inappropriate where the
income of a semi-subsistence farm is being calculated. Instead, the producer price should be used
only for the portion of production actually sold. The consumer price should be used for the portion
consumed on the farm, the reason being that reduced subsistence production would force the
household either to reduce consumption or to buy the deficit at the prevailing consumer price.
However, in the exercise that follows, the common practice of using the producer price to value
home consumption is maintained in order to reduce complexity.
The second part of the table is concerned with the calculation of total net income:
total value of output - total variable costs - total fixed costs = net income from farm sources
+ non-farm income = total net income
Fixed costs are costs which remain constant irrespective of the level of output produced, such
as depreciation, rent etc, while variable costs are those which vary directly with the level of output,
for example fertiliser, seed and insecticide.
Calculating the net total cash income (as opposed to the net total income) will provide an
indication of the liquidity position and the degree of market integration. Net total cash income is
computed as follows:
total value of sales - value of purchased inputs (variable costs) - fixed costs (excluding
depreciation) = net cash income from farm sources + cash income from non-farm sources = net total
cash income
3.5.2 Relevant exercises
Exercise 3.2: Estimating total net income.
Example: Refer to the example given in Exercise 3.1. We will now convert the information
contained in Table 3.2 into financial terms using the following additional information:
Consumption, purchases and sales:
Resident household members consume all maize produced on the farm; the average requirement
(regardless of age) is 0.5 kg/person per day. Sorghum is regarded as an additional source of starch
and all domestic production is consumed by the household. An additional 25 kg of sorghum is
purchased for beer production. A surplus of 10 kg of beans is available for sale, but there is a deficit
of 20 kg of groundnuts. Cattle are sold for slaughter, but cattle and goat milk and goat meat are
consumed by the household. No additional milk or meat is purchased.
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n.a. = not applicable.
1 Assume maize is locally available for purchase at the producer price, implying that there are surplus producers within the
area. If this were not the case, the purchase price would exceed the producer price, in which case output would have to be
valued at the consumer price.
Annual fixed costs amount to $ 15.10, of which depreciation accounts for $ 10. Non-farm
income consists of $ 28.00 from handicraft sales.
Using these data and the data in Table 3.2 (Exercise 3.1), it is possible to derive a total income
table as shown in Table 3.3.










Maize (kg) 750 1160 750 (410) 22.50
Beans (kg) 100 90 90 10 1.20 12.00
Groundnuts (kg) 75 95 75 (20) 3.75
Sorghum (kg) 300 325 300 (25) 9.00
Cattle:
Meat (kg) 125 125 22.50 22.50




2(1 20 20 5.00
6 6 6.00 6.00
Subtotal 29.70 95.75
Variable costs:
Maize seed (kg) 90 2.70 2.70
Bean seed (kg) 4? 5.40 5.40
Groundnut seed (kg) 45 2.25 2.25
Sorghum seed (kg) 10 0.30 0.30
Calf milk (kg) 150 7.50
Veterinary ($) 5 5.00 5.00
Manure (t) 6 6.00 6.00
Subtotal 21.65 29.15
Fixed costs ($) 5.10 15.10
Net farm income ($) 2.95 51.50
Non-farm income ($) 28.00 28.00
Total income ($) 30.95 79.50
1 The value of the quantity (shown in brackets) of net purchases (negative net sales) ofpurchased food consumed is not deducted
from farm income.
2 Used on farm, but treated in accordance with section 3.5.1, thereby exaggerating the importance of the monetary circuit.
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Exercise: (estimated time required: 2 hours).
Study the input-output table calculated for the small-scale dairy model in Exercise 3.1 and the
following information on consumption, costs and prices:
Consumption, purchases and sales:
The resident household requires 0.5 kg/day per caput of maize, 40 kg of beans in total and the same
amount of groundnuts are purchased to meet the household's need. All coffee produced is sold, but
all meat and 40% of the milk produced is consumed at home.
Cost and price data:
Producer price Consumer/input












n.a. = not applicable.
1 Hybrid seed.
Fixed costs amount to $ 24.90/year, $ 20 of which are for depreciation. Income from non-farm
sources amounts to $ 32. For other cost details, refer to the input-output table for the small-scale
dairy operation in Exercise 3.1.
Question 1. Calculate an income table using the above information.
Question 2. What proportion of total net farm income is total net cash income? What does this imply
in terms of market integration? Is this farmer more or less integrated in the market than
the farmer in Table 3.3?
(Hint to instructors: In the sections on input-output tables and consumption purchases and
sales and in Exercise 3.1 and 3.2, very simple examples of mixed farming enterprises have been
given in which there are no livestock purchases and no changes in the value of the herd. Changes
in the value of the herd may come about through transfers of livestock in and out (e.g. sales, purchases,
gifts/bride wealth given and received) and through births and deaths, or by changes in the value of
individual animals as they mature or decline through age. Such changes in the value of the herd can
be very important in livestock-dominated farms.)
A full table of farm income for such farms would have a separate livestock section in which
the following items would be distinguished:
+Sale of livestock produce (milk, meat, manure, draft power)
+Home consumption of livestock produce
+Sales of livestock
+Gifts of livestock given away
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-Purchases of livestock
-Gifts of livestock received
+Closing (i.e. end-of-year) value of the herd
-Opening (i.e. beginning-of-year) value of the herd
The "opening" value of the herd should include the value (at the start of the year) of animals
later given away or sold. Similarly, the "closing" value should include the value (at the end of the
year) of any animals purchased or received as gifts during the year.
The "sale of livestock produce" entry should include internal transfers of, e.g. manure and
draft power to the crop activities of the same farm, with the same items being shown as "purchases"
by those crop activities.
If you have some spare time, you may want to demonstrate some examples of this full
reckoning. They have not been included in the manual in order to keep it as simple as possible.
 
Important points (3.4-3.5)
• Input-output tables are used to show specific production patterns, input-output relationships
and resource deficits or surplus of a farm. The tables help to characterise production systems
and assess the potential for increasing production.
• Subsistence consumption and cash income earned on and off the farm are the important
performance indicators of a production system.
• Subsistence consumption = production - sales + purchases.
• Total net income = total value of output - total variable costs - total fixed costs + non-farm
income.
• Net total cash income = value of sales - value of purchased inputs - fixed costs + cash
income from non-farm sources.
3.6 Responses to policies and market signals
Different production systems will respond to government policy interventions according to their degree
of market integration and factors which influence individual household goals and aspirations. This
section analyses the effects of price policy on semi-subsistence and commercial production systems
in terms of production, consumption and supply.
3.6.1 Production response
Types of price-production responses
When assessing production responses to price, bear in mind that the desire to increase cash income
is not the only (and sometimes not even the most important) determinant of the pattern of production.
A rise in the price of a product will not necessarily result in an expansion of production. Many food
crops (and livestock products such as milk) are primarily produced for subsistence and are more or
less independent of market prices. In these circumstances, prices may have a negligible effect on
production decisions. In some cases, production for sale will be based on the need to meet fixed
cash obligations (ceremonies, school fees, tax etc) or to fulfil particular aspirations (e.g. to purchase
certain commodities). In other cases, sales will tend to be opportunistic in nature, occurring only
when surpluses above subsistence needs are obtained. Sales will thus be either inversely related to
prices (Figure 3.4a) or wholly independent of them.
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However, inverse relationships between production and price are unlikely to persist over the
long term as the transition towards greater integration in the economy occurs. As rural markets for
goods and services develop, price increases usually begin to have a positive influence on production.
In the following discussion, we will assume that price/production responses are positive, as shown
in Figure 3.4b. A positive long-term production response does not, however, preclude a negative
short-term market supply response. This will be discussed later with particular reference to the impact
of prices on herd development.
Figure 3.4. Inverse and positive production responses.
Price
a) Inverse production response
Price





Adjustment mechanisms to increase production
In considering positive responses, profitability will be the driving force to increase the quantity of
output or agricultural production. This can be achieved in three possible ways, namely:
• by utilising slack resources
• by substituting enterprises
• by intensifying production.
• Utilising slack resources. Land, labour or other resources available to a production unit may
not be fully used. Utilising slack resources implies strategies such as expanding the area under
cultivation, shortening fallow periods, building up herd numbers and working longer hours.
Such strategies for increasing production have been Africa's traditional response to the rising
demand for food caused by population growth, but they are now putting severe pressure on
the natural resource base.
• Substituting enterprises. Commodities produced on a farm compete for the use of resources
such as land and labour. When the profitability of one commodity increases relative to another,
resources can be shifted to it. Substitution is common between cropping enterprises but may
also occur between crops and livestock or between different livestock species or products (e.g.
cattle and smallstock, meat and milk).
• Intensifying production. Opportunities for intensifying production depend predominantly on
the availability of external inputs and new technologies. Intensification means that producers
respond to a rise in the price of a commodity by seeking to raise yields rather than by expanding
the area cultivated or, in the case of livestock, the number of animals kept. It is difficult to
begin intensifying highly extensive production systems such as pastoralism because the delivery
of external inputs is hampered by the lack of infrastructure. Technologies are also less well
developed for such systems.
The decision to substitute one enterprise for another depends on their relative profitability.
This, in turn, depends on the physical productivity of the inputs and resources used and on
the relationship between input and output prices.
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The gross margin of an enterprise is a measure of profitability which takes these factors into
account. Gross margin also provides a basis for analysing the likely impact of a price change on
production. It is defined as:
Gross margin = gross value of output - variable costs
Since purchased inputs are used in limited amounts in semi-subsistence systems, the gross
margin for an enterprise in such systems is often closer to the gross value of its output than in more
commercial systems, where substantial amounts of inputs may be used. In theory, comparisons
between enterprises should be based on a calculation of gross margin per unit of the scarcest resource.
In practice, however, several resources (e.g. both land and labour) may restrict the opportunities for
substitution, and personal factors such as risk aversion will also play their part. For these reasons, a
simple ranking of enterprises on the basis of gross margins per unit of land or labour used may not
be sufficient. In such cases, more complex techniques such as linear programming will be needed,
but these will not be discussed here. For our purposes, the essential principles of substitution can be
demonstrated using a simple gross margin planning model as explained in Exercise 3.3.
The profitability of adopting intensified production methods, and the amounts produced by
these methods, will depend on three main factors:
• The marginal physical productivity (MPP) of the inputs used (i.e. how much more output
one gets per additional unit of input). In many cases, MPP declines per extra unit of input
used, especially when not all the inputs can be increased simultaneously or to an equal extent.
For example, if we add more cows to the same farm size or more oil cake to the same cow,
each extra unit of input is likely to bring about less extra output (milk) than the previous one.
The marginal revenue (MR) generated by each extra unit of output. For the individual farmer,
MR is usually identical to the producer or market price and usually the same per unit sold
however many units are sold. Sometimes—for instance when a farmer is selling under a
minimum or maximum quota system or to a customer who obtains reductions for additional
purchases—market price will differ from MR, reflecting the new price level used when the
extra unit is sold. The marginal value product (MVP) is obtained by multiplying MPP by
MR.
• The marginal factor cost (MFC) per extra unit of input used. For the individual farmer, MFC
is usually identical to the purchase or market price, and is usually the same however many
units of input are used. Sometimes, for instance when the input is difficult to obtain and can
only be bought on the black market, the MFC will exceed the market price of the previous
unit used. Or, for example, when discounts are offered for bulk purchases, it will be less.
As a general rule, a farmer wishing to maximise profits through intensification should use extra
inputs to increase output so long as MVP exceeds MFC.
To give a simple example, a farmer has two half-bred cows and no capacity to keep any more.
She can buy a special dairy mix feed at a special farmers' price of 105 cents/kg if she restricts her
purchases to 1 kg/day, but she has to pay an unsubsidised price of 210 cents/kg if she exceeds this
rate. She can sell up to 10 litres of milk a day locally (2 litres to each of five families) at 100
cents/litre, but has to sell amounts above this level to the government milk collection scheme which,
because of limited market outlets, will only buy up to 6 litres/farmer at a price of 80 cents/litre.
Thus, she has to make amounts of milk higher than 16 litres into butter, which she sells at a price
equivalent to 40 cents/litre of milk.
Without being fed concentrates, our farmer's cows each give only three litres/day. This rises
rapidly to five litres when they are fed 0.5 kg daily of dairy mix, but the yield response to feed
levels higher than this is limited by the cow's low genetic potential. At a daily feed level of 3 kg of
dairy mix, the cows will not yield more than 9.5 litres each.
Table 3.4 presents the effects of feeding different levels of dairy mix on milk output, revenue
and cost. The table indicates that, given current government policy, our profit maximising farmer
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should feed 1 kg of dairy mix daily to each of her cows, giving a total milk output of 13 litres daily.
A new policy intervention in the form of an initial 15% rise in the price of milk paid by the government
collection scheme (from 80 to 92 cents/litre) should evoke a rise in feeding level to 1.5 kg and in
milk output to 15.5 litres (a rise of 19%). A further milk price rise of 15% (to 106 cents/litre) should
not evoke any more output unless it were accompanied by a lifting of the maximum supply quota
of 6 litres/farmer. If this were relaxed, the feeding level should rise to 2 kg/cow per day and milk
output to 17.5 litres (a rise of 13%).
Table 3.4. Feeding dairy mix to milking cows: Effects on productivity, revenue and cost, with and without policy
interventions.
Productivity Feed intake/cow (kg of dairy mix/day)
revenue and cost 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Yield/cow (litres/day) 3.00 5.00 6.50 7.75 8.75 9.25 9.50
MPP of intake (litres/kg) n.a. 4.00 3.0 2.5 10 1.0 0.5
MR (cents/litre)
Pre - new policy 100 100 so so 40 40 40
Post- new policy 100 100 92 92 40 40 40
MVP of intake (cents/kg)
106* 106* 106+ 106+ 106+
Pre - new policy n.a. 400 240 200 so 40 20
Post - new policy n.a. 400 276 230 so 40 20
480* 265* 212+ 106+ 52+
MFC of intake (cents/kg) n.a. 105 210 210 210 210 210
MPP = Marginal physical product. n.a. = not applicable.
MR = Marginal revenue. * = further 15% price rise.
MVP = Marginal value product. + = maximum quota lifted.
MFC = Marginal factor cost.
We need to distinguish between the concepts of the marginal and the average. The marginal
is the additional product/revenue/cost brought about by adding one more unit of input or output. The
average is the total production/revenue/cost divided by all the units of input or output involved. For
example, in Table 3.4, the marginal physical product of feeding an extra half kg of feed, raising feed
intake from one half to one kg daily, is 1 .5 kg of milk/half kg of feed. The average physical product
of half a kg of feed at that feeding level is 3.25 kg of milk (i.e. 6.5 kg of milk divided by 2 half
kg of feed; see third column of figures in Table 3.4). The total product per cow at that feed level is
6.5 kg of milk.
In summary, an increase in the price of a product will affect production through one or more
of the adjustment mechanisms outlined above, such that:
Total production response = resource expansion effect + enterprise substitution effect +
intensification effect
(Hint to instructors: Ask the participants what a person-day is. Does the concept provide a
sensible basis for assessing labour requirements in African agriculture?)
3.6.2 Relevant exercises
Exercise 3.3: The effect of product and input price changes on farm production and income.
Example: Refer to the example given in Exercise 3.2. Excluding, for the moment, data on the
cost of manure (a within-farm transfer), fixed costs and non-farm income, the original situation with
regard to total gross margin is shown in the table below. The table also presents information on the
constraints imposed on crop and livestock production by land availability.
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 Box 3.2: Short-term supply and long-term production responses
The response to a price change in the short term may be quite different from that in the long
term. This is particularly true of livestock production systems.
Farmers' responses to price changes are not usually instantaneous but lagged in time. For
instance, a maize producer may react to a past price increase by increasing ouput in the next
production period. However, if the price in that period falls, the apparent response in the short
term will be negative. That is, production will appear to have risen in response to a price drop.
Lagged responses to price are most pronounced in cattle production, since gestation and
maturation periods tend to be long. Producers may thus react to a price increase initially by
reducing rather than increasing offtake, in order to increase herd numbers and hence herd value.
Future offtake may increase as a result, but the time-lag before such an increase has any impact
on the market may be three years or more. Thus, a serious imbalance between market prices
and marketed output may occur in the short term.
This imbalance feeds on itself. As a result of the shortfall in market supply, prices may
be even further stimulated in the short term, further reinforcing the short-term negative supply
response and the long-term positive production response. This scenario, known as cyclical over
response, continues until market offtake starts to reduce prices again. Price cycles have a
stronger influence on market supply in the developed world than they do in Africa, where
drought and other factors also intervene.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the price cycle. Herd size adjusts gradually to changes in price in
such a way that movements in marketed output and herd size do not correspond. Exercise 3.4
contains a herd development model which again demonstrates this type of response.





In conclusion, cattle production systems may be characterised by the following features:
• relatively low or even negative price elasticities of supply in the short term
• higher and positive price elasticities of both production and supply in the long term.
Examples of these responses, expressed in terms of the price elasticity of supply, are







(kg) ($) (ha) Quantity (kg) ($)
Maize >750 6.60 3.0 750 19.80
Beans <100 13.20 0.5 100 6.60
Groundnuts >75 3.00 0.5 75 1.50
Sorghum <300 8.70 1.0 300 8.70
Livestock n.a. n.a. — — 30.00
Total 5.0 66.60
n.a = not applicable.
Now, let us assume a rise in the farm-gate price of sorghum and groundnuts to 6 and 14
cents/kg, respectively, and a fall in the price of beans from 12 to 7 cents/kg. All other prices and
input costs remain unchanged. The table below shows the optimum farm plan and the total gross
margin in this new situation:
Minimum Gross
margin/ha
Optimum plan Total farm
Activity quantity gross margin
constraint (kg) ($) (ha) Quantity (kg) ($)
Maize >750 6.60 3.0 750 19.80
Beans <100 7.70 0.0 0.0 0.00
Groundnuts >75 8.40 1.0 150 8.40
Sorghum >300 17.40 1.0 300 17.40
Livestock n.a. n.a. — — 30.00
Total 5.0 75.60
n.a. = not applicable.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 2 hours).
Question 1. For the example above, comment on the changes which have occurred in the farm plan
and the total farm gross margin. Estimate the percentage increase in total farm gross
margin and total income, assuming that non-farm income and fixed costs remain constant
(refer to Table 3.3, Exercise 3.2; continue to ignore manure cost and income).
Question 2. What would you expect to be the effects on farm output from an increase in meat and/or
milk prices? Give a qualitative answer distinguishing between the short- and long-term
effects of a price increase.
Question 3. For the small-scale dairy example (Exercises 3.1 and 3.2) assume the following:










Maize: 3 cents/kg to 3.5 cents/kg
Groundnuts: 5 cents/kg to 14 cents/kg
Coffee: 1? cents/kg to 35 cents/kg
Using this information and the data in Exercises 3.1 and 3.2, tabulate your results to obtain
the total farm gross margin for the original and new optimum farm plans. Estimate the percentage
change in output resulting from the price changes for maize, beans, groundnuts and coffee. Summarise
the data in a table, placing the percentage change in price for each enterprise against the corresponding
percentage change in output. Discuss your results.
Question 4. List some of the factors you consider would influence the supply response to price for
the commodities produced by the sample small-scale dairy unit. Explain why you think
these factors would influence the response.
Question 5. Discuss qualitatively the possible effects of a significant decrease in the price of fertiliser
or concentrate.
Exercise 3.4: Livestock production response: The use of cattle herd projection models.
Example: Herd projection models can be useful in understanding how producers are likely to
respond to market signals over time. A pastoral model will be used to demonstrate changes in offtake
rate, herd size and herd composition over 10 years. To do this, the following information on initial
herd structure, expected performance parameters and offtake rates are needed:
Herd size and structure (years 1-5):




1- to 2-year-old males 9
1- to 2-year-old females 9
2- to 3-year-old males 8
2- to 3-year-old females 8














a For simplicity, it is assumed that calves are born just after the start of the year.
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Performance parameters (years 1-10):
Calving rate (%) 60.0
Mortality rates (%) :
Calves 25.0
1- to 2-year-olds 10.0
2- to 3-year-olds 10.0
Cows 8.0
Bulls or oxen 8.0
Offtake rates:







Cows are culled at an annual rate of 10% and mature males at 30%. Residual sales (required
to obtain the offtake rate selected) are made up entirely of 2- to 3-year-old males.
Table 3.5 presents a simple herd projection model based on the information provided above.
Note how the increase in offtake rate from year 6 progressively reduces herd size until the original
rate is re-established in year 9. At this rate, herd size begins to grow again, but it will take five years
to regain the level of years 1-5. We may assume that the reduction in net sales from year 9 onwards
reflects a desire to prevent a further decline in herd size.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 1 hour).
Question 1. Using the same production parameters as in the example above, estimate total herd size
and herd structure for years 1 1 and 1 2, assuming that the overall offtake rate remains
at 11% from year 9 onwards.
Question 2. Compare your result with the original herd statistics.
3.6.3 Consumption response and market demand
Basic concepts guiding consumption response
In order to understand the factors affecting household consumption responses, it is first necessary to
introduce a number of concepts from economic theory. Much of the economic theory of consumption
is based on three key propositions. The first proposition is that the way in which people spend their
incomes and consume commodities is not haphazard but has some underlying rationale which can
be understood and predicted. We will deal with only one element of this proposition here—the
relationship between the amount consumed and the satisfaction afforded. According to theory, for
most commodities the amount of satisfaction per unit consumed diminishes with each additional unit.
For example, one or two chocolates, mangoes or cigarettes are very enjoyable; above that number,
each succeeding one gives less enjoyment.
Because the additional satisfaction a person gets with each unit tends to decline, he or she will
be prepared to pay less in order to acquire the next unit, perhaps preferring to spend the money on
some other commodity. For the first mango one will be prepared to pay 50 cents, for the second
only 45 cents, for the third 40 cents and so on. If we aggregate all these preferences of individual
consumers, we can construct a market demand schedule (market demand backed up by cash with
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Table 3.5. Projected herd numbers by category ofstock: Pastoral example.
Opening Net Closing no. Opening no.
Year Stock category number Births Deaths sales (year end) (next year start)
0-1 y.o males 12 3 9
0-1 y.o females 12 3 9
1-2 y.o males 9 1 8 9
1-5 1-2 y.o females 9 1 8 9
2-3 y.o males 8 1 2 5 8
2-3 y.o females 8 1 7 8
>3 y.o males 12 1 4 7 12
Cows 40 3 4 33 40
Total 86 24 14 10 86 86
0-1 y.o males 12 3 9
0-1 y.o females 12 3 9
1-2 y.o males 9 1 8 9
6 1-2 y.o females 9 1 8 9
2-3 y.o males 8 1 5 2 8
2-3 y.o females 8 1 7 8
>3 y.o males 12 I 4 7 9
Cows 40 3 4 33 40
Total 86 24 14 13 83 83
0-1 y.o males 12 3 9
0-1 y.o females 12 3 9
1-2 y.o males 9 1 8 9
7 1-2 y.o females 9 1 8 9
2-3 y.o males 8 1 5 2 8
2-3 y.o females 8 1 7 8
>3 y.o males 9 1 3 5 7
Cows 40 3 4 33 40
Total 83 24 14 12 81 81
0-1 y.o males 12 3 9
0-1 y.o females 12 3 9
1-2 y.o males 9 1 8 9
8 1-2 y.o females 9 1 8 9
2-3 y.o males 8 1 6 1 8
2-3 y.o females 8 1 7 8
>3 y.o males 7 1 2 4 5
Cows 40 3 4 33 40
Total 81 24 14 12 79 79
0-1 y.o males 12 3 9
0-1 y.o females 12 3 9
1-2 y.o males 9 l 8 9
9 1-2 y.o females 9 1 8 9
2-3 y.o males 8 l 4 3 8
2-3 y.o females 8 1 7 8
>3 y.o males 5 I 1 4 7
Cows 40 3 4 33 40
Total 79 24 13 9 81 81
0-1 y.o males 12 3 9
0-1 y.o females 12 3 9
1-2 y.o males 9 1 8 9
10 1-2 y.o females 9 1 8 9
2-3 y.o males 8 1 3 4 8
2-3 y.o females 8 1 7 8
>3 y.o males 7 1 2 4 8
Cows 40 3 4 33 40
Total 81 24 14 9 82 82
1 Herd projection models would normally exclude this column. It has been included to demonstrate the derivation of opening
herd number statistics for each production year.
2 y.o = year old.
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which to pay). The imaginary schedule below shows how much of a commodity (say poultry) would



















Such a relationship can be plotted graphically, and Figure 3.7 illustrates the general shape of
the resulting demand curve. Market demand will be discussed further under the third key proposition.
The second proposition is that consumption patterns change in response to changes in income.
These responses differ according to the nature of the goods in question and the income level of the
consumer. As income rises, the rate of increase in demand for staple commodities tends to decline
until a point of saturation is reached. When the consumption of a good increases at a rate below
the rate of growth in income, that good is known as a relatively inferior good. If consumption
declines in absolute terms as income increases, the commodity is known as an absolutely inferior
good. This good is then replaced by others in the individual's budget. An example would be the
replacement of maize or sorghum by wheat or wheat flour as incomes increase in urban areas. When
the consumption of a good increases faster than the rate of income growth, that good is said to be
a superior good. Examples in African urban areas include meat, milk and fish.
Two concepts are important to this discussion on the relationship between income and
comsumption: propensity to consume and income elasticity of demand. The average propensity
to consume a commodity is the proportion of consumers' total incomes spent on that commodity. If
total income is $ 1000, of which $ 500 is spent on grain, then the average propensity to consume
grain is 0.5. A more useful term is the marginal propensity to consume (MPC). The MPC can be
defined as the proportion of an additional dollar of income that is used to consume a given commodity.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the relationship between income, the consumption of food and non-food
commodities, and savings. Up to the relatively low level of income indicated by point A, all income
is spent on food. Both the average and the marginal propensity to consume are equal to 1. Between
income levels A and B, MPC declines rapidly and an increasing proportion of income is spent on
non-food commodities. At income levels above B, the MPC for food is practically zero and some
income starts to be saved. However, the average propensity to consume food at income level B and
above is still about 0.5.











Table 3.6 presents empirical data from a rural household survey in Sierra Leone in 1977. The
table shows typical shifts in the pattern of consumption associated with increases in rural income.
Notice how the share of subsistence consumption declines as incomes increase. A higher proportion
of income is allocated to urban-produced non-food goods within the higher income classes.
Table 3.6. Marginal propensities to consume by income classfor commodities grouped by origin, Sierra Leone,
1977.
Marginal propensity to consume
Income class
Origin classification Lowest 2nd & 3rd 4th & 5th 6th & 7th 8th & 9th Highest
Rural subsistence food
decile decile deciles deciles deciles decile
products 0.684 0.588 0.497 0.436 0.370 0.286
Rural purchased food
products 0.153 0.178 0.201 0.218 0.235 0.257
All rural food products 0.837 0.765 0.698 0.654 0.605 0.543
Rural non-farm goods 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009
Rural services and
ceremonial 0.036 0.023 0.080 0.117 0.158 0.211
All rural products 0.814 0.801 0.789 0.782 0.773 0.763
Small urban products 0.034 0.043 0.061 0.066 0.062 0.069
Large urban products 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021
Imported products 0.133 0.137 0.140 0.142 0.144 0.147
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Source: King and Byerlee (1977).
The second concept expressing the relationship between income and consumption for demand)
is the income elasticity of demand. This expresses the proportionate change in demand in relation
to a proportionate change in income, both changes expressed as percentages.
Thus:
% change in demandIncome elasticity of demand = ——;—a—:—:
% change in income
An income elasticity of demand of 0.25 would mean that for every 1 % rise in income, demand
for a given commodity would rise by 0.25%. Table 3.7 presents empirical data on the income
elasticities of demand for livestock products and cereals in different parts of the world.
1 Demand, defined as cash expenditure on a commodity, is easier to measure than physical consumption.
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Table 3.7. Income elasticities ofdemandfor livestock products and cereals, 1975.
Country group/
Region Meat Milk Eggs Cereals
Developed economies 0.25 -0.05 0.27 -0.22
Developing economies 0.63 0.57 1.00 0.16
Africa 0.79 0.68 1.05 0.21
Asia and Far East 0.97 0.52 1.07 0.22
Near East 0.72 0.53 0.83 0.13
Latin America 0.37 0.49 0.60 0.16
Source: FAO (1978).
1 Countries are grouped according to the classification system of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
The third key proposition is that consumption responds to changes in the price of a commodity.
This response is measured by the price elasticity of demand, defined as follows:
„ . ... , ■ % change in consumption
Price elasticity of demand = ——f : .
% change in price
For example, if the price of a product were to increase by 10%, resulting in a 1% decline in
demand for it, the price elasticity of demand would be -0.1. Note that the sign is negative, indicating
the normal inverse relationship between price and demand that exists for most products.
A price change will in fact have two separate effects on consumer demand for a product. These
are known as the income effect and the substitution effect. The income effect of a price increase
is to reduce the purchasing power of a given level of nominal income (all other things being equal).
This means that, unless it is also a producing household, a consuming household will be unable to
maintain previous consumption levels without sacrificing the consumption of other goods. The effect
of a commodity price change on consumer's income will depend on the share of that commodity in
total expenditure. Increases in the price of staple foods in third world countries will often have a
significant effect by virtue of their high share in household expenditure (often greater than 60%). A
change in the price of non-staple commodities such as beef and milk will have less effect.
A substitution effect occurs when a change in the price of a product alters the demand not
only for that product but also for its substitute(s). An increase in the price of maize, for example,
will tend to reduce the demand for maize and at the same time increase the demand for cassava and
grain sorghum. Similar substitution effects occur in the livestock subsector, for instance between beef
and other meat products. Under normal conditions, expenditures on most products accounts for only
a small proportion of total income, so that substitution effects tend to outweigh income effects.
The demand response for the good in question is known as the own price effect, while that
for its substitute(s) is called the cross price effect. These two effects are shown in Figure 3.7.
Consumption response of producing household
So far we have assumed that a household has a given income which is allocated between consumption
and saving according to prevailing prices and individual preferences. This assumption does not apply
to semi-subsistence households, where a portion of farm production is allocated to home consumption.
In such cases, the producer price for a good moves with the consumer price, so that nominal total
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income is not predetermined (as consumption theory normally assumes). Rather, nominal income
varies as producer prices vary.
Figure 3.7. Own and cross price effects on consumption response.
Price
A a) Own price effect
Price
Demand (good 1)
b) Cross price effect
Demand (good 2)
Quantity Quantity
For example, a rise in the consumer, and hence the producer, price of meat increases the value
of meat output and therefore the value of total farm income. This increase may encourage the
household to consume more meat, a response which could be called the producer income effect and
which will normally be positively related to price changes. The household will also be aware that
each unit of meat consumed has become more expensive—either, in the case of a surplus-producing
household, because of the extra market income foregone or, in the case of a deficit household, because
the costs of purchasing additional meat at market have gone up. In the latter case, the household is
negatively affected by the price increase in the same way as the non-producing household.
Thus, for a subsistence commodity, the overall income effect of a price change (i.e. whether
it is positive or negative) will depend on the commodity's share in the total value of farm output as
well as its share in total consumption. When the share in total cash income is high, but the share in
consumption is low (as is the case for beef in the typical agropastoral household), the positive effect
of a price increase on producer income will often more than compensate for the negative effect on
consumption.
The examples given in Exercises 3.5 and 3.6 show how to calculate income and price effects
on consumption.
Consumption response of non-producing household
Two additional points need to be made with respect to the consumption response of non-producing
households. Specifically:
• Increases in the price of food have a direct depressive effect on consumption in urban
households because a decline in real income is not partially offset by an increase in producer
income (the reverse is also true).
• In most African countries, inequalities of income are more pronounced in urban than in rural
areas.
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Box 3: Equity and the urban consumer.
Increases in food prices have a serious impact on the urban poor. For example, a 10% increase
in the price of food led to a 9% reduction in the real income of the lowest decile urban income
group in Nigeria. For the highest decile group, however, the increase resulted in only a 5.7%
decline in real income. The difference reflects the proportion of income allocated to food
consumption within each group. In the former group, between 60 and 80% of total income
was spent on food; in the latter group, the proportion was much smaller.
The composition of commodities in the city dweller's "food basket" changes as income rises.
Figure 3.8 depicts the typical pattern of change according to FAO data for a number of
developing countries. The figure shows how the relative share of animal products increases
rapidly as incomes increase. In other words, the income elasticity of demand for such products
is high.
Figure 3.8. The effect of income on diet schematised: Percentage of total calories derived from fats,
carbohydrates and proteins, by annual per caput GNP.
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Note: The figure is drawn in semi-logarithmic scale.
Source: Perisse et al (1969).
While the response to a price change for livestock commodities is likely to be elastic, the effect
of such a change on real income will tend to be small in most African countries, because the
proportion of income devoted to livestock commodities is still low. In contrast, a change in
consumer prices for staples will have a pronounced effect on income, particularly for the poor.




Exercise 3.5: The effect of income changes on food consumption.
Example: Refer again to the agropastoral example given in Exercises 3.1 to 3.3. Assume this
time that increases in crop and/or livestock production have resulted in a 10% increase in real income.







Income increases also affect demand for non-food items, but these will be ignored in this
example.









Commodity level (kg) (kg) level kg
Maize 0.1 +1.0 1160 + 11.60 1171.6
Beans 0.4 44.0 90 + 3.60 93.6
Groundnuts 0.4 +4.0 95 + 3.80 98.8
Sorghum 0.1 +1.0 325 + 3.25 328.3
Milk 1.0 +10.0 150 + 15.00 165.0
Meat 1.0 +10.0 20 + 2.00 22.0
Note: Consumer and producer prices used for the agropastoral example do not correspond.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 1 hour).
Question 1. Using the small-scale dairy farm model in Exercises 3.1 to 3.3 and assuming a 15%
increase in real income resulting from improved productivity, calculate consumption








Note: Use the estimates you obtained for consumption in Exercise 3.2 as the basis for
calculating consumption changes.
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Question 2. Rank the following consumer commodities according to their probable income elasticities
of demand for a middle-income and a high-income rural household, respectively, in an
African country of your choice (commodities may be grouped together if necessary).
State the reasons for your ranking.
Maize Eggs
Sorghum Fish




Exercise 3.6: The effect of price changes on food consumption.
Example: Table 3.8 summarises cash expenditure for an urban middle-income household.














1 CDW = cold dressed weight (for the relationship between dressing out percentage, CDW and price, see box. Exercise 4. 1).
n.a. = not applicable.
Holding total cash income and non-food prices constant, let us examine the impact of price
changes for selected food commodities on total cash expenditure and total savings. Commodity price
changes have occurred as shown in the following table:













Original price New price Price change Price elasticity
Commodity (cents/kg) (cents/kg) (%) of demand
Maize 5.0 6.0 +20 -0.1
Milk 6.0 5.4 -10 -1.2
Meat' 35.0 38.5 +10 -1.2
Sugar 10.0 10.0 0 -0.2
Vegetables 10.0 13.0 +30 -0.5
1 CDW.
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Given the above data, changes in total cash expenditure on food, in total savings and in total
























1100 -2 1078.0 64.60
400 +12 448.0 24.19
60 -12 52.0 20.33
50 0 50.0 5.00
200 -15 170.0 22.10







n.a. = not applicable.
Price increases for maize, meat and vegetables have resulted in a decline in their amounts
consumed, accompanied by an increase in expenditure on maize and vegetables. A decline in the
price of milk has resulted in an increase in the amount consumed and a marginal increase in cash
expenditure for that commodity. Savings have declined by approximately 25% because of a 7%
increase in the amount spent on food.
Note that this analysis has not taken into account the substitution effect. In this exercise, we
are merely concerned with own price demand responses and have assumed a zero cross elasticity of
demand between the goods consumed.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 1 hour).
The following table summarises data on cash expenditure, savings and total cash income for









































n.a. = not applicable.
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Question 1. Examine the impact on food consumption, cash expenditure and household savings
(assuming that non-food expenditure and total cash income remain constant), given the
following information:
Original price New price Price elasticity
Commodity cents/kg) (cents/kg) of demand
Maize 5.0 7.0 -0.1
Milk 6.0 6.6 -1.4
Meat1 35.0 28.0 -1.3
Sugar 10.0 12.0 -0.6
Vegetables 10.0 15.0 -0.9
Beverages no price change throu ghout
1CDW.




Market supply response (as opposed to production response) can be considered as the residual of
other responses to price changes. The response can be computed as follows:
market supply response = production response - net stock increase - home consumption response
It is not possible to draw specific conclusions about the nature of supply response to price
signals without reference to empirical data. However, as a general rule, the market supply response
for most products is positively related to output prices and negatively related to input prices. Figure
3.9 provides an example from semi-subsistence agriculture. (The figure ignores changes in net stock
levels). Production responds positively and consumption negatively to a price increase. Above the
threshold price, where production equals consumption, this household produces a market surplus,
i.e. net supply (production minus home consumption) is positive. Below the threshold price, the
residual is negative, i.e. there is a household deficit or net market demand (shown on the left hand
side of the figure).












Returning to the agropastoral example, assume a case in which a portion of annual herd offtake
is consumed at home and the remainder is sold. A relative decline in the price of beef might persuade
the producer to increase offtake for sale (i.e. reduce herd size), in order both to increase average
herd productivity so as to maintain revenue above cost, and to transfer resources into other enterprises.
Beyond a certain point, however, further sales would force a decline in home consumption of beef.
The retail price at market would now become the basis for valuing beef output. This change from
farm gate to retail price might dissuade the producer from further reducing herd size.
Aggregate supply response
So far we have discussed how price changes influence individual farmers, but not how to assess their
influence on production and supply as a whole. From a policy perspective, it is the aggregate rather
than the individual supply response which is of concern. In practice it would be impossible to obtain
the aggregate response at the national level by predicting and summing all individual responses.
Instead, analysts tend to rely on sectoral statistics of market supplies to estimate supply responses.
The data obtained can then be related to other time series or cross sectional data in order to establish
explanatory relationships.
However, because the results of aggregate response estimates tend to be mathematically and
practically unreliable, an understanding of how individual farmers are likely to respond is essential.
Extrapolations from individual to aggregate responses form a useful comparison with aggregate
responses derived from sectoral data.
When extrapolations of this kind are made, remember that not all producers will be able to
respond as they wish to, so that aggregate response will always be less than the intended responses
of all individuals summed. This is because increased competition for resources constrains individual
responses, since input prices may rise and pasture, water or other resources may become scarce.
(Hint to instructors: When assessing aggregate response, be careful not to double count by
attributing the same production gain to more than one stage in the production chain e.g. breeder,
stock-feeder, fattener.)
The direction and intensity of an aggregate supply response is measured by the price elasticity
of supply, calculated as follows:
Price elasticity of supply =
% change in supply
% change in price
Empirical estimates of supply elasticity are rare for African livestock production systems,
largely because of problems in data collection. Table 3.9 summarises data on livestock supply
responses recorded in Africa and Latin America. The table demonstrates that while supply elasticities
may be negative or very low in the short term, they tend to be both higher and positive in the longer
run.
Table 3.9. Livestock supply elasticities: Country examples.
Product Country
Price elastic ty
Short run Long run
Beef Latin America -0.1 to -1.2 0.4 to 1.6
Beef stock Botswana 0.3 2.6
Beef (commercial) Zimbabwe -0.5 to -0.6 2.6
Beef (communal) Zimbabwe -0.3 n.a.
Cattle Swaziland -1.1 n.a.
Cattle Sudan 1.1 n.a.
Source: Rodriguez (1985; 1986).
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Market equilibrium and market price
We have now examined the concepts of a supply curve, which relates the quantity of a commodity
supplied to price, and a demand curve, which relates the quantity demanded to price. Neither of
these curves tell us what a price will actually be. They are much like conditional sentences: "If the
price is W then the amount supplied will be X."; "If the price is Y then the amount demanded will
be Z." In this section we will discuss how market prices are determined by the relationship between
the two curves, assuming an open economy as the basis for discussion.
The columns below set out demand and supply schedules for a given commodity, in this case
poultry meat. These columns provide the raw material for our supply and demand curves.









80 75,000 100 30,000
70 69,000 90 39,000
60 63,000 80 48,000
50 57,000 70 57,000
40 51,000 60 66,000
30 45,000 50 75,000
20 39,000 40 84,000
The prices in these supply and demand schedules are recorded at different points of sale. It is
the price paid to the producer at the point where he or she sells (the farm gate or primary market)
that determines how much he or she will supply, and hence the supply schedule. It is the price paid
by the consumer at the point where he or she buys (in the market place or the retail shop) that
determines how much he or she will demand, and hence the demand schedule. Only rarely, in large
modern economies, do farmers sell directly to the consumer, such that the price the consumer pays
is the price the farmer receives. Normally, transport costs, taxes, traders' and butchers' costs and
margins fill the gap between the producer price and the consumer (retail) price.
In order to relate the supply and demand schedules to each other, we need to use a common
price. For simplicity, assume there is a uniform gap of 20 cents/kg between the producer and consumer
prices in the schedules given above. We can either deduct this from consumer prices or add it to
producer prices, obtaining either derived consumer prices or derived producer prices, respectively.
Below are the poultry meat supply and demand schedules, harmonised at a common derived retail
price.
















What will the market retail price actually be? Assume that supply and demand can respond
instantaneously to price. Suppose the price is 80 cents/kg. At that price, producers will be prepared
to supply 63,000 t but consumers will only demand 48,000 t. The price would have to fall to about
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60 cents/kg to persuade consumers to buy it all. But at 60 cents/kg, producers will be prepared to
supply only 51,000 t, which will not be enough to meet demand. As a result, consumers will start
competing with each other by offering a higher price. At 70 cents/kg, the amount supplied (57,000
t) will be equal to the amount demanded. That is the equilibrium price at which the market will
settle; at all other prices, either producers or consumers will be dissatisfied and will adjust their
supply or demand.
3.6.6 Relevant exercises
Exercise 3.7: Supply, demand and market equilibrium.
Example: Given below are (imaginary) supply and demand schedules for beef, unadjusted for
derived prices:









35 50,000 45 17,000
30 45,000 40 23,000
25 40,000 35 29,000
20 35,000 30 35,000
15 30,000 25 41,000
10 25.000 20 47,000
Exercise: (estimated time required: 1.5 hours).
Question 1. Draw up the schedules again, using a marketing margin which is fixed at 10 cents/kg.
Question 2. Draw the supply and demand curves. Do they cross one another? If so, what price will
the consumer actually pay at the point of intersection?
Question 3. In the text we assumed that supply and demand respond instantaneously to price changes.
Now suppose that demand adjusts instantaneously but that it takes two years before
producers can adjust their supply to each price change. What effect will this have on
reaching market equilibrium?
Question 4. If a government controls retail prices at a level lower than equilibrium, what will this




The production response to price may be neutral, negative or positive. However, with increased
integration to a market economy, positive responses are more common over the long term.
• A long-term production response is, in some situations, associated with a negative short-term
market supply response.
♦
Important points (3.6) cont...
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 Important points (3.6) cont...
• An increase in the price of a product will affect production through one or more of the
following adjustment mechanisms:
♦ utilising slack resources
♦ substituting enterprises
♦ intensifying production.
• The decision to substitute one enterprise for another depends on their relative profitability
measured in terms of the gross margin, expressed as:
• Gross margin = gross value of output - variable costs
• The profitability of adopting intensified methods will depend on three main factors:
♦ The marginal physical productivity (MPP) of the inputs used, i.e. output per additional
unit of input.
♦ The marginal revenue (MR) generated by each extra unit of output. When MPP is
multiplied by MR, we get the marginal value product (MVP).
♦ The marginal factor cost (MFC) per unit of input used.
• To maximise profits through intensification, one can use extra inputs so long as MVP
exceeds MFC.
Consumption response
• Three key propositions of the economic theory of consumption are:
♦ For most commodities, the amount of satisfaction per unit consumed diminishes with
each additional unit.
♦ Consumption patterns change in response to change in income. Consumption responses
will differ according to the nature of the good in question and the income level of the
consumer.
♦ Consumption responds to changes in the price of the commodity.
• Two important concepts to express the relationship between income and consumption are:
♦ marginal propensity to consume
♦ elasticity of demand.
• The marginal propensity to consume is defined as the proportion of an additional dollar of
income that is used to consume a given commodity. The income elasticity of demand
expresses the proportional change in demand in relation to a proportional change in income,
both changes being expressed as percentages. Thus:
... . % change in demandIncome elasticity demand = -_ , g . .
% change in income
• The consumption response to change in commodity price is measured in terms of price
elasticity of demand, defined as:
- . .... % change in consumption
Price elasticity demand = —f : .
% change in price
• A change in the price of a commodity has two separate effects on consumer demand: income
effects and substitution effects.
Important point (3.6) cont...
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 Important points (3.6) cont...
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• a systematic long-term component, known as the trend
• short-term deviations from the trend, known as fluctuations.
Reliable estimations of past trends and their use in forecasting is a highly specialised field
using sophisticated econometric techniques. Here we shall not deal with these but with rough
approximations.
Rough approximations of a trend from time series data can be made in three ways:
• By calculating moving averages in order to eliminate the effect of fluctuations. For example,
the 1980 3-year moving average of production for a commodity would be the production
average for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981. There is no rule concerning the number of years
that should be included when calculating a moving average. The choice will depend on
commodity characteristics and on the data available. In most cases, 3- or 5-year moving
averages are used.
• By calculating the average annual rate of change for the variable over a defined period (t).
This rate should always be calculated as a compound growth rate, defined as follows:
r-[(^»-l]il»
where:
r = the compound growth rate
Xo = the starting year value
Xt = the final year value
t = the number of years used for trend estimation.
In order to avoid bias caused by unusually high or low values at the beginning or end of the
period, starting and end-year values should themselves be an average of three years.
• By graphing changes in the variable over time and subjectively estimating the trend line by
hand. This method, though simple, is obviously less exact (see Exercise 3.8.)
(Hint to instructors: At this point you may wish to comment on variability and the use of
means and standard deviations.)
3.7.2 Trend extrapolation
The simplest way to forecast the future of a given variable is to extrapolate its past trend. Using the
graphical method described above, extrapolation would simply be done by extending the trend line
to the year for which the projection is required. Using moving averages, the same method can be
applied but with more reliable results.
Finally, we can extrapolate on the basis of the average rate of change observed in the past. To
do this, we will need to use compound growth rates. Thus, if "r" is the percentage rate of growth
for a variable and "Yo" is its starting value, and we wish to extrapolate for a period of "t" years to
obtain an end year value, "Yt", the formula used would be:
Yt= Y°x(l +r)t
Forecasts by trend extrapolation are based on the assumption that the factors which have
influenced the past will continue to have the same influence in the future. If there is reason to doubt
this, extrapolations should be modified accordingly.
Sometimes the factors influencing a variable will be subject to less fluctuation about their
trends and so will be more reliably predictable than the variable itself. In such cases, the best forecast
of the variable is obtained by deriving it from predictions about the influencing factors rather than
by extrapolating a past trend that is itself derived from sharply fluctuating values.
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For example, in the case of demand, it is usually assumed that the most important factors
determining the trend will be population and income. Prices may also be important, but for long-term
forecasts the usual assumption is that prices will move in parallel with each other, such that specific
price effects can be neglected. However, if price ratio changes are expected, they may be incorporated
into the forecast.
On this basis, demand can be forecasted relatively easily, using the concept of income elasticity
of demand.
For a given percentage change in real income per caput (i.e. income at constant prices ), the
percentage change in per caput demand is equivalent to the real income change multiplied by the
income elasticity. Hence, the percentage change in aggregate consumption can be calculated as
follows:
% change in aggregate consumption = % change in population + income elasticity
x % change in real income per caput
Consumption for a given year in the future can then be forecasted by compounding the annual
rate of change in consumption over the number of years required.
As we have already seen, it is extremely difficult to predict future trends in production since
the number of influencing factors is much greater. If all other factors were to remain constant (which
is unlikely), then price would be the determinant. The impact of changes in real producer price would
be measured in terms of the price elasticity of supply. Thus:
% change in future production = % change in past production + price elasticity of supply
x (% change in expected real producer price - % change in past real producer price)
Production for a given year in the future could then be forecasted by compounding the annual
rate of change in production over the number of years required.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting relationships of cause and effect between variables
projected in this way. Relationships for which there is no logical explanation may be apparent
statistically.
The forecasting methods are rather basic, and useful only for approximating future trends.
Projections based on them cannot adequately incorporate the full range of factors influencing
production and consumption. However, in practical policy analysis, the opportunity to use more
sophisticated methods may not exist, and these simpler techniques, properly applied, will often be
useful.
3.7.3 Relevant exercises
Exercise 3.8: Supply and demand projections.
Example: Table 3.10 provides country statistics on disposable income, the consumer price
index and population numbers for 1976-95. These are then related to consumption and production
data for maize and to producer prices, in order to determine consumption per caput and real producer
prices for each year of the period. Figure 3.10 presents the data from Table 3.10 in graphical form.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 4 hours).
Examine Figure 3.10a carefully and compare the graph with the time series data given in Table
3.10. In the graph, a trend line has been drawn by hand for deflated disposable income, forecasted
When projecting supply and demand, distinguish between current prices (the sums actually received)
and constant prices (prices adjusted according to the cost of living index in order to offset the impact of
inflation).
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estimates of which have been extrapolated for 1990 and 1995. These estimates have also been entered
in the table.
Table 3.10. Derivation ofreal producer prices and per caput consumption ofmaize, 1976-95.
Year Projectedguestimates
-^ 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1990 1995
Disposable income $106 900 1020 1170 1430 1830 1866 1920 1940 1980 2000
Consumer price 100 115.0 124.9 142.4 147.9 158.8 164.3 177.4 193.4 212.8
index
(CPI) (1976 =100)
Deflated $106 900 886.9 936.7 1004.2 1237.3 1175.0 1168.6 1093.5 1023.8 939.8 850.0 710.0
disposable income
Population $106 6 6.24 6.50 6.75 7.00 7.29 7.58 7.90 8.20 8.52 10.35 12.58
Deflated 150 142.0 144.0 148.8 176.8 161.2 154.2 138.4 124.9 110.3
income/caput
Maize:
Consumption t 106 0.90 0.97 0.93 1.01 1.09 1.11 1.15 1.16 1.19 1.20
Consumption/ 150.0 149.0 149.2 149.6 155.7 152.3 151.7 146.8 145.1 140.8
caput k8
Production t 106 1.20 1.00 1.12 0.80 1.15 0.40 1.05 1.40 1.40
Producer price3 $/t 14.0 14.0 16.5 19.5 19.5 23.0 23.0 27.0 27.0 27.0
Real producer $/t 14.0 12.2 13.2 13.7 13.2 14.5 14.0 15.2 14.0 12.7
price (in 1976 $)4
Nettradeable t 106 +0.30 +0.07 +0.13 +0.11 -0.29 +0.04 -0.75 -0.11 +0.21 +0.20
surplus
106 = Million
1 Deflated disposable income is derived as follows: [disposable income/(consumer price index)] x 100.
2 Deflated per caput income is derived as follows: deflated disposable income/population number.
3 That is, the current producer price per unit.
4 That is, the constant producer price per unit.
Question 1. On Figure 3.10b, draw trend lines for maize production and consumption, and extrapolate
values for 1990 and 1995. Enter these values in the table.
Question 2. On a separate sheet, derive and plot consumption per caput and extrapolate its trend to
1990 and 1995.
Question 3. On Figure 3.10c, draw the trend line for real producer price and enter your estimates in
the table.
Question 4. Identify and comment on any observed and logical relationships between the variables
graphed in Figures 3.10a-3.10c. Discuss the relationships between price, income and
quantity trends. Indicate whether the country is moving towards being self-sufficient, a
net importer or a net exporter of maize.
Question 5. Table 3.11 presents information on production, consumption and producer prices for beef
and whole milk. The table is incomplete, and information from Table 3.10 on population
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For both products, complete all rows in the table.
Graph the results, as in the previous example.
Sketch the trend line for each variable and project this to the year 1995. Enter these estimates
in Table 3.11.
For both products, comment on any relationships which you consider logically explainable.
For both products, determine whether the country is likely to be self-sufficient, a net exporter
or a net importer by 1990.
Why do you think the positive relationship between deflated disposable income per caput and
consumption per caput is so strong for all three products? Estimate the implied income
elasticity of demand for each product, assuming for this rough estimate that prices and other
factors do not influence demand.
Table 3.11. Production, consumption and producer prices ofbeefand whole milk, 1976-95.
Year Projectedguestimates
Item Unit 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1990 1995
Beef:
Consumption '0001 90.0 92.0 96.2 101.3 112.7 113.0 115.2 115.3 114.8 113.3
Consumption/ kg
caput
Production '000t 115.0 125.0 120.0 125.0 130.0 145.0 151.0 140.0 145.0 150.0






Consumption '000t 540.0 549.1 568.8 598.7 667.8 670.7 685.2 684.9 683.1 676.5
Consumption/ kg 90 88.0 87.5 88.7 95.4 92.0 90.4 86.7 83.3 79.4
caput
Production '000 t 600.0 580.0 540.0 550.0 545.0 560.0 550.0 562.0 580.0 570.0
Producer price1 $/t 15.0 15.0 20.0 24.5 24.7 30.0 30.1 34.9 45.1 50.0
Real producer $/t 15.0 13.0 16.0 17.2 16.7 18.9 18.3 19.7 23.3 23.5
price
Nettradeable '000 t +60.0 +30.9 -28.8 -48.7-122.8-110.7-135.2-122.9-103.1.-106.5
surplus
1 Dressed weight price/t for FAQ beef.
Exercise 3.9: Group Exercise: Production systems, supply and demand. Read the relevant sections
of the central case study.
Question 1. Describe the role of beef cattle in the economy of Alphabeta, giving reasons for the
changing contribution of the livestock subsector to GDP earnings since independence.
Cite statistical data to support your description, where possible.
Question 2. Describe quantitatively changes in beef herd growth, offtake rates, urban demand,
marketed supply and exports in Alphabeta for the period since independence. Plot past
trends in these variables and extrapolate these trends for five years beyond the final year
of your data set. Discuss the implications of the extrapolations you have made.
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Question 3. What factors have influenced the stability of the beef sector's contribution to the economy
of Alphabeta?
Question 4. Describe the main features of Alphabeta's various beef production systems. If possible,
indicate the degree of commercialisation in each. Also examine the evidence for changing
ownership patterns and land access rights in the communal areas since independence.
Comment on the results you obtain. Give quantitative evidence for the significance of
each system to the Alphabeta meat industry.
 
Important points (3.7)
• Two rough methods of forecasting future production and/or consumption for a particular
product are:
♦ analysis of past trends
♦ trend extrapolation.
• A rough analysis of a trend is made from time series data in three ways, namely,
♦ by calculating moving averages
♦ by calculating average annual rate of change
♦ by graphing changes in the variable over time subjectively.
• Extrapolation can be done by using the changes in the variable over time, moving averages
or the average rate of change observed in the past.
• Forecast by trend extrapolation method, based on past trends, must be modified for special
factors having influence for the future.
• Future population and income provide the basis for forecasting demand of a commodity
instead of its price.
3.8 Feedback exercises
All answers can be found in the text.
1. Name major livestock production systems in Africa,
small-scale:
large-scale:
2. Circle T for True and F for False.
i) The degree to which a farm is integrated into the market economy greatly depends on
the geographical location of the farm.
T F
ii) The proximity of a farm to urban centres does not guarantee agricultural integration
into the market economy.
T F
iii) Pure subsistence production systems are virtually non-existent in Africa.
T F
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iv) Semi-subsistence producers consume the bulk of their produce at home with no
surplus available for sale.
T F
v) For a semi-subsistence producer, the major goal is maximising chances for survival
rather than maximising production.
T F
vi) Innovation with higher production capability will be attractive to subsistence-oriented
producers, despite the probability of failure.
T F
3. Below is the format of an input-output table for a mixed smallholder farming system. List
the items under the heading inputs, outputs and farm activity.
Farm activity
Item 1 2 3 4 Input utilisation
Inputs
Outputs
4. Fill in the missing terms for the following equations:
i) Total consumption = subsistence consumption + - sales.
ii) Total value of output - total variable cost - total fixed cost + non-farm income =
iii) Net cash income from farm sources = value of
purchased variable inputs - fixed cost, excluding depreciation.
5.a. Define the terms marginal physical productivity (MPP), marginal revenue (MR) and





b. Write the formula to calculate marginal value product (MVP):
MVP =
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b. Differentiate between the terms "average propensity to consume" and "marginal propensity
to consume".
c. The price of milk at a farm was increased by 20%, resulting in a 4% decline in demand
for it. Calculate price elasticity of demand.
7. Justify the following statement:
"Market supply response can be considered as the residual of production and consumption
responses to price changes."
8. Circle T for True and F for False.
i) Above the threshold price, the net market supply would be positive.
T F
ii) The production decisions at a farm are based on the price that the producer receives
while consumption decisions are based on price at the retail level.
T F
iii) It is possible to convert consumer retail price to producer price term by adding the
marketing margin.
T F
iv) Market equilibrium price is that price at which consumers are willing to buy all that
the producers offer for sale.
T F
9. Name two rough methods of forecasting future production/consumption for a product.
i)
ii)
lO.a. How will you calculate the 1990 3-year moving average of consumption of a commodity?
b. What type of values for a variable can be used to forecast its future consumption by
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Module 4: Market, Price and Trade Policies
 
4. 1 Performance objectives
4.2 Introduction
4.3 What policy instruments are currently being used?
4.4 What effects do current policy instruments have?
4.4. 1 Effects of border measures
4.4.2 Effects of domestic measures in an open economy
4.4.3 Effects of domestic measures in a closed economy
4.4.4 State agencies: Inconsistent policies and informal markets
4.4.5 Relevant exercises
4.5 To what degree have current policy instruments been applied?
4.5.1 The basis for comparison
4.5.2 Estimating rates of protection
4.5.3 Official and shadow rates of exchange
4.5.4 Relevant exercises
4.6 What Is the effect of current policies?
4.6.1 Estimating price elasticity
4.6.2 Effects on quantity
4.6.3 Effects on producer income and consumer surplus
4.6.4 Effects on budget and net welfare
4.6.5 Limitations of the analysis
4.6.6 Relevant exercises









Module 4 is intended to enable you to:
1 . Discuss effects of policy instruments, in qualitative terms, on: prices and quantities at the producer
and consumer levels; marketing margin; quantities traded; and government expenditure or income.
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2. Demonstrate proficiency in solving numerical questions related to equivalent domestic and border
policy instruments and the effects of state agencies.
3 . Explain the rationale for using border price as a point of reference for determining the degree to which
current policy instruments have been applied.
4. Explain the terms "nominal rate of protection" and "nominal protection coefficients" and solve
numerical problems on nominal protection coefficients.
5. Describe methods for determining quantitative effects of current market price and trade policies at
consumer, producer and national levels and solve related numerical exercises.
6. Discuss the justification for government interference with price.
7. Describe implementation problems associated with market price and trade policies.
4.2 Introduction
Market, price and trade policies directly affect the prices and amounts of commodities produced or
inputs applied. Such policies normally have both domestic and international trade effects. Module 4
provides a framework for analysing market, price and trade policy by posing questions a policy
analyst might ask when reviewing policy towards a given commodity, and illustrating some of the
methods available for answering them. The module discusses both the extent to which different
government objectives can be met by interfering with prices and some of the problems of
implementing market, price and trade policies.
In this module we focus mainly on the impact of policy on commodity output levels and prices,
but much of the discussion also applies to input quantities and prices. Policy issues relevant to market
structures and distribution systems are discussed in module 5.
4.3 What policy instruments are currently being used?
The first task in reviewing current policy towards a given commodity is to discover what policy
instruments are already being used. This task may be complicated by the fact that a wide range of
policy measures (each with its own historical origin) will often be applied simultaneously by different
government and/or parastatal agencies. Below is a checklist of questions designed to ensure that no
instruments are omitted from the review:
• What instruments are being used at the international trade level? Are there any import or
export tariffs, taxes or subsidies? Are there quantitative restrictions or other non-tariff measures?
Is international trade the responsibility of a state or parastatal agency with monopoly power?
If so, what policy does the agency concerned pursue? Can the policy's economic effects be
described in terms of tariff or non-tariff measures? Is the exchange rate in equilibrium or is it
overvalued or undervalued?
• What instruments are being used at the wholesale level? Is marketing done by private firms
or are there state or parastatal agencies with monopoly power? Are there commodity-specific
taxes or subsidies? Are there any public authorities buying or selling at predetermined prices?
Does the government attempt to control prices by other means? Is there a public storage policy?
• What instruments are being used at the producer level? Is there a programme of public
procurement? Are there any commodity-specific subsidies or taxes? Are there forced deliveries
or quotas on production?
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What instruments are being used at the retail level? Does the government attempt to control
retail prices? If so, how? Are there specific taxes or subsidies? Are there "fair price" retail
outlets? Is there rationing?
4.4 What effects do current policy instruments have?
After identifying the policy instruments used by the government, the second step is to ascertain how
the various market, price and trade policy instruments affect:
prices and quantities at the producer level
prices and quantities at the consumer level
marketing margins
quantities traded
government expenditure or income.
A competitive iree market will be assumed as the point of reference. In order to simplify the
discussion, we will also assume that world prices remain unaffected by the country's trading
operations (i.e. the country under consideration is a small one in terms of external trade).
As a methodical basis for discussion, the effects of the following policy instruments commonly
adopted by African governments and elsewhere will be described and analysed:
• border measures
• domestic measures in an open economy
• domestic measures in a closed economy
• state agencies: inconsistent policies and informal markets.
4.4.1 Effects of border measures
An import tariff raises the price of imports above international levels for both the producer and the
consumer. The effect is to reduce imports and increase domestic prices, and hence domestic
production, while consumption declines. Domestic producers therefore benefit but consumers suffer
a welfare loss. Government revenue increases. Similar effects will occur when an import quota is
used, except that such quotas do not increase government revenue. Instead, licensed traders will be
able to earn a rent on their operations over and above the profit they would have made in a free
market (unless the government auctions import licenses to the highest bidder). An import subsidy
will have the opposite effects.
An export tax reduces exports and hence domestic prices, leading to lower domestic production
and higher consumption (Figure 4.1). Producer welfare declines but consumer welfare improves.
Government revenue again increases. Similar effects result from an export quota, while an export
subsidy will have the opposite effects.
The marketing policies adopted by monopoly trade agencies will often have similar effects to
tariffs, subsidies or quotas. Thus, when a state or parastatal monopoly import agency sells on the
domestic market at prices above those on the world market (even with marketing costs taken into
account), the effect will be similar to an import tariff. Likewise, if a monopoly export agency buys
on the domestic market at prices below those on the world market, the effects on production and
consumption will be analogous to those of an export tax.
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Dw Dd Sd Sw Quantity
Pw: World market price
Pd: Domestic market price
t: Export tax (equivalent to producer tax/
consumer subsidy)
Dw: Domestic demand at Pw
Dd: Demand at Pd
Sw: Supply at Pw
Sd: Supply at Pd
4.4.2 Effects of domestic measures in an open economy
When a country's international trade is unrestricted by tariffs, licenses, quotas, foreign exchange
controls or any other kind of barrier (including high transport costs) it is said to have an open
economy. The expression open economy is relative. An economy with a non-prohibitive level of
import tariff but no quantitative or foreign exchange controls is "fairly open". Conversely, when
foreign exchange controls accompany the same level of tariffs, it is considered "rather closed".
In an open economy, domestic prices generally correspond to their border price equivalents.
The border price equivalent for a given commodity in which a country trades is its border price,
adjusted for marketing, handling and transport costs (but not taxes) between the border and the
domestic market. The border price of a commodity is its international trade price, c.i.f. (costs,
insurance, freight) at the country's own border in the case of imports, and f.o.b. (free on board) in
the case of exports.
When applied in an open economy, a producer subsidy increases returns to the producer,
raising the incentive to produce more. Consumers remain unaffected (Figure 4.2). Either imports are
reduced or exports are increased. Government expenditure increases.
A deficiency payment scheme, where producers are compensated for reduced revenue caused
either by falling prices or by falling output (or both) over a given time period, is one example of a
producer subsidy. A floor price system, through which the government pays the producer a guaranteed
price above the border price equivalent (while it sells to consumers at the lower free market level),
has essentially the same effects. A producer tax will work in the opposite direction.
A consumer subsidy reduces the price paid by the consumer; thereby increasing domestic
consumption. Producers remain unaffected. Either imports are inoeased or exports are reduced.
Consumer welfare is improved. Again, government expenditure increases. A consumer tax will have
the opposite effects.
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Pm: Market price equal to world market price
Pp: Subsidised producer price
Zp: Producer subsidy
Sm: Supply at market price
Sp: Supply at subsidised producer price
D: Demand
The effects of tariffs/subsidies applied at the border can be expressed in terms of equivalent
subsidies or taxes applied at the domestic level. For example, an export tax will have an effect
equivalent to the combined effect of a producer tax and a consumer subsidy (Figure 4.1). The only
major difference between border measures and equivalent domestic measures lies in their ease of
administration. Whereas trade taxes and subsidies can be implemented conveniently at the border
where the market channel is narrow and relatively easy to control, equivalent domestic measures
require an elaborate institutional administrative framework for effective implementation. Border
measures, however, will not work unless smuggling can be stopped.
4.4.3 Effects of domestic measures in a closed economy
When a country's international trade is restricted by trade barriers, high transport costs or for other
reasons, it is said to have a closed economy. In these circumstances, domestic subsidies/taxes have
different effects. For example, a producer subsidy would increase the producer price, but it would
also increase total supply (instead of merely displacing imports), in which case consumer prices
would fall, such that both parties would benefit (Figure 4.3). In a closed economy, a producer subsidy
would be similar in its effects to a consumer subsidy. The difference would depend on the relative
elasticities of supply and demand.
4.4.4 State agencies: Inconsistent policies and informal markets
Policies implemented through domestic state monopolies are analogous in effect to subsidies or taxes.
For example, a monopoly marketing board, which pays a higher price to the producer than it
charges the consumer (once marketing costs have been taken into account), is effectively implementing
a policy to subsidise both parties.
State monopolies and other state or parastatal agencies often operate inefficiently, resulting in
serious market distortions. Associated with such distortions is the emergence and growth of informal
(and often illegal) markets, which circumvent monopolies and so erode their power. Under these
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circumstances, a fundamental condition for an efficient system, namely market transparency, is
violated. Even where state agencies do not operate as total monopolies, their margins often exceed
those of the private sector. As a result, the market share of the state body often declines, adversely
affecting its marketing operations still further. When state agencies operate inefficiently, private traders
may face reduced competition (if their numbers are restricted), enabling them to make excessive
profits.
Figure 4.3. Effects ofa producer subsidy in a closed economy.
Consumer
 
Po: Price paid by consumers before introduction of subsidy
PI: Price paid by consumers after introduction of subsidy
Zp: Producer subsidy
Qo: Quantity before subsidy
Ql: Quantity after introduction of subsidy
Inconsistency results when a state agency is required to maintain an artificial price level (i.e.
above or below equilibrium), but is unable to do so because of inadequate financial and/or policy
support from government. A state monopoly with a responsibility to maintain consumer prices at
levels below market equilibrium must be supported either by explicit government subsidies or by the
provision of adequate financial resources to cover the losses it incurs.
Inconsistencies between the domestic operations of state agencies and the border measures taken by
government are also common. For example, state monopolies are often required to purchase commodities
at prices below export parity levels. (For a definition of parity price, see the footnote to Exercise 4.1.) When
such agencies receive no support (or at least no effective support) in the form of an export tax, an
informal/illegal export trade will tend to emerge which will compete with the official body.
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Box 4.1 : The case of Alphabets.
In Alphabeta, a range of market, price and trade policy instruments have been applied. For
beef and milk, prices at the producer, wholesale and retail levels are controlled through
monopolies. A tax on exports is applied and the domestic price is held below the border price
equivalent. Monopolies also exist for coffee, tea and pyrethrum, but a free market system
operates for sheep and goats.
The beef price policy adopted by the Meat Marketing Commission (MMC) has
transferred income from producers to consumers. This has encouraged domestic beef
consumption, particularly in urban areas, but production has suffered. Not surprisingly, exports
have also declined.
Another aspect of Alphabeta's beef marketing policy is that a price distortion has been
introduced through the beef grading system. Because price differentials between grades have
been kept narrow, deliveries of superior grades have declined in relative terms while domestic
demand for them has risen sharply. This has adversely affected the country's exports of prime
quality beef.
Two factors have contributed to the growth of informal/illegal slaughtering and marketing
of beef in Alphabeta. First, MMC's processing and marketing costs are higher than those of
the private sector. The private sector has been able to pay a higher price to the producer and
has commanded an increasing share of deliveries as a result. Second, MMC has attempted to
keep the price of beef below the equilibrium level, but this has been done without the necessary
government support. At set domestic sale prices, demand has exceeded MMC supply capacity.
In order to increase supplies, MMC would have had to raise the prices offered to producers,
but the necessary government financial support to do this has not been forthcoming. The
intention to maintain low consumer prices has also failed since consumers have had to pay
higher prices on informal markets.
The situation is similar with dairy products. The market price of milk has been kept
below export parity, simultaneously stimulating consumption and discouraging production. The
export of dairy products has declined as a result, with Alphabeta becoming a net importer in
recent years. The price policy adopted by the National Dairy Co-operative (NDC) has
effectively resulted in a transfer of income from producers to consumers.
The NDC is a commercial/co-operative agency whose prices are controlled by
government. It operates as a parastatal marketing body and has been plagued by the problems
and policy inconsistencies typical of such agencies. For example, seasonal and regional price
structures have not reflected cost differentials since year five, resulting in serious distortions
in the production and marketing of milk products. Production in remote areas has been
encouraged and seasonal gluts and shortages have become common. Informal marketing has
flourished.
4.4.5 Relevant exercises
Exercise 4.1: Equivalent domestic and border policy instruments and the effects of state agencies.
Example: Let us consider the case of a wheat importing and producing country where the
government has established a monopoly agency to import the commodity and to market both imported




Retail consumer price 60.00
Import parity price at retail level 50.00
Transport and marketing margin
(farm gate to retail level) 8.00
Under these conditions, the state agency would make a profit of L$ 10/t on its wheat imports.
In the absence of such an agency, the equivalent border measure would be an import tariff of L$ 10/t,
while the equivalent domestic measure would be a consumer tax of L$ 10/t combined with a domestic
producer subsidy of L$ 1/t.
The domestic producer price is L$ 52/t (L$ 60 minus marketing costs of L$ 8/t). If government
permitted competition by private traders and if their marketing costs were lower, (say L$ 5/t), the
state agency would find it difficult to operate effectively and would tend to incur losses. Private
traders could offer the domestic producer a price of L$ 55/t, and domestic wheat output would tend
to be channelled through them, by-passing the government body.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 1 hour).
Read the parts of the central case study which describe the beef price policy adopted in
Alphabeta.
Answer the questions below, given the following price/cost data :
L$/t
Farm-gate producer price 340.00
Export parity price at producer level
(including MMC slaughtering costs) 358.00
Box 4.2: Calculating beef prices at different market levels.
Assume a farm-gate price of L$ 0.20/kg live weight and a dressing
All prices and margins are expressed in L$/kg CDW:
out percentage of 50%.
L$/kg
Farm-gate price, CDW equivalent (by-products included) 0.40
+ transport and marketing* (farm gate to wholesaler) 0.01
+ processing (slaughtering) 0.03
- value of by-products (hides, blood, bones etc) 0.06
= wholesale price, cut beef, CDW (by-products excluded) 0.38
+ transport and marketing (wholesaler to retailer) 0.01
= retail price, cut beef 0.39
The important parity price is the cost of imports (c.i.f.) adjusted by all other costs (e.g. marketing,
handling, transport and taxes) incurred in getting the imports to the point of sale (in this case, the retail
level). The export parity price is calculated in a similar way. The main difference between the
import/export parity price and the border price equivalent is that the former includes adjustments for taxes.
These data relate to fair average quality (FAQ) grade beef and are expressed in cold dressed weight
(CDW) equivalents.
Transport cost, farm gate to wholesale
(slaughterhouse) 9.00
Value of by-products retrieved during
processing (hides, blood, bones etc) 56.00
Transport and marketing margin, wholesale
(slaughterhouse) to retail 6.00
Question 1. Assume MMC is the sole export agency for beef and that private traders are prevented
from exporting it. Does the MMC make a loss or a profit on its export sales? What is
the size of this loss or profit/t CDW?
Question 2. Assume that private traders are authorised to export beef. What type of border measure
would be needed to maintain the producer price at its original level? What would be the
level in L$/t CDW required for this measure?
Question 3. What would happen if the government did not apply the measure? What equivalent
domestic measures could the government adopt instead (assuming that transport costs
do not differ between MMC and private trade, but that slaughtering costs differ as in
the central case study).
 
Important points (4.3-4.4)
• In analysing the impact of market, price and trade policies on commodity output levels and
prices, the initial task would be to find out the nature of policy instruments being employed
for the given commodity at various levels including international, wholesale, producer and
retail.
• Some of the important groups of market and trade policy instruments used by various
governments in Africa are:
♦ border measures
♦ domestic measures with an open or closed economy
♦ domestic marketing monopolies.
• Among border measures, import tariffs reduce imports and domestic consumption but
increase domestic prices and domestic production of the commodity. Government revenue
also increases. An import subsidy will have the opposite effects.
• An export tax reduces exports, domestic prices and domestic production but increases
domestic consumption. Government revenue again increases. An export subsidy will have
the opposite effects.
• A producer subsidy in an open economy increases production of the subsidised product with
no effect on domestic consumption. Government expenditure is increased while imports are
reduced. A tax on producers will work in the opposite direction.
• A consumer subsidy reduces the price paid by the consumer, thereby increasing domestic
consumption. Imports tend to increase. Government expenditure increases. There is no effect
on domestic production. A consumer tax will have the opposite effect.
• The effects from domestic subsidies/taxes in a closed economy are different from those in
an open economy. A producer subsidy would increase the producer price but it would also
reduce the consumer price such that both parties would benefit.
• Border measures are easier to administer than domestic measures.
• State monopolies and other state or parastatal agencies often operate inefficiently, resulting
in serious market distortions.
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Question 4. Assume that the MMC and the private sector pay identical prices for beef to producers.
What is the consumer price in L$/kg CDW for beef marketed through MMC and the
private sector? What is the likely consequence of such a price difference? (With regard
to transport and processing costs, make the same assumptions as in Question 2.)
4.5 To what degree have current policy instruments been
applied?
For a detailed empirical policy analysis, it is important to assess quantitatively the effect of various
policy instruments used. First, the degree to which different policy instruments have been applied
should be determined. For example, suppose a major policy objective is to increase farmers' incomes
and that the chosen instruments for doing so are measures to raise milk prices. We now need to find
out the extent to which these measures have succeeded in raising prices above what they would
otherwise have been. However, to do this we need something more than a simple statistic quantifying
the instruments applied, such as ad valorem rates for tariffs, subsidies and taxes, or volumes for
commodities restricted by quotas. Different policy instruments should be measured in comparable
terms. To do this, a common denominator or basis for comparison should be identified. This common
denominator would need to contain information which could be used to determine the impact of
different policies on income transfers and quantities produced, consumed and traded within the
economy.
This basis for comparison should reflect the degree of price distortion caused by each
instrument. It should measure the extent to which prices under present policy circumstances differ
from those which would prevail in a "no policy" environment.
4.5.1 The basis for comparison
For tradeable commodities, the basis for comparison is the border price equivalents. Thus, the
yardstick used to measure the degree of distortion caused by different policy instruments is the extent
to which domestic prices diverge from those prevailing in international trade.
The use of border price equivalents as a reference point for policy analysis is justified by the
fact that they are the prices that would prevail on domestic markets in an open economy with a
competitive free market. In an open market, tradeable commodities can always be imported or
exported. Domestically-produced tradeable commodities should therefore be valued on the basis of
what they would attract in international trade.
(Hint to instructors: You may wish to discuss border and shadow prices further at this point.
Refer participants to Little and Mirrlees, 1974; Gittinger, 1982; and Timmer et al, 1983).
The advantage of using this indicator as a quantitative measure of the effects of policy is that
the effects of different policy instruments, such as an import quota, an import tariff, a domestic
subsidy or the operations of a domestic marketing monopoly, can be analysed and expressed in
comparable terms.
4.5.2 Estimating rates of protection
The case of tradeables
The difference between the domestic price and the border price equivalent (expressed as a proportion)
gives the nominal rate of protection (NPR) for a commodity. That is:
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where:
NPR = nominal protection rate
DP = the domestic price for the commodity
BP = the border price equivalent for the commodity





Since NPR can be either positive or negative, NPC can be above or below 1.
When calculating NPR or NPC, policy analysts should avoid using data collected only over
the short term, since these may reflect short-term fluctuations caused by exceptional circumstances
which may soon be reversed.
In estimating the border price equivalent, marketing margins (including transport and handling)
must be taken into account in order to ensure that international and domestic prices are compared at
the same point in the marketing chain.
When a policy has different implications for producer and consumer prices, two different rates
of protection may need to be estimated. Similarly, if the government has interfered with the regional
price structure, different rates of protection may apply to different regions of the country. The uniform
pricing for milk applied across regions in Alphabeta is a case in point. Alphabeta's dairy policy also
shows how different rates of protection might be applied for different seasons of the year.
The case of non-tradeables
Estimating rates of protection will only be possible when the commodity concerned is actually traded.
In the livestock subsector, most commodities are traded except liquid milk, where high transport costs
are prohibitive. Ideally, the domestic equilibrium price would be used as a reference point in those
circumstances (i.e. the price at which domestic supply and demand are equal to one another in the
absence of government intervention). The rate of protection would be estimated by comparing actual
consumer and producer prices with this equilibrium price. However, due to the difficulty in estimating
domestic equilibrium price, ad hoc approaches are sometimes needed to estimate the reference price.
Dried skim milk, which is traded, can be used as a proxy for liquid milk, provided the
quantities are adjusted for reconstitution as liquid milk (Exercise 4.2). Using dried skim milk as a
proxy is not entirely satisfactory, since fresh liquid milk may give greater satisfaction to consumers
than reconstituted skim milk and so command a higher price on the domestic market. In this case,
a premium should be added when calculating the NPR to allow for price differences.
4.5.3 Official and shadow rates of exchange
Border price equivalents are based on international prices expressed in foreign currencies (often the
US$). To express foreign currencies in the domestic currency, we use a rate of exchange. In developing
countries, official rates of exchange often overvalue the local currency. For this reason, it may be
preferable to use a shadow rate of exchange in order to reflect the real value of local currency.
Shadow rates of exchange are not necessarily the same as black market rates, since the former
should represent the equilibrium rate of exchange in the absence of government intervention, while
the latter represent the scarcity value of foreign exchange. If the difference between black market
and official rates of exchange is small, then the black market rate can be taken as a good indicator
of the shadow rate. If almost all transactions take place at the official rate but the difference between
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the two rates is very large, this may reflect an artificial scarcity of foreign exchange. Thus, a half-way
point between the two rates should be chosen in the absence of any other indicators of what the
shadow rate should be. In some countries, a standard shadow rate of exchange is applied for all
national planning and policy making purposes, in which case this should be used.
Box 4.3: The case of Alphabeta.
The central case study provides examples of NPCs. The NPC for beef averages 0.95 over all
grades, at the official exchange rate. Domestic producers in Alphabeta thus receive an average
price 5% below the level they could expect in a free market. This could be described as an
example of negative protection (or producer taxation). The NPC varies between beef grades,
owing to the policy of distorted price differentials between grades. Since MMC took no
measures to widen or diminish the difference between producer and consumer prices, we can
assume that the NPC is the same for consumers as it is for producers.
For milk, a time series of NPCs is given. In year 1 1 , for example, the NPC at the official
exchange rate was 0.66. In that year, producers received a price 34% below the border price
equivalent. A similar rate of protection for the consumer can be assumed.
4.5.4 Relevant exercises
Exercise 4.2: Estimating NPRs at official and shadow exchange rates.
Example: Assume our country has recently become a net importer of maize. The current
producer price at the farm gate is L$ 30/t, while the current consumer (retail) price is L$ 50/t (sifted).
The price for an equivalent quality c.i.f. at the border is US$ 150/t, and the official exchange rate
is US$ 1 - L$ 0.30. It costs approximately L$ 5.00/t to store maize and transport it between the
border and the wholesale market, and an additional L$ 3.00 to sift the grain, package it and transport
it to retail outlets. Transport from the farm gate to the wholesaler averages L$ 4.00/t. Market
processing, handling and transport facilities are competitive, with no monopoly element, but the
official exchange rate is 30% overvalued. Given this information, producer border price equivalents
and NPRs can be estimated as follows:
Maize import price c.i.f. (US$/t) 150.00
x official exchange rate (US$ 1 .00 = L$ 0.30)
= import price equivalent (L$/t) 45.00
+ transport/storage costs to wholesaler (L$/t) 5.00
= local wholesale border price equivalent (L$/t) 50.00
- transport costs, farm gate to wholesaler (L$/t) 4.00
= border-equivalent farm-gate price at official
exchange rate (L$/t) 46.00
+ adjustment for currency overvaluation 13.50
= border-equivalent farm-gate price at shadow
exchange rate 59.50
The adjustment for currency overvaluation is calculated as: border price in US$ x (shadow exchange rate •
official exchange rate), where exchange rate is stated as amount of local currency per US$.
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Thus, the NPC for producers at the official exchange rate is 0.65, while at the shadow rate it
is 0.50. At the official rate, the NPR at the farm gate is -35%. That is, farmers are implicitly being
taxed at a rate of 35% for growing and selling maize. The NPR for producers at the shadow rate of
exchange is even more negative at -50%.
Border price equivalents and NPRs for the consumer are calculated as follows:
Maize import price c.i.f. (US$/t) 1 50.00
x official exchange rate (US$ 1 .00 = L$ 0.30)
= import price equivalent (L$/t) 45.00
+ transport/storage costs to wholesaler (L$/t) 5.00
= local wholesale border price equivalent (L$/t) 50.00
+ processing/transport costs to retailer (L$/t) 3.00
= border-equivalent consumer price at official
exchange rate (LS/t) 53.00
+ adjustment for currency overvaluation 1 3.50
= border-equivalent consumer price at shadow
exchange rate 66.50
Thus, the NPC for consumers at the official exchange rate is 0.94; at the shadow rate it is
0.75. At the official rate, consumers are paying 6% less than the border price equivalent; at the
shadow rate they are paying 25% less.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 3 hours).
Question I. Refer to Question 2 of Exercise 3.8, Table 3.1 1 and the graphs derived for beef production
and consumption. The country is a net exporter of beef, as shown by the net tradeable
surplus calculations. Calculate the border-equivalent consumer and producer prices and
NPRs for beef, given the following information:
• The 1986 farm gate price CDW for FAQ beef is L$ 340/t.
• The 1986 retail price for cut beef CDW is L$ 350/t.
• The f.o.b. border price for CDW cut beef is US$ 1500/t and handling costs to the
border from the wholesaler are L$ 6.30/t.
• It costs L$ 6.00/t to transport and market beef from the wholesaler to the retailer in
cut form. Transport from the farm gate to the wholesaler costs L$ 9.00/t and
processing to cut beef costs L$ 32.00/t. The value of by-products retrieved during
processing (hides, blood, bone etc) is L$ 56.00/t.
• Exchange rates are the same as in the example given above, and marketing and
transport activities are competitive, with no monopoly elements.
Enter your calculations into Tables 4.1 and 4.2 and comment on the results.
Question 2 Refer to Question 2 of Exercise 3.8, Table 3.11 and the graphs derived in the exercise
for whole milk. The country is a net importer of whole milk, as indicated by the net
tradeable surplus figures. Calculate the border-equivalent consumer and producer prices
and NPRs for milk, given the following information:
• The 1986 international price c.i.f. at port of entry for powdered whole milk is US$
800/t (13.5 kg of whole milk powder with added water is reconstituted to form 100
litres of liquid whole milk).
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• The 1986 farm-gate price of whole milk is L$ 50.00/t and the consumer price
(processed, in carton or bottled form) is L$ 60.00/t.
• It costs L$ 4.00/t of liquid milk equivalent to transport powder from the border to
the wholesale point, and another L$ 8.00/t of liquid milk equivalent to reconstitute
powder to liquid form.
• It costs L$ 7.00/t to transport whole milk from the farm gate to the wholesale point.
• Processing of whole milk to bottled or carton form plus wholesale to retail marketing
costs are L$ 2.00/t.
Given the same exchange rates, and assuming that marketing functions are competitive,
complete Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for whole milk and comment on the results.
Table 4.1. Border equivalent producer prices and NPRsfor beefand whole milk.
Operator






Export price f.o.b. (USS/t CDW)
Official exchange rate (US$ 1 = L$ 0.30)
Export price f.o.b. (L$ equivalent/t CDW)
Handling costs, border to wholesale (L$/t)
Processing and transport, farm gate to wholesale (L$/t)







Border equivalent farm-gate price/t CDW
equivalent (official exchange rate)
Effect of currency overvaluation
Border equivalent farm-gate price/t CDW




i) Nominal protection coefficient
(official exchange rate)




Import situation (whole milk)
Import price c.i.f (US$/t whole milk equivalent)
Official exchange rate (US$ 1 = L$ 0.30)
Import price (L$/t whole milk equivalent)
Transport costs, border to wholesale (L$/t)
Costs of reconstitution (L$/t)







Border equivalent farm-gate price/t
(official exchange rate)
Effect of currency overvaluation





i) Nominal protection coefficient
(official exchange rate)
ii) Nominal protection coefficient(shadow exchange rate)
n.a.
n.a.
n.a. = not applicable
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Export price f.o.b (US$/t CDW, cut form
Official exchange rate (US$ 1 = L$ 0.30)
Export price f.o.b (L$ equivalent/t CDW)
Handling costs, border to wholesale (L$/t)






Border equivalent consumer price/t CDW equivalent
(official exchange rate)
Effect of currency overvaluation





i) Nominal protection coefficient
(official exchange rate)




Import situation (whole milk)
Import price c.i.f. (US$/t whole milk equivalent
Official exchange rate (US$ 1 = L$ 0.30)
Import price c.i.f (LS$/t whole milk equivalent)
Transport and storage costs to wholesale (LS$/t)
Cost of reconstitution (L$/t)







Border equivalent consumer retail price/t
(official exchange rate)
Effect of currency overvaluation




i) Nominal protection coefficient
(official exchange rate)




n.a. = not applicable.
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 Important points (4.5)
• For detailed policy analysis, it is essential to assess quantitatively the effect of various policy
instruments. To compare various policy instruments, a common denominator is required.
• For any tradeable commodity, the border price equivalent is used as a common denominator.
• The difference between border price equivalent and the domestic price is taken as the
yardstick to measure the effects of different policy instruments in terms of price distortions.
• The divergence of domestic prices from the border price equivalent is generally expressed
in terms of nominal rate of protection (NPR) for a commodity or normal protection
coefficient (NPC). Their values are calculated as:
NPR = {(DP - BP)/BP} X 100
NPC = DP/BP=(NPR/100) + 1
where
DP = the domestic price for the commodity
BP = the border price equivalent for the commodity
• Since policies may have different implications for producer and consumer prices, two
different rates of protection may need to be estimated.
1 For non-tradeable commodities, the domestic equilibrium price is used as a reference point.
Sometimes ad hoc approaches are more appropriate.
■ Shadow rates of exchange express the real value of a local currency.
4.6 What is the effect of current policies?
To complete our analysis of current market price and trade policies, we need to measure their effects
on consumer and producer welfare as well as on the amounts of a commodity produced, consumed
and traded. To do this, information on price elasticity must be incorporated.
4.6.1 Estimating price elasticity
The concept of price elasticity expresses the responsiveness of demand and supply to price changes.
In this section, we discuss the problem of how to estimate elasticity, outlining a few of the factors
known to influence it.
Elasticity must be estimated empirically, and there is often controversy about the estimates
used. In addition, econometric analysis tends to be cumbersome and time consuming. As a result,
policy analysts often have to rely on their best guesses, based on whatever estimates are available
for other similar commodities or countries. In Africa, elasticity estimates are rarely available, and
there is a dearth of reliable data from which to calculate them.
Price elasticities of demand and supply vary significantly between commodities. As a rule, they
tend to increase as the degree of substitutability between commodities increases. For example,
elasticities of demand and supply for individual grades of beef will tend to be higher than for beef
as a whole. This is because consumers are more likely to switch between different grades of beef
than to switch from beef to some other meat. Likewise, producers will find it easier to adjust the
kind of beef they produce than to move out of beef altogether. The availability of the inputs or
technology required to increase production is an important determinant of the price elasticity of
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supply. For example, livestock production based on the use of purchased feed is likely to be more
flexible than production based on rangeland feed resources.
In terms of supply, an important consideration is the time horizon used to estimate probable
response. The short-term elasticity of supply tends to be considerably less than the long-term. This
is particularly true for livestock production, where short-term market supply responses may even be
negative (Table 3.9).
4.6.2 Effects on quantity
The quantity effects of policies can be calculated by multiplying the NPR for a commodity by its
elasticity:
% change in quantity = elasticity x NPR (%)
where NPR is also the percentage change in price caused by the current policy measure. This formula
holds for both supply and demand.
Having estimated the effects of a policy instrument on domestic supply and demand, it is
relatively simple to calculate its probable international net trade effect. This is simply the difference
in the surplus available for export (or deficit requiring to be imported) resulting from the change in
domestic production and consumption. The effect on the balance of payments can easily be calculated
by multiplying the net trade effect by the border price. Exercise 4.3 gives examples of how these
effects are calculated.
4.6.3 Effects on producer income and consumer surplus
The aggregate effect of a price change on the income of producers can also be estimated. It will be
brought about by a combination of changes in price and changes in the amount produced. This can
best be understood by looking at the area between the two price lines (Pi and P2) and the supply
curve shown in Figure 4.4.
Conceptually, the overall income change can be broken down to small incremental changes.
Each small change in income consists of a separate price multiplied by its respective volume of
production.
If the calculation of these income effects were limited to the effects on producers' income,
then rises in commodity prices would usually seem desirable because they would lead to rises in
producers' income. Similarly, price falls would usually seem undesirable because they lead to falls
in producers' income.
In reality, the effects of commodity price changes on consumers need to be taken into account to
offset them against the effects on producers. Effective policies often depend on striking a fair balance
between the interests of the consumer and those of the producer.
The concept of consumer surplus enables us to quantify the effects of price changes on
consumer welfare. Consumer surplus is defined in terms of the amount consumers would have been
prepared to pay for a commodity in excess of what they actually paid. Suppose you would have
been prepared to pay $ 0.75 for an egg but only had to pay $ 0.50 for it. Your consumer surplus
is $ 0.25. Figure 4.5 helps us understand the concept of consumer surplus. The change in consumer
surplus is represented by the area between the two price lines and the demand curve. Again, this
can be calculated in terms of the effect of incremental price changes on the quantity consumed..
Each small change multiplied by its respective consumption level gives the resulting change in
consumer surplus.
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In algebraic terms, changes in producer income and consumer welfare can be roughly estimated
by multiplying the absolute difference between any two prices (Pi and P2) by the average of the
quantities produced (Si and S2) or consumed (Di and D2) at these prices. That is:
Effect on producers' income = (P2 - Pi) x (Si + S2)/ 2
Effect on consumers' surplus = (P2 - Pi) x (Di + D2)/ 2
where the symbols have the same meaning as in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
4.6.4 Effects on budget and net welfare
We are also interested in the impact of policy on a government's budget and on net economic welfare.
The budget effect, assuming that all differences between domestic and border equivalent price arise
from taxes, subsidies or the profits and losses of government corporations, is best calculated as
follows:
Budget effect = (DPP-BPP) x S - (DCP-BCP) x D
where
DPP = domestic producer price
BPP - border producer price
DCP = domestic consumer price
BCP = border consumer price
S and D = supply and demand.
If the resulting number is positive, the policy instrument results in net government expenditure.
If it is negative, there is a net income to the government. In cases where quantitative restrictions (in
contrast to tariffs) allow those with import licenses to capture all or part of the difference between
border equivalent and domestic prices as excess profits which do not accrue to the government
(section 4.4.1), the calculation must be adjusted accordingly.
The net welfare effect of a policy is the sum of the effects on producers, consumers and the
government budget. Figure 4.6 demonstrates how the net welfare effect of an export tax can be
derived.
Before the imposition of an export tax, the domestic price is equal to the border price equivalent
at Pi. At that price, domestic consumer demand Qi and the balance of production (Q4 - Qi) is
exported.
The government now imposes an export tax (Pi - P2). After the tax, the producer receives only
P2, which becomes also the domestic price. At that price, producers decrease their supply to Q3 and
consumers increase their demand to Q2. The balance (Q3 - Q2) is still exported.
The welfare effects are as follows. The fall in the after-tax price reduces producers' incomes
by the area AEFH. This income loss is partially offset by gains made by consumers and by
government. Consumers gain a surplus represented by ABGH. The government gains revenue
represented by CDFG. The net welfare effect is an uncompensated loss represented by the two
triangles BCG and DEF. This is the cost of the government's intervention.
Because they distort domestic resource use away from the economic optimum, interventions
of this kind usually have a negative effect on net economic welfare. The price decrease resulting
from the tax has reduced domestic production below what could have been competitively produced
at the international price. At the same time, consumers benefitting from lower prices have been led
to believe that the commodity is less scarce than it actually is. In other words, when policies disrupt
market forces, prices no longer convey the appropriate signals to producers and consumers.
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Sometimes, there may be sound reasons for government interference with free market forces,
and some of these reasons are discussed in the next section. In such cases, the benefits of intervention
should always be set against the overall welfare losses which result. These would be measured in
the way just described. Moreover, we need to remember that net economic welfare may not be a
complete indicator of all the welfare aspects of change within society. This is because our definition
weighs all incomes in the economy equally (i.e. regardless of income distribution). If, however,
consumers in the export tax example given above are poorer than producers, the government may
want to give their gains more weight (per nominal $) than the producers' losses.
4.6.5 Limitations of the analysis
The analysis of policy effects, as presented, has a number of limitations. For example, the analysis
is partial in the sense that it is applied to individual commodities, without taking into account the
linkages which might exist between different commodities. In reality, however, such linkages may
be very important to both production and consumption. While these limitations can be overcome, the
methods adopted will not be discussed here.
4.6.6 Relevant exercises
Exercise 4.3: The effect of price and exchange rate policies at consumer, producer and national levels.
Example 1. National effects of price policy. The effects of price and exchange rate policies
on maize production and consumption, foreign exchange and foreign trade are summarised in
Table 4.3. Relevant data from Exercise 4.2 are given and the price elasticities of demand and supply,
and 1986 national consumption and production levels are also stated. From these data, the following
policy effects can be calculated for maize priced at the shadow rate of exchange:
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Table 4.3. The effects of government policy on consumption, production, foreign trade and foreign exchange
earnings of maize, beefand milk.
Whole
Maize Beef milk
Item Unit (1986) (1986) (1986)










Protection coeff. production (Official exch. rate) 0.65
Protection coeff. (Official exch. rate) 0.94
consumption
Level of national production '000 t 1100.00 152 580
Level of national '000 t 1250.00 115 680
consumption
ii) Assumptions: Price elasticity of supply (%) +0.30 +0.50 +0.60
iii) Calculated results:
Price elasticity of demand (%) -0.10 -1.20 -1.20
Policy effects on:









- foreign exchange USS million +18.45
1 Refers to savings or losses in foreign exchange as a result of policies adopted, i.e. foreign trade effect multiplied by border
price policies.
• Production: At the official exchange rate, the NPC for the farm-gate price is 0.65, showing that
producers are paid 35% below the border price equivalent. Given a supply, elasticity of 0.3, this
means that the existing price policy lowers production by 10.5% (i.e. 0.3 x 35.0). Aggregate maize
production is thus reduced by 115,500 t (1.10 million t x 0.105).
• Consumption: Consumers, on the other hand, pay 6% less than the border price equivalent at the
official exchange rate. At a price elasticity of demand of -0.1, this price depression has increased
maize consumption by 7500 t.
• Foreign trade: The net foreign trade effect of this price policy is simply the increase in consumption
and the decrease in production, i.e. 7500 + 115,500 = 123,000 t of maize which, in the absence
of current policies, would not have had to be imported.
• Foreign exchange: These additional imports, valued at the current US$ price/t c.i.f (i.e. US$ 150),
result in an extra foreign exchange expenditure of US$ 150 x 123,000 t = US$ 18.45 million.
Example 2. Farm-level effects of price policy. Table 4.4 presents data on changes in the maize
gross margin per ha and per person-day for maize produced by the agropastoral farm used in module
3. The border price equivalent for maize at the official rate of exchange is taken from the example
in Exercise 4.2. At the official exchange rate, the border price equivalent farm-gate price is
L$ 0.046/kg, compared with the current producer price of L$ 0.03/kg. At the shadow exchange rate,
it is L$ 0.060. Gross margins per ha and per person-day are, thus, considerably higher at the shadow
foreign exchange rate.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 3 hours).
Question 1. Using data from Exercise 4.2, complete Table 4.3 for beef and whole milk, using the
border price equivalent at the official exchange rate.
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Question 2. Using data from Exercises 3.1-3.2 and 4.2, complete Tables 4.4 and 4.5. Note that for
hybrid maize seed, the price per unit used should remain unchanged. Ignore the cost of
manure in Table 3.3.
Table 4.4. Impact ofdifferent producer price levels of the gross margins ofmaize and beefenterprises onfarms
in an agropastoral production system.
At market price
At border equivalent price
(official exchange rate)
At border equivalent price
(shadow exchange rate)

































30 0.046 1.38 30 0.060 1.80
1.38 1.80
10.12 13.20
Exercise 3.1 0.56 0.73












n.a. = not applicable,
p.d. = person-days.
Table 4.5. Impact ofdifferent producer price levels on the gross margins ofmaize and dairy enterprises on farms




























Maize Exercises 3.1, 4.2


































: Calf rearing n.a. n.a. 10.00
: Fertiliser







1 Hybrid seed price = 50 cents/kg per unit.
p.d. = person-days,
n.a. = not applicable.
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Question 3. For both sets of tables, comment briefly on the results.
Question 4. Discuss in qualitative terms how the results change when the border price equivalent at
the shadow exchange rate is applied. If time is available, compute the pure effect of
currency overvaluation for beef.
 
Important points (4.6)
The concept of elasticity expresses the responsiveness of supply and demand to changes in
commodity prices.
Price elasticities of demand and supply vary significantly between commodities. Elasticity
increases with substitutability of commodities.
The effect of a policy on the quantity of a commodity is calculated by multiplying nominal
protection rate by its elasticity.
The net trade effect of a policy is expressed in terms of gross exports minus gross imports.
The effect of price changes on producer income is computed by multiplying the change in
price by the change in quantity produced.
The concept of consumers' surplus shows how price changes affect consumers.
The effect of policies on the government budget is best calculated as:
Budget effect = {(domestic producer price - border producer price) x supply}
- {(domestic consumer price - border consumer price) x demand}
The net welfare effect of a policy is the sum of effects on producers, consumers and the
government budget.
Government interference in prices usually results in a net welfare loss.
4.7 How does interfering with price help to meet different
government objectives?
Thus far we have examined some of the instruments of market, price and trade policies and shown
how to quantify their effects. We will now discuss the extent to which government interference with
prices helps meet different national objectives. The module will end with a brief discussion of practical
issues concerning the implementation of trade, price and market policies.
In module 2, government objectives were classified under five major categories. Our discussion will
focus on three of these categories: the stability objective, the equity objective and the efficiency objective.
4.7.1 Stability objective
Instability in the price and/or availability of major commodities and inputs may result from
fluctuations in supply and demand on either the international or the domestic market. In both cases,
there are sound arguments for stabilising domestic prices, since abrupt changes often have undesirable
effects on income distribution and/or resource use. In addition, they play havoc with both national
and individual planning.
However, a stabilisation policy which attempts to freeze prices at a certain level, when long-
or medium-term trends in international supply and demand are moving them away from that level,
will usually have undesirable effects on farmers' incomes, consumers' surplus and the government
budget. A stabilisation policy which evens out extreme inter-year fluctuations but keeps the domestic
price moving in the same direction as medium-term border price equivalents is probably the most
sensible one.
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If domestic production can only be increased at costs which exceed world market prices, price
interventions geared to the promotion of self-sufficiency may be unwise. The pursuit of self-reliance
(in the sense of fostering economic prosperity) will be a more cost-effective route to stable food
availability.
Similarly, market, price and trade policies often aim to stimulate domestic production and/or
discourage consumption in an attempt to save/earn foreign exchange and prevent foreign exchange
crises. Such a strategy, however, cannot be easily defended. Balance of payment problems should be
tackled through appropriate macro-economic policies, in particular exchange rate adjustment. Policies
which distort individual markets decrease the international competitiveness of the economy and are
therefore likely to lead to deterioration of the balance of payments in the long term.
Box 4.4: The case of Alphabeta.
Alphabeta has experienced a decline in price for several of its export commodities and a
resulting deterioration in its balance of payments. One conceivable policy reaction would be
to provide support for producers of those commodities in an attempt to raise the volume of
exports to its previous level. To the extent that such producer support would eliminate existing
negative protection, this would be a desirable policy response. However, expanding exports
beyond the competitiveness of domestic producers on international markets would be
inadvisable.
Heavy dependence on a few commodities for the generation of foreign exchange incurs a
higher risk of economic instability (a sudden change in the economic fortunes of the country).
Countries often attempt to overcome this problem by diversifying their export trade. This strategy
may require a degree of protection for the production of new export commodities. Justification for
this will depend on whether the direct welfare costs involved are less than the macro-economic
benefits associated with greater foreign exchange stability.
4.7.2 Equity objective
Arguments in favour of interference are often based on equity criteria. Price distortion is justified on
the grounds of income redistribution between and within the various groups of consumers and
producers. Interventions will often be effective in achieving redistribution objectives of this nature,
particularly when the proportion of producer or consumer income affected is large.
However, the problem is that market, price and trade interventions do not only affect the
distribution of income. They also affect the structure of production and consumption. This, in turn,
may have international trade and welfare implications. The desired effects of income redistribution
must therefore be balanced against any negative welfare effects resulting from structural changes.
Moreover, income transfers resulting from market policies tend to be non-specific in terms of
who benefits and who pays. For example, a general low-price policy for food benefits not only poor
urban consumers (who may be the policy target group), but also consumers in other income classes
who could afford to pay unsubsidised prices.
Sometimes it may be possible to avoid this non-specific policy effect by concentrating on
commodities of particular importance for the target group (i.e. by implementing self-targeting
policies). For example, if cassava is consumed largely by the poor, subsidising its consumer price is
likely to have the desired effect. However, self-targeting policies are not always feasible
Regardless, it is always worth asking whether more cost-effective ways of achieving the same
end are not open to government. In economic terms, alternative ways of affecting income distribution,
without distorting the structure of production and consumption, may well be superior to interventions
in the market place.
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If direct transfers (in cash or kind) to the target group are feasible, they should be given
preference over price policies. For example, food stamp or similar schemes for poor consumers are
preferable to low-price food policies. A policy which works directly towards eradication of the cause(s)
of poverty should be given priority over one which merely attacks the symptoms.
Direct income redistribution policies are not always easy to implement. Among other things,
they may require substantial government expenditure, which may be difficult to finance.
Similarly, market policies are often implemented to increase government revenue (for example,
through export taxes or low producer prices). Again, it must be emphasised that such measures often
have negative side-effects, and these must be taken into account in any policy evaluation exercise.
Box 4.5: The case of Alphabeta.
Taxation through low producer prices often has negative effects on producer income distribution.
Alphabeta's low-price policy for beef demonstrates this. Although herd size and sales levels are
highly skewed, the policy affects both large and small producers. Direct, taxation could instead be
targeted towards larger producers, with more effective impact on income redistribution.
4.7.3 Efficiency objective
As far as economic efficiency is concerned, few arguments favour market intervention and price
distortion. Where producers need incentives to embark on new enterprises, adopt new technology or
enter the market, there may be a case for stimulating responses by offering price incentives. This is
known as the infant industry argument for producer protection.
However, since policies of this nature tend to become entrenched, it is often difficult to abandon
protection after achieving the initial purpose. The possible negative long-term consequences of such
a policy must therefore be weighed against its short-term benefits.
Production may occasionally have pronounced positive or negative external effects which
justify price intervention. For example, if there is overwhelming evidence that overgrazing is
endangering the long-term sustainability of production in a particular area, there may be a case for
lowering producer prices for animals raised there in order to reduce the incentive to keep so many.
In many cases, however, external effects do not result from production as such, but from a
specific method of production or input use (this appears to apply to the problem of overgrazing).
The appropriate policy response in such cases is to attack the root causes of the problem rather than
some superficial or symptomatic aspect of the production system. For example, low market supplies
of cattle may reflect the circumstances of a particular production system at a given point in time
(e.g. the post-drought rebuilding of herds), rather than a deficiency in marketing infrastructure or in
the price policy adopted.
A different issue, and indeed a difficult one, is the balance of protection offered to different
sectors of the economy. In many African countries, the manufacturing sector is protected at the
expense of the agricultural sector.
Box 4.6: The case of Alphabeta.
In Alphabeta, the protection of certain manufacturing industries penalises the agricultural sector.
Resources have been attracted into the manufacturing sector, wages have increased and the
terms of trade have moved against agriculture.
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In such circumstances, the appropriate strategy would be to reduce distortion by decreasing
protection for the manufacturing industry. Where this is not feasible, there may be a case for protecting
agriculture in order to counter the effects of protecting industry. In this way, distortions in resource
allocation can be balanced or redressed, but the number of policy measures multiplies, complicating
the analysis.
Such a policy, known in economics as a second best policy, may well be justified, for the
case against disadvantaging agriculture in developing countries is very strong. In the long run,
however, an accumulation of second best policies may make a return to best policy options
increasingly difficult.
In considering alternatives to existing policies, the costs of using any additional administrative
resources should be included in the analysis. Countries attempting to implement self-targeting policies
may find themselves unable to do so because they lack the necessary institutional resources. Effective
implementation of market, price and trade policies also depends on the existence of efficient
institutions.
4.8 Implementation problems associated with market, price
and trade policies
Although governments may have clearly defined objectives when market, price and trade policies
are initially implemented, the overall policy framework may lack coherence. Different measures may
be introduced at different times, some (or even most) of which may no longer be justified. For
political reasons, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to modify or abandon an existing policy.
Again, different government institutions may be responsible for different measures, with the result
that the overall policy package is inconsistent. Two general principles should be observed:
• The number of policy measures should be kept as small as possible. The larger the number of
measures, the greater the likelihood of inconsistency. Thus, before a new measure is introduced,
it is important to determine whether existing measures can be adapted to achieve the same
objectives. Ironically, new measures are often introduced to counter the negative effects of existing
policies. Instead, it may be better to abandon an existing measure than to introduce a new one.
Box 4.7: The case of Alphabeta.
In Alphabeta, beef is illegally slaughtered and traded. This problem could possibly be solved
by imposing fines or by exercising greater control over marketing. However, instead of
introducing these new measures, it would seem more sensible to tackle the cause of the problem
by changing the operations of the MMC, thereby removing the incentive to trade illegally.
Measures which have a direct bearing on quantities and prices should be controlled by the
smallest possible number of institutions. In addition, there must be close co-operation among the
different institutions involved. Particular care should be taken to reconcile domestic with border
measures and to ensure that consumer policies are in harmony with those applied to producers.
Box 4.8: The case of Alphabeta.
In Alphabeta, the number of institutions involved in marketing is too large: five ministries and
eighteen statutory boards. Moreover, border measures for beef appear inconsistent with domestic
marketing interventions.
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• Policy instruments should be continually under review. Long-term objectives and effects must
always be carefully considered during such reviews, for the danger is that they will be eclipsed
by short-term exigencies, such that the original intentions of the policy are lost. To avoid this,
the direction of a domestic price policy might, for example, be monitored by regular comparison
of the administered price with the equivalent border price (using a 3-year moving average).
Changes in commodity price relationships should also be monitored. Marginal price changes
which move the prices of closely-related commodities in opposite directions can have more serious
consequences than a distortion resulting from broad-based price protection for the whole sector. Again,
it should be emphasised that price ratios in international trade will normally provide the most reliable
basis for domestic pricing decisions.
4.8.1 Relevant exercises
Exercise 4.4: Group exercise: Market, price and trade policies. Read the relevant sections of the
central case study.
Question 1. Calculate the NPC at the producer level for any one year of your data set.
Question 2. Estimate how this protection may have affected production, government budget and
foreign exchange earnings. If estimates of supply elasticity are not available, make
reasonable assumptions. Justify your assumption for supply elasticity in qualitative terms.
 
Important points (4.7-4.8)
• Government interference with market, price and trade policies is generally motivated by
certain national objectives such as stability, equity and efficiency.
• Two major concerns of a government, in terms of stability, are to avoid abrupt changes in
prices and/or quantities offered on the domestic market, and to maintain equilibrium in
balance of payments.
• Price stabilisation policies should ensure that domestic prices move in the same direction
as international prices.
• Equity concerns may lead a government to formulate price policies aimed at income
redistribution between producers and consumers. Such interventions affect the distribution
of income within the community and the structure of production and consumption.
• Alternative ways of affecting income distribution should be sought in place of price policies
with negative side effects.
• Price policies or market interventions intended to reinforce economic efficiencies may be
justified in order to introduce new production technology, transfer resources into alternative
activities, stimulate market entry and the like. However, protection offered in the farm-price
policies to encourage such incentives becomes difficult to abandon even after achieving its
initial purposes.
• Effective implementation of market, price and trade policies depends on the existence of
efficient institutions. The major problem in implementation of these policies is the lack of
coherence in the overall policy framework. Two important principles to remember are:
♦ The number of policy measures and institutions administering them should be kept as
low as possible and effective communication should be maintained within existing
institutions.
♦ Policy instruments should be frequently reviewed.
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Question 5. What government policies may have caused this protection? Were these policies
appropriate, given the country's overall objectives for the livestock subsector? What
better market, price and trade policies could have been applied? Why would they have
been better?
4.9 Feedback exercises
All answers can be found in the text.
l.a. Name two main areas that market and price policies focus upon:
i)
ii)
b. What type of information would you collect to analyse the nature of the current policy










3.a. Explain the terms "open economy", "closed economy" and "border price equivalent".
b. How does the effect of producer subsidy differ in an open economy from that of a closed
economy?









5.a. What are the two concepts used to calculate the effects of policies on the quantity
(supply/demand) of a commodity? Tick (•) the correct answers.
i) border price equivalent
ii) price elasticities
iii) shadow price
iv) nominal rate of protection
v) domestic equilibrium price
b. Which of the following are included in determining the net welfare effect of a policy?
Tick (•) the correct answer(s).
i) effects on producers
ii) effects on consumers
iii) effects on the government budget
iv) none of the above
v) all of the above
6. Circle T for True and F for False.
i) Government interference with prices is always for justifiable objectives.
T F
ii) Self-reliance, rather than self sufficiency, should be the goal of a government's stability
objective.
T F
iii) A high degree of export concentration on a few commodities for foreign exchange
earning is preferred to diversifying export trade.
T F
iv) Price policies associated with the equity objective of a government focus on income
redistribution between producers and consumers.
T F
v) The appropriate policy responses to national objectives should attack the root causes of
the problem rather than the symptoms.
T F
vi) In order to avoid policy implementation problems, the number of policy measures should
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Module 5: Marketing and Distribution Systems
 
5 . 1 Performance objectives
5.2 Marketing and its role in economic development
5.2.1 What is marketing?
5.2.2 Characteristics of agricultural and livestock marketing
5.2.3 The role of marketing and trade in development
5.2.4 Requirements for market development
5.3 The theory of markets; Six basic considerations
5.3.1 Perfect competition
5.3.2 Imperfect competition: Monopolies and oligopolies
5.3.3 Horizontal and vertical integration
5.3.4 Separation of markets
5.3.5 Product differentiation
5.3.6 Price movement due to seasonal and cyclic variations
5.4 Marketing systems: Functions, agents, enterprises and channels
5.4.1 Marketing functions
5.4.2 Marketing agents
5.4.3 Marketing enterprises and channels
5.5 Structure and specifics of livestock trade and their implications
5.6 Marketing systems evaluation
5.6.1 Degree of market efficiency in terms of marketing margin
5.6.2 Price analysis
5.6.3 Services
5.6.4 Structure, conduct and performance analysis
5.6.5 Market information and intelligence
5.7 The role of government interventions in markets
5.7.1 Improve market infrastructure
5.7.2 Improve information
5.7.3 Improve institutional infrastructure




Module 5 is intended to enable you to:
1 . Define marketing and explain the role of marketing in economic development.
2. Discuss the theory of markets.
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3. Describe the main characteristics of marketing systems for their basic elements, functions, agents,
enterprises and channels.
4. Explain specific features of livestock marketing as compared with crop marketing.
5. Discuss some important methods of evaluating marketing systems.
6. Differentiate between direct and facilitating roles of governments in improving markets.
7. Describe three types of indirect government interventions for market improvements.
8. Describe how an effective marketing system contributes to the national objectives of a country.
5.2 Marketing and its role in economic development
5.2.1 What is marketing?
Markets are the context, both physical and conceptual, where exchange takes place. Marketing
includes all activities from the producer to the final consumer, including processing and distribution
systems. The term producer includes farmers or pastoralists and the manufacturers of production
inputs when they produce the commodity being marketed. The term consumer is used for anyone
who is the final consumer of a product or the final user of a production input (e.g. pastoralists may
consume butter and veterinary inputs). The retailer is the final link in the chain from producer to
consumer. Hence, an urban butcher is a retailer and so is a vaccinator in the government veterinary
services who delivers a vaccination. The wholesaler delivers the product to the retailer. The term
farm gate is the location of a sale where a farmer keeps his or her animals or produces his or her
crop (i.e. on a farm in the case of settled cultivators or at an encampment in the case of pastoralists).
The terms market actors and market agents are used interchangeably to represent any persons
participating at any level of the market.
The objectives of marketing vary. For the individual producer or consumer, the objectives
may be to maximise benefits from the resources available and to expand marketing operations in
order to increase wealth. From a societal viewpoint, the objectives may be to encourage efficient
allocation of resources, to create wealth and promote economic growth in order to improve the general
welfare of society. Important considerations may also be to improve distribution of income between
sectors of the economy and to maintain some stability of supply and demand for marketed goods.
The concurrence of marketing objectives with national policy objectives identified in module 2 will
be discussed later in this module.
5.2.2 Characteristics of agricultural and livestock marketing
Agricultural marketing in Africa normally begins at the level of the individual smallholder. Producers
usually carry out some or all of the marketing steps. Often, because producers are also consumers,
little of what is produced is marketed. Livestock owners may be only marginally market-oriented.
Because of traditional attitudes towards wealth in cattle, owners may choose to hold cattle rather
than market them.
Producers are likely to be some distance away from consumers. They may also be highly
dispersed. Both conditions affect the nature of the marketing and distribution process. Also affecting
the process is the nature of agricultural and livestock commodities, which are rarely in consumable
form when first entering the marketing system, and suffer from perishability or are otherwise
susceptible to losses during storage/handling. Agricultural, and particularly livestock products, are
generally seasonal in supply and are more susceptible to natural shocks. In Africa, the marketing of
agricultural products typically suffers from limited institutional support.
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5.2.3 The role of marketing and trade in development
Marketing and trade play vital roles in the economic growth and overall development of a nation.
The major roles of marketing and trade in the national economy can be thought of in terms of:
• specialisation in activities of comparative advantage
• enhanced resource-use efficiency and trade
• advances in marketing with economic growth.
Specialisation in activities of comparative advantage
Without market facilities, areas must maintain diversified activities to produce their own food, shelter,
tools and other needed goods. In the presence of a market, however, an individual can specialise in
one activity and sell the surplus in order to purchase other needed goods. The individual is likely to
specialise on the basis of a comparative advantage in that activity for which he or she has some
special resource or ability. A comparative advantage exists when an individual or region can produce
a good, relative to the price of other goods, more cheaply than another individual or region. In
livestock production, comparative advantage is often the result of agro-ecological conditions particular
to a region making it suited to certain specialised activities. The agro-ecological basis for production
results in regional comparative advantage, whereby all of an area with that common agro-ecological
base shares the ability to produce the good relatively more cheaply than another area.
Box 5.1 : Comparative advantage.
Table 5.1. Production possibilities ofbeefand mutton for Countries A and B.
Proportion (%) of land Production ('000 t)
devoted to Country A Country B
Beef Mutton Beef Mutton Beef Mutton
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In this very simplistic example, countries A and B produce both beef and mutton. The two
countries have an equal amount of productive land. Country A, however, has more favourable
agro-ecological conditions than B for both mutton and beef. Table 5.1 shows the relative production
potential of both countries for different proportions of land devoted to each product.
The trade-off ratio between beef and mutton for Country A is 3/2 (i.e. 90/60 under complete
specialisation; 100% of land devoted to each) while for Country B it is 1/2 (i.e. 25/50). The
trade-offs for the two countries can be expressed as:
Beef Mutton
Country A, 1 t = 2/3 t
Country B, 1/2 t = It
Note that country A can produce more of either beef or mutton than country B. Thus,
country A has an absolute advantage for both beef and mutton over country B. However, when
we consider the trade-off ratios between beef and mutton for individual countries, we find that
to produce one tonne of mutton, country A has to give up the production of 3/2 t of beef and
Country B only 1/2 t of beef. Therefore, Country B has a comparative advantage in the production




The important point is that both countries would benefit if they could trade with each
other in the item for which each has a comparative advantage.
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Figure 5. 1 further explains the concept of specialisation and trade for beef and mutton
for Countries A and B. If we look at the total production of beef and mutton in the two
countries, we find four possible situations:
a. Countries A and B devote half of their
land to each product 45 + 30 + 1 2 + 25
b. Both countries specialise in beef 90 + 25 =
c. Both countries specialise in mutton 60 + 50 =
d. Country A specialises in beef and







The largest amount of production results from each country specialising in the product
for which it has a comparative advantage. Both countries will, however, end up with more of
one good than they need and none of the other. So, for the benefits from comparative advantage
to be realised, trade must occur. Figure 1 illustrates that the largest production results at point
C, where both countries specialise and trade for one product only.
Specialised activities lead to trade. The gains from trade will be the value of additional
production made possible through specialisation and trade. The exact gains from trade will depend
on the market prices of the goods with and without trade. This concept applies equally to individuals,
who use their comparative advantage to specialise in one task, selling their products to trade for the
other goods they need.
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Exercise 5.1: Comparative advantage (estimated time required: 3/4 hour).
The table below provides production alternatives for countries C and D in milk and beef
production.
Proportion (%) of land Production ('000 t)
devoted to:
Country C Country D
Milk Beef Milk Beef Milk Beef
100 0 7000 0 9000 0
50 50 3500 10 4500 30
0 100 0 20 0 60
Question 1 . What are the trade-off ratios between milk and beef for countries C and D? (Hint: create
two trade-off tables, one expressed in terms of 1 kg milk, the other 1 kg beef.)
Question 2. Where do absolute and comparative advantages exist for milk and beef? Use your results
to discuss the type of trading scenario which would be to the advantage of both countries.
Question 3. Draw a graph, as in Figure 5.1, showing the point of greatest benefit to both countries.
Enhanced resource use efficiency and trade
Through specialisation and trade, a community is better able to utilise its limited resources.
Specialisation and the resulting efficiency of resource-use is the basis for economic growth and
development. As markets and economies develop, surpluses occur more frequently in profitable
activities, creating new wealth, while products are moved greater distances than before. Thus, trade
is a necessary ingredient for economic growth. Marketing is simply the means by which trade occurs.
Advances in marketing with economic growth
As economic growth proceeds, several changes in marketing take place. With economic development,
the activities and tasks of marketing increase. Activities such as storage and processing, packaging
and retail distribution become more important. Greater activity moves away from the site of production
and towards marketing. This, in turn, creates employment opportunities and further specialisation
(diversification of the community). Since livestock products typically have positive income elasticities
of demand, economic growth can lead directly to new opportunities for production. Thus, the livestock
subsector increases in importance.
With development, more economic agents may enter trade, helping to improve marketing
services and, in some cases, allowing the market to capture external economies of scale. This refers
to a situation where the presence of many agents allows each one to operate at a lower cost. An
example is the case where increased trade in some commodity (e.g. livestock) allows for the
establishment of large storage facilities (e.g. pre-slaughter holding areas), which lowers per unit
storage costs. The physical infrastructure can also be affected in a positive way by large markets, in
the form of better roads and communication, offering the potential for external economies of scale.
(Hint to instructors: Discuss the differences between external and internal economies of scale.
For example, discuss external economies with respect to milk production density.)
5.2.4 Requirements for market development
For market development to occur, rural areas must be effectively linked, in terms of information and
infrastructure, through the middlemen in the marketing system with urban centres of consumption.
With the shift in resources away from production to marketing services, small-scale processing can
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expand markets by increasing demand through diversification of the end products. Perhaps most
important, and crucial to the reform of African marketing systems, is the requirement that the
institutional and policy environments do not discourage or unnecessarily impede the actions of
marketers. As well, property rights and contracts should be protected.
Another important factor in the development of markets is the disequilibrium between demand
and supply. Producers and consumers then must exert greater efforts to cope with each others'
requirements. Increased efficiency resulting from trade is not in itself sufficient to create wealth. A
stable but static equilibrium, where supply meets demand, may no longer produce new wealth.
Disequilibrium, along with technical and institutional changes, may be the conditions needed to move
to even greater comparative advantage and efficiency levels.
Further, initial scarcity of resources (poverty trap) can cause subsistence activities to dominate,
denying the surplus labour or resources necessary to invest in new knowledge or technology required
to create comparative advantage. The institutional and organisational requirements necessary to expand
markets may also be enormous. The role of property rights will play an important role, as marketing
inherently involves transferring property rights. The nature of the society may restrict the scale on
which such transfers can take place.
5.3 The theory of markets: Six basic considerations
Module 3 showed how market supply and demand curves were derived from aggregated individual
supply and demand. The intersection of the two curves gave us equilibrium market prices and
quantities. We also saw how supply and demand elasticities could be used to make market price
forecasts. We will now look a little more closely at how the marketing system and its structure can
influence the determination of price. In this context, six main characteristics of the marketing system
which influence price will be discussed:
perfect competition
imperfect competition: monopolies and oligopolies
horizontal and vertical integration
separation of markets
product differentiation
seasonal and cyclic variations.
5.3.1 Perfect competition
For supply and demand to determine price, a competitive situation must exist in the market.
Competition is an ingredient in most markets which are not centrally-planned. Competition, by
definition, exists when no single economic agent, whether buyer or seller, can control the price in
the market. This will occur when each agent's activities in the market make up only a small part of
total market activity, because many other agents are carrying out the same roles. New agents can
enter the market at will if they feel there are profits to be made. Price is thus determined by the
market as a whole. In theory, each agent must simply accept that price. Ideally, the market would
also be large enough to absorb whatever quantity of goods is traded by any single agent at the ruling
price. Since, in perfect competition, it is up to the agent to decide the quantity traded, sellers and
buyers are all quantity-fixers and price-takers. Each agent chooses to trade that quantity which will
maximise his or her profits and which he or she has the resources to handle.
In such a market, no agent is earning more than a normal profit level, comparable to the profits
of all others in the market. Any occurrence of unusually high profits will cause new agents to enter
that activity, driving down the price until profits return to normal. Market prices thus act as a signal
to participants, informing them where best to expand their efforts and resources in order to achieve
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the greatest returns. High prices to sellers in one market sector will result in greater efforts to supply
that sector. Similarly, low prices to buyers will cause greater demand for those goods, again shifting
resources appropriately. Traders will move their resources to those goods where the margin, or
difference between the price they pay and the price they receive, is the greatest.
The movement of resources in response to price signals occurring in a competitive market
results in one of the most important and desirable aspects of such a marketing system: the optimal
allocation of resources. The producer is able to respond, through market signals, to the changing
needs of the consumer. A well-operating market provides for the most efficient use of resources, thus
providing the potential for greater wealth creation and economic development.
The ingredients for such a competitive system are thus:
• A large number of economic agents in every market activity, with unhindered entry and exit.
• A rapid and extensive flow of information, especially relating to prices, quality and quantity,
between consumers, traders and producers.
• Institutional and physical infrastructures which support the movement of goods and which
enable the above two requirements to be met.
5.3.2 Imperfect competition: Monopolies and oligopolies
A system of perfect competition is often difficult to find. Many marketing systems are characterised
by some degree of imperfect competition, where some agents have the ability to influence directly
or indirectly, if not control, market prices. Imperfect competition occurs when one of the above
requirements is not met and is usually seen in two general forms: monopoly and oligopoly. A
monopoly exists when a single large supplier can dictate the market price because buyers have no
alternative suppliers. (Monopsony is the case of a single buyer). An oligopoly occurs when there
are only a few large actors in the market. This reduces competition and allows these actors (whether
deliberately in concert or not), to influence market prices to their benefit. Both of these situations
result in increased costs for other market actors and inefficient use of market resources as a whole.
Inefficient resource use results when monopolists receive greater returns than they "deserve" (i.e.
greater than "normal" profits). Those resources cannot then be used elsewhere. Figure 2 illustrates
the concepts of complete and partial monopolies and oligopoly.

















Source: Abbot (1979: p. 21).
5.3.3 Horizontal and vertical integration
Market integration refers to the expansion of some firms to the point that they begin to occupy larger
portions of the market, in terms of either activities or market share. Horizontal integration occurs
vhen some firms grow so large within one trade that they are able to dominate that trade. Vertical
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integration is the expansion of activities of a firm until it controls its raw materials at one end and
its markets at the other. Contract farming is a form of quasi-integration where the buyer assumes
some of the risks and also has some control over production decisions.
5.3.4 Separation of markets
Agents with some degree of monopoly power may be able to separate markets. If agents can control
the movement between markets, they can control not only the total quantity sold but the price in
each market. Under this form of discriminatory pricing, sellers take advantage of differences in
demand in each market. This is done by charging a higher price in a high-income or inelastic demand
market and a lower price in a low-income, elastic demand market. A micro-level example is the
pricing arrived at by individual bargaining. If each buyer is unaware of what the other buyers paid,
the seller can charge what the buyer can, and is willing, to pay. In a traditional livestock market,
buyers are, however, aware of existing prices. A tourist buying souvenirs, on the other hand, may
not be, and thus may be subject to price discrimination. On a larger scale, separation of markets
might take place regionally. Separation of markets can also result from official restrictions on product
movement.
5.3.5 Product differentiation
Product differentiation, which can also lead to market separation, occurs when otherwise similar
products are differentiated by quality or presentation (i.e. packaging, brand name etc). An example
is the urban red meat market, where prices in the elite market, sold by licensed butchers and
supermarkets catering largely to higher-income consumers, may be much higher than those in shops
selling to the larger community.
5.3.6 Price movement due to seasonal and cyclic variations
As with all agricultural markets, livestock markets are susceptible to seasonal variation. Fresh milk
prices fluctuate in the same way as food crop prices—moving inversely with supply on the market
as supply diminishes in the dry season. Meat prices move in a slightly different manner with natural
shocks. While food prices are likely to rise during bad years when crop production falls, meat prices
will fall during the same years as producers attempt to sell livestock they can no longer maintain for
lack of feed or water. The bad year price rise in food causes demand to fall and sellers to hoard
supplies, contributing to reduced consumption. This lengthens the period during which food supplies
will last. The consequences of a bad year on the livestock market, however, are the opposite. The
perishability of livestock during such a year causes supplies to be consumed more quickly than
normal. The effects may be felt for years as producers attempt to rebuild their herds.
Cyclical price variation is not due to natural shocks, but is based on the reactions of supply
to changing market conditions. Because sustained increases in livestock production, in response to
some increase in demand, may take some years to bring about, during the lag prices may be sustained
at a high level, and fall later.
5.4 Marketing systems: Functions, agents, enterprises and
channels
All marketing systems have evolved within the constraints and conditions placed upon them by the
production sector and by the nature of the goods being marketed. The type of product, the number,
size and density of producers, the infrastructure and the policy and institutional environments all
determine the type of marketing system and the effectiveness with which it operates.
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 Important points (5.2-5.3)
Marketing includes all business activities involved in the flow of goods and services from
producers to consumers.
For a consumer or producer, the objectives of marketing are to maximise benefits from the
available resources and to expand marketing operations to increase wealth.
From a societal viewpoint, the major objectives of marketing are to:
♦ assist in the efficient allocation of resources
♦ create wealth and promote economic growth
♦ improve income distribution among different sectors of the economy
♦ maintain stability of supply and demand for marketed goods.
The main characteristics of agricultural and livestock marketing in Africa are:
♦ Marketing begins at the level of individual farmers.
♦ Producers are widely dispersed.
♦ Agricultural and livestock commodities are perishable and seasonal in supply.
♦ Institutional supports are limited.
Marketing and trade allow specialisation of activities. This leads to enhanced resource-use
efficiency and economic growth. With economic development, the tasks and activities of
marketing further increase, creating employment and other avenues for development.
Some important prerequisites to market development are:
♦ proper linkages between rural areas and urban centres of consumption
♦ a conducive policy institutional environment for marketers to operate effectively and for
markets to expand beyond the basic need levels of consumers and producers
♦ a dynamic relationship between supply and demand.
The marketing system and its structure influence the determination of a commodity's market
price.
The six main elements of price theory used to explain market prices are:
perfect competition
imperfect competition
horizontal and vertical integrations of markets
separation of markets
product differentiation
seasonal and cyclic variations.
A marketing system is comprised of a number of elements: the particular products (e.g. butter
only, or butter and raw milk) and their characteristics being transferred from producer to consumer;
the characteristics of participants (e.g. the producer, the trader, the consumer); the functions or roles
that each participant performs in the market; and the locations, stages, timetable and physical
infrastructures involved.
When we talk of describing, quantifying or analysing a particular marketing system, there is
an implicit assumption that we can distinguish the elements of that system from other economic
activities. Analyses of marketing systems usually include a quantification of the flows and of the
value added, costs and profit margins at each stage in the system.
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5.4.1 Marketing functions
Marketing is sometimes thought of as simply the process of buying and selling. Its tasks are much
more extensive than this simple description. For a marketing system to be operative and effective,







♦ transport and handling
♦ storage
♦ processing and packaging
♦ grading and standardisation.
• Facilitating functions:
♦ financing and risk-bearing
♦ market information
♦ demand and supply creation
♦ market research.
Exchange functions are what is commonly thought of as marketing. They involve finding a
buyer or a seller, negotiating price and transferring ownership (but not necessarily physical transfer).
These functions take place at the "market"—that is, the physical meeting point for buyers and sellers
at the point of production or via some other means of communication. At this point, formal or informal
property rights are important to ensure the reliable transfer of ownership and to guarantee legality
(e.g. that animals on sale were not stolen and will not be reclaimed).
Physical functions enable the actual flow of commodities through space and time from producer
to consumer and their transformation to a form desirable to the consumer. Assemblying or
concentrating the product at convenient points allows its economical transport (i.e. getting enough
animals together to transport cheaply). This is a valuable function which is often overlooked in the
public perception of traders. Storage allows the commodity to be held until peak season demand,
thereby stabilising supply. Processing transforms the commodity into the products desired by the
consumers. Grading and standardisation allow the consumer to be more confident of the characteristics
of the good being purchased.
Financing and risk-bearing are two important facilitating functions. The owner of goods at any
marketing stage must sacrifice the opportunity to use the working capital needed to buy those goods
elsewhere. Or the owner must borrow that capital. In either case, capital must be provided by the
trader or by some lending source. Regardless, cost is involved. Further, there is an implicit cost in
the risk of losing all or part of that capital through theft, spoilage, mortality or changing market
conditions. Without the willingness to provide the capital and to bear these costs, no stage of the
market chain could function. Other facilitating functions enable producers to respond to consumer
needs and thus provide goods in the locations, quantity and form desired.
These functions create the marketing environment, whose elements are:
• Market and facilities—including all of the physical infrastructure that a market may depend on.
• Market information and intelligence—including informal and formal communication systems, and
standard weights and grades on which market information depends.




Market actors are defined by the roles they play, by the nature of their financing activities and their
responsibility to ownership (whether to a centralised public office, to a private purchaser of the
marketing service or self-responsibility as in the case of independent private enterprises). Actors in
the market can choose between specialising in one activity or integrating a number of activities into
one enterprise in a vertical or horizontal manner. A specialised enterprise can offer its customers
more individual attention and provide the exact quality and form of goods desired (e.g. local butcher).
Thus, the roles of actors are often difficult to separate. The roles of vertically-integrated actors are
likely to overlap with those of more specialised agents in the market. Figure 5.3 illustrates how the
roles of market agents can vary.
Figure 5.3. The varying roles ofmarket agents.
S P T
Farmer — ► Rural consumer
S P T T
Farmer !—! ► Rural retailer ► Rural consumer
S,T P, S, T
rmer ► rvcMueni processor
► Rural retailer - ^> * ^ Rural consumer
ST P S T
Farmer ' ► Nonresident wholesaler
-*- Urban wholesaler or consumer
Adapted fromTimmeret a! (1983: p. 167).
S = storage; P = processing; and T = transport.
Country buyers often carry out the initial task of assembling goods from dispersed farms or
local rural markets. These buyers may be farmers, shopkeepers, itinerant traders or some co-operative
or government-buying agency.
The role of wholesalers is to transfer goods from producers or country buyers to retailers or
other wholesalers. Thus, their role may overlap with that of country buyers, in that they may deal
directly with producers. They often finance the movement of goods themselves and consequently
bear the cost of marketing risks. In the African livestock trade, there is a tendency for there to be a
number of stages in the wholesale trade, as animals are assembled into larger and larger herds for
subsequent trekking to urban centres. To operate profitably, wholesalers must be especially
well-informed about current market prices and conditions, since the costs of market risks increase
with the number of stock being handled.
Commission agents may sometimes operate on behalf of wholesalers for a percentage of the
price paid. Although they act in the same way as wholesalers, the risk remains with the owner of
the goods. Brokers offering an intimate knowledge of the market act to bring buyers and sellers
together. In West Africa, livestock brokers also serve to enforce informal market rules by monitoring
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transactions, assuring the integrity of each party in the transaction and guaranteeing that the negotiated
price will be paid. Thus, they contribute in several ways to the exchange functions by facilitating
buying and selling, and reinforcing the informal system which enforces contracts.
Processors transform the good either partially or completely into the form to be consumed. In
the African livestock trade, processing is often carried out on a large scale by government agencies
who also operate as wholesalers. They may also sell their processing services to smaller traders.
Retailers present the good to the consumer in the manner, location and form desired. In the
case of livestock, they may also carry out processing activities (e.g. butchering).
5.4.3 Marketing enterprises and channels
Enterprises of four types normally fulfill the roles of middlemen described above. These are:
• independent, locally-based private enterprises
• co-operatives
• marketing boards and other state enterprises
• transnational companies.
Independent, locally-based private enterprises operate with capital owned directly by the
operators and their partners, or in some cases by shareholders. Although not always large in scale
of operation, these make up the greatest number of agriculture and livestock enterprises. Great variety
exists in their level and degree of sophistication. Sometimes foreign-owned operations may occupy
important roles in this niche, particularly in foreign trade of livestock products.
Co-operatives have the potential to improve marketing efficiency. They can reduce marketing
costs. For example, a village livestock marketing co-operative could co-ordinate the production
schedules of small farmers, so that sufficient animals would reach market age at the same time,
allowing truck transport to markets and lowering per unit transport costs. Co-operatives can also be
used to counteract imperfect competition (monopsony/oligopoly power) among buyers, by creating
greater bargaining power among producers. Typically they are used to distribute credit or subsidised
inputs. In Africa they have been more successful when they have confined themselves at first to one
simple function which is important to all members, attempting only later to expand their role. In
order to be successful in the long run, a co-operative must be able to carry out marketing functions
with lower cost or effort than available alternatives. If this ability is not perceived by members,
co-operatives are likely to break down. Since the ownership of co-operatives, by definition, lies in
the hands of those who use its services (and who are thus entitled to any profits), a distinction must
be made between farmer-owned and -controlled co-operatives and parastatals. Parastatals are
co-operatives in name only, since they are government controlled. They may serve as taxation
mechanisms or to promote government support. Private co-operatives are likely to be more efficient
than parastatals, because of ownership incentives. Some co-operatives are difficult to classify, such
as the Kenya Co-operatives Creamery (KCC). Although nominally a private cooperative, the KCC
acts as a parastatal because of government-sanctioned monopoly and regulatory powers.
Marketing boards and other state enterprises, although popular with many African
governments, have been much criticised. They are set up by government direction with government
capital. Major operating decisions are subject to approval by the responsible minister. Parastatals are
slightly more independent. Although government financed, they are autonomous in terms of handling
funds, recruiting staff and making operational decisions.
The objectives of establishing such public intermediaries are: to raise the bargaining power of
agricultural producers via an imposed monopoly on sales; to set up needed market and processing
facilities; to raise the scale of operation and thus to capture economies of scale; and to stabilise
market supply and prices. They often fail to achieve these objectives because of inappropriate policies,
poor management and lack of knowledge. Attempts to replace private markets usually fail because
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the detailed information necessary to operate may be too dispersed to gather. Managers succumb to
patronage and corruption, and incentives for efficient operation are usually lacking. The Kenya Meat
Commission (KMC) was, until recently, a parastatal set up to buy and process cattle and to market
the products. Although potential economies of scale existed, these were not achieved because capacity
was under-utilised and per unit costs were higher. Slaughterhouses built to handle peak seasonal
supply are usually under-utilised during other seasons. Parastatals with a mandate to buy at fixed
prices from all producers also suffer from high costs of cattle purchases in pastoral areas, where such
sales are widely dispersed.
Transnational companies often succeed because of their access to processing technology and
external markets. By definition, they operate in countries other than that of their headquarters. They
can assist market development by facilitating the movement of skills and capital to areas where they
are in short supply, potentially contributing to the levelling of commercial expertise.
When considering the relative advantages of each of these enterprises, attention must be given
to the particular environment of livestock marketing in Africa. Its marketing structures are more
complicated and differentiated than those in a developed country where production is much more
specialised. Further, issues of equity and income distribution between producers are more acute and
must be considered in the policy decision to promote certain types of enterprise .
All of the goods in a particular market are unlikely to pass through the same set of agents.
Usually goods pass through a variety of market channels as a result of varying degrees of vertical
integration existing in the same market. Figure 5.4 illustrates a marketing system showing multiple
Figure 5.4. Marketing chain for milk and dairy products.
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Note: (*) means near-zero quantities
Adapted from Ansell (1971: p. 7).
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marketing channels. At times, some intermediaries are bypassed, while in others, goods pass through
a large number of hands. Note that at any one level of the market, such as at level A, the sum ofthe
percentage flows in the diagram is always 1 00. This type of diagram can be helpful in basic planning
for new investment in marketing, by identifying both the channels where volume is highest and other
channels which could be further developed.
Exercise 5.2: Livestock marketing channels (estimated time required: 1 hour).
Using personal knowledge of a livestock marketing system in one's home country, draw a
market channel diagram similar to Figure 5.4. Identify all stages, actors, enterprise types and flows
in the system and identify the percentage flows through each channel. Discuss the reasons, in terms
of price policy, institutional environment and infrastructure, for the existing pattern of market channels.
5.5 Structure and specifics of livestock trade and their
implications
While livestock and agricultural marketing systems share some characteristics, a number of features
unique to livestock products determine how their marketing will be carried out. Tables 5.2 and 5.3
illustrate some of these similarities and differences. In our discussion of livestock marketing
characteristics, we will deal mainly with the marketing of meat, although dairy marketing will also
be addressed.











Source: Amir and Knipscheer (1989: p. 147).
Table 5.3. Common marketing problems in the livestock sector.
A problem about:
Production inputs Meat Milk
Problems for livestock producers
No market outlet X X
Differential prices by location X X
Place of sale too far from farm X
Difficulty of storing X
Low prices X X
Purchaser exploiting seller X X
Retailer exploiting producer X
Overproduction and surpluses X X
Problems for consumers
High prices X X X
Unreliable supply X X
Suspect quality and hygiene X X X
Poor consumers lack access to supply X X
Problems for producers and consumers
Seasonal fluctuation, price and quantity X X
Large margins between prices X X X
Market failure when drought X X
Marketing system not responsive to




The characteristics of livestock producers hamper buying at the producer level—a level which
is typified by many small producers. They are widely dispersed under traditional land tenure regimes
using traditional management systems. Communication and infrastructure are limited and bargaining
power is poor. A lack of market orientation often exists among producers, especially in pastoral areas,
where cattle are not necessarily held for profit, thus changing the nature and timing of sales. These
characteristics affect the number and type of traders, the types of services offered, the cost and type
of transport system adopted, the location of market sale points and processing facilities, and the
efficiency of information dissemination. One result of such conditions is the large role of the informal
sector in livestock marketing, because of the costs incurred by large integrated efforts to market
cattle. Facilities for assembling livestock are important, but often lacking, leading to informal trading.
Some marketing differences are brought about by the nature of the good itself. There is less
processing involved in the marketing of livestock than with grains. Indeed sometimes no processing
may occur until just before the products are to be sold at retail. Therefore, a larger share of the
amount the consumer spends on meat is expended for the live animal. Thus, a greater proportion of
the retail price goes to the producer. Livestock processing usually involves not only slaughter, but
butchering and refrigeration as well. Because of the lack of refrigeration facilities, meat is stored for
only a short period of time. Therefore, storage after processing is minimal. Meat marketing begins
with the live animal which is transported or trekked to slaughtering facilities for processing to, at
least, the carcass level. If transport opportunities are limited, slaughtering may only operate to sell
fresh meat to the local market. The limited role of processing in livestock marketing is made up by
the importance of transportation and its associated costs. In Africa, the limitations of road transport
and the unreliability of refrigerated transport (either by road or rail), lead to most livestock being
trekked to slaughter points. This has been shown to be relatively efficient, as will be discussed in
more detail in the section on market evaluation.
At slaughter points, and at the carcass level, livestock are graded according to consumer
preferences. Important characteristics for grading are fat levels, tenderness, age, and weight. Carcasses
can be processed into either wholesale or retail cuts, in the former case serving yet another level of
market intermediaries. If not processed into retail cuts, carcasses can be chilled and shipped to
centralised butchering and distribution centres, where they are further processed into wholesale cuts,
which at retail outlets are processed into retail cuts. More valuable cuts are distributed to
higher-income retail areas, leading to product differentiation in the retail market. Slaughter and
packing houses must comply with government sanitation regulations and be subject to inspection,
which forms another part of the grading and standardisation process. Although export markets exist,
disease regulations inhibit the movement of stock for export. Thus, such trade is usually limited and
is handled by parastatals.
As the livestock market develops, the use of specialised skills and technologies increases, as
does market integration. Market integration can reduce the risks that occur from price instability. The
larger firms that result from integration can raise capital for improved plant and equipment and its
more specialised management.
Box 5.2: Example of a livestock marketing system: West African markets
for cattle and meat.
There are three main sources of meat supply for the southern cities along the West African
coast:
• cattle and small ruminants from dry savannah areas (pastoral areas)
• livestock from mixed farming areas





Because tsetse occurs along the coast, producers are far to the north. As a result, the
marketing structure has to be complex in order to move livestock over long distances to the
consuming areas with minimum loss.
Supply varies with the willingness of producers to sell, the quantity and quality of grazing
at different seasons, and disruptions to the infrastructure such as broken bridges or restrictions
on movement imposed by veterinary officials. The price for meat in Abidjan or other coastal
cities may be twice as high as equivalent prices for cattle in the supply regions. Thus, prices
which dominate the trade are the wholesale prices in the consuming towns on the coast—where
the greatest aggregation of supply and demand are reflected.
Marketing begins with local traders (country buyers) in the north who buy surplus cattle
from migratory herders. Cattle are driven to village markets where some are bought by other
traders to transport (in droves of 100-150 head) to the south by rail, truck or foot. The animals
may be bought and sold several times before reaching their destination, with each trader
specialising in a single stage of the market. This, using the best local knowledge and permitting
rapid turnover of capital, thereby reduces risk. Along the journey, the cattle are fed and watered,
weak animals are sold and all are inspected, dipped or vaccinated by veterinary officials. If
travelling via official corridors, they are taxed at the frontiers.
In the coastal towns, brokers or "landlords" put buyers in touch with sellers and provide
some of the finance required to handle the cattle between arrival and the retail sale of the cuts.
These landlords provide accommodation to the livestock sellers, arrange introductions and
provide guarantees for payment at agreed prices. Most buyers are wholesalers, although some
resell to subsidiary markets. Wholesalers sell carcasses to retail butchers, and sell hides and
offal. The retail market is differentiated into low quality meat at low prices, marketed in
low-income areas and high quality meat, sold in select shops in high-income areas. (Whetham,
1972).
Important points (5.4-5.5)




♦ policy institutional environment.
• Marketing system functions are broadly categorised as: exchange functions, physical
functions and facilitating functions.
• Actors in the market are defined by the roles they play. Major market agents/actors are:
farmers, country buyers, wholesalers, commission agents and brokers.
• Functions of the middlemen in the market are carried by four types of enterprises, namely,
♦ locally-based private enterprises
♦ co-operatives
♦ marketing boards and other state enterprises
♦ transnational companies.
• Goods in a market pass from producer to consumer through a variety of channels.
• Livestock marketing systems differ from agricultural marketing systems in terms of product
procurement, processing, grading and transportation. Markets for livestock products are less
organised than crop markets.
 
126
5.6 Marketing systems evaluation
In Africa in the 1960s, and in some cases prior to that, governments, development agencies and
commercial farmers tended to think that existing indigenous and private sector marketing systems
were inefficient and had little potential for internally-generated improvement. Common assumptions
were that: traders were exploitative; their operations were inefficient because of an excess number
of intermediaries; and traders were unable to respond to new market opportunities and changes in
consumer demand (resulting in consumer demand not being relayed properly to producers). Traders
were seen as adding costs to trade without providing a service. As a consequence, government
intervention increased and many livestock marketing projects and schemes for the distribution of
veterinary supplies and other inputs were initiated, which either did away completely with
private-sector participation in these activities, or placed them under intense government regulation.
Examples of such regulatory interventions were compulsory use of stock routes, frequent veterinary
inspection, mandatory weighing of animals, auction markets and detailed specifications of the
qualifications or endowments a trader must have before being licensed.
While some of these projects were successful, many were not. Studies have suggested that
many of these indigenous systems were much less inefficient than had earlier been believed. As a
consequence, it is now more generally accepted that before intervening to change the existing
marketing or distribution system, its current performance should be evaluated. This section discusses
some commonly used methods of market evaluation including:
degree of market efficiency in terms of marketing margin
price analysis
evaluation of services
structure, conduct and performance analysis
market information and intelligence.
5.6.1. Degree of market efficiency in terms of marketing margin
Technical versus economic efficiency
The degree of efficiency is often the measure by which marketing systems are evaluated. However,
a distinction exists between technical and economic efficiency. A new machine may allow for greater
technical efficiency by using fewer inputs for the same level of output; it may not result in economic
efficiency if the cost of the machine is not compensated by the savings in inputs. Economic efficiency
is more desirable because it considers the value of resources, not just their quantity. Economic
efficiency occurs in marketing when market operations are carried out at the least cost, subject to
the techniques and knowledge available, provided that the good is supplied at a desired quality.
Economic efficiency is likely to occur in a competitive environment where traders are forced
to provide good quality products and services at low prices, or be undercut by others more willing
to do so. The obstacles to economic efficiency in marketing are lack of information, resistance of
established institutions and monopoly or oligopoly power on the part of some market agents.
To evaluate markets on the basis of efficiency, the ingredients of an efficient market must be
identified. Four of these are:
• Consumer demand is accurately and quickly relayed to the producer and the resulting information
on producer supply is relayed back to the consumer.
• Marketing and distribution services are provided at the minimum cost per unit, compatible with
the kinds and qualities of service required. Normally, the cost of marketing services will be
reflected in the marketing margin.
.
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Innovation and flexibility exist so that market intermediaries are able to respond to new
opportunities in terms of location or product quality.
The national objectives of marketing are assisted.
Marketing margin, a measure of market efficiency
A common means of measuring market efficiency is to examine marketing margins. This is an
attempt to evaluate economic or price efficiency. The overall marketing margin is simply the
difference between the farm-gate price and the price received on retail sale. That difference can then
be considered to be the cost of marketing and all that is entailed in getting the product from the
producer to the consumer in the desired form. The question to be evaluated is whether the marketing
services being provided are "worth" the cost of this margin.
Marketing margins can be calculated for different levels of the market, so that:




the price at one level or stage in the market
the price at another level
A marketing margin is the difference between the primary and derived demand curves.
Primary demand is based on consumer preferences and their response to retail prices. Derived demand
is based on the relationship between price and quantity at the farm gate or intermediate points.
Derived demand can thus be thought of as consumer demand as experienced by producers or other
intermediaries. Primary and derived supply curves are analogous. The retail price is established where
the primary demand curve and the derived supply curve intersect. The farm-gate price, on the other
hand, occurs at the point where derived demand and primary supply curves intersect. The difference
between the two prices is the marketing margin, which is illustrated in Figure 5.5.














Source: Amir and Knipscheer (1989: p. 160).
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There are several types of marketing margins, based on the market level being considered. The
wholesale margin is the difference between the price paid by the wholesale trader (or the processor)
and the farm-gate or producer price. The retail margin is the difference between the price the retail
trader pays and the retail price he charges to consumers. When the margin is expressed in monetary
terms, it is called the price spread. Expressed as a percentage, it is known as the percentage margin.
The mark-up is the price spread between two levels in the market divided by the selling price,
expressed as a per cent.
Exercise 5.3: Calculation of marketing margins.
Example: A rural dairy producer sells one kg of locally-processed butter to a trader for 20
Ethiopian Birr (EB)/kg. The trader sells the butter to a retailer in an urban area for EB 24/kg. The
retailer in turn sells the butter to his consumers for EB 26/kg.
wholesale margin = trader price - producer price
EB 24 - EB 20 = EB 4
retail margin = retail price - trader price
EB 26 - EB 24 = EB 2
total price spread = wholesale margin + retail margin
EB 4 + EB 2 = EB 6
percentage margin = wholesale margin/wholesale buying price X 100
(EB4/EB20)xl00 = 25%
retail mark-up = retail margin/retail selling price x 100
(EB 2/EB 26) X 100 = 7.69%
Exercise: (estimated time required: 1/2 hour).
A pastoral herder in West Africa can sell his cattle to a trader for about CFA 700/kg (based
on the buyer's estimate of the weight). The trader treks the animals to an urban area, where he sells
them to a butcher for 1200 CFA/kg. The butcher then sells the meat to consumers. Half of the meat
sells for 2100 CFA/kg; the rest sells at 900 CFA/kg.
Question 1. What is the wholesale margin? What is the retail margin, based on an average retail price
for meat? What is the total price spread?
Question 2. What is the wholesale percentage margin? What per cent is the retail mark-up?
In an efficiently operating market, the competitive environment should keep the marketing
margin to a minimum. Market prices should then reflect two elements: the actual costs of marketing
plus normal profit margin. A normal profit is one which provides returns to investment comparable
to available rates of interest plus some compensation for the risk borne by the marketer.
At different stages in the marketing system the "product" (e.g. animal or meat) is sold and
bought. Normally, at each successive stage, the price per unit bought/sold is higher and we say that
value has been added. This refers to the fact that some marketing service has been provided, whether
transport, processing or one of the other marketing functions, and the value of that service is now
included in the product price (and presumably the desirability of the product has been likewise
increased). Again, at each successive stage the value added at that stage can be split into two
categories: the part which is reflected in the real additional costs of adding value and the part which
reflects the extra "profit" made.
Some of the additional costs incurred at each marketing stage are obvious, for example: taxes
and market fees, transport costs (e.g. hiring a truck or paying trekkers accompanying the cattle), food
purchases for the animals, any interest paid on a loan taken to finance the purchase, and animal
upkeep.
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Table 5.4 gives an example, based on data from Abidjan in 1977, of the growth in value added
at different point in a marketing system and the apportionment of this growth in value added to costs
and profits.
Table 5.4. Evolution ofthe cost and value added of beefand offal sold retail in Abidjan in 1977.

















Transport of cattle 12.7
Transport fees 6.1
Shrinkage 7.0
Losses and forced sales 1.5
Total transport 14.6
Selling costs of meat
Transport, stall rental and labour 4.4
Wastage (bone) 1.0
Losses due to condemnations, credit default 0.8















Source: Delgado and Staatz (1980: p. 62).
In value-added costs, some costs are less obvious. If a trader buys 20 cattle at $ 100 each and
one of these dies before he can resell it, the average additional "cost of losses" incurred can be
estimated at $ 5.26 for each of the remaining 19 animals that he does sell ($100 loss divided by
19 remaining). Similarly, if a trader buys a 300 kg animal at $ 600 and, before he sells it, the animal
loses 30 kg, then to his original cost per kg (live weight) of $ 2.00 has to be added a further $ 0.22/kg
for the loss of live weight before sale (cost per kg is then $ 600/270 kg = $ 2.22). Such costs and
transport costs are particularly important in livestock trade (Box 5.4).
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Box 5.3: The case of Alphabeta: Beef marketing efficiency.
An evaluation of the efficiency of the beef market in Alphabeta was carried out by examining
processing costs. The focus was on the Meat Marketing Commission (MMC), a state agency
which controls slaughter for export and urban markets. The analysis showed that between years
one and six, MMC's costs rose faster than inflation. MMC total costs rose by 31%, while
consumer costs rose by 13% and manufacturing costs in general rose by 22%. This trend
continued in years 7 and 11. The comparison suggests that increased costs to MMC are not
caused by increased costs in general in the economy, but by inefficiency in MMC's operation.
Further, MMC's margins were compared with those of private slaughtering operations
and again the analysis suggested inefficiency. Private margins were 5 cents/kg, while MMC
operated at a margin of 7.5 cents/kg. Private processors can offer a higher price to producers
and a lower price to consumers.
Some further costs tend to be more controversial. Suppose a trader keeps an animal which he
has bought for $ 600 for three months before he sells it. The interest rate payable on deposit accounts
at the local bank is 10%/year, calculable 3-monthly. By investing $ 600 in the animal and not selling
for three months, the trader "lost" $ 15 which otherwise he could have earned by putting the money
on deposit account ($ 600 x 10% x 3/12 = $ 15). Many economists would want to count that $ 15
as a "cost" of trading, even though the trader did not actually pay anyone interest for using this
money. The $ 15 is the opportunity cost of the capital he has invested in the animal during the
period he is holding it. Another controversial cost is that of the trader's own time. Suppose he spent
three weeks trekking the animals from the place he bought them to the place where he sold them.
If he had not been doing that, the trader could have been employed by someone else at $ 5/day.
Again, many economists would argue that an extra $ 105 (i.e. $ 5 x 21 days) of any "value added"
between purchase and sale should be counted as "cost of trading" rather than as "trader's profit".
Information on value-added costs and profits is very difficult to obtain, since the people who
have the information (usually traders) are reluctant to reveal it for fear that, as a consequence, they
will be taxed or regulated or the information might be used by a competitor.
Value-added costs and profits will tend to vary widely over time, i.e. a trader will make a big
profit on one buying expedition, a small one on the next and possibly, a big loss on the third. For
this reason, policy makers must carefully consider the variation that is possible not only over time,
but between enterprises (i.e. some may be making profits while others fail, even though the market
as a whole exhibits normal margins).
Some approaches to estimating market margins
Three commonly used approaches to determine marketing margins are:
• To sample prices of uniform products at each market stage cross-sectionally at one point in
time across a variety of market agents.
• To sample prices of uniform products at each market stage through time (time-series), relying
on data from a smaller number of sources.
• To examine gross receipts and expenses of marketers at each stage, and divide by number of
units traded.
The method selected may depend on the availability of reliable means of collecting data.
Margin analysis in African agricultural markets shows that there are not many cases of excess
profits. In most cases, traders' profit margins amount to less than 10% of the selling price. Table 5.5
shows the distribution of costs in some free-market livestock systems. Returns of 10% or more may
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be required in many markets to compensate for risk factors. Further, such returns may be similar to
those in other professions. The analysis of livestock margins is often made particularly difficult by
the large role of the informal market, and thus a lack of data on prices and/or the level and structure
of costs of those involved in the marketing process.
Table 5.5. A comparison offree-marketing sheep and cattle systems in selected African countries.
Proportion of trader s selling price accruing to:
Country Producer Trader Lorry, Losses and Cost Method of
return profit Taxes ship, rail shrinkage Other sub-total transport
Cote d' Ivoire 90 4 1 0 1 4 6 Trek
Coted'Ivoire 78 4 8 3 2 5 18 Trek , rail
Cote d'lvoire 80 8 1 4 2 5 12 Trek, lorry
Kenya 93 2 n.a. 3 n.a. n.a. 5 Lorry
Madagascar 73 9 1 0 11 6 18 Trek
Madagascar 76 5 2 8 7 2 19 Lorry
Mali 23 16 36 8 8 9 61 Trek, lorry
Somalia 63 7 3 11 6 10 30 Trek, ship
Burkina Faso 76 5 4 0 2 13 14 Trek
Burkina Faso 53 14 11 7 13 2 33 Trek, rail
Source: Sandford (1983: p. 204).
n.a. = not available.
Box 5.4: Transport systems and costs in Africa.
A number of studies have addressed the conditions and costs of transport systems and their
effects on trade (Ariza-Nino et al, 1980). Examination of the economics of transport requires
a comparison of the merits and disadvantages of different modes of livestock transport (trekking,
trucking and railing), a comparison which is usually made on the basis of cost. Such costs are
both direct and indirect. While the direct costs may be obvious, indirect costs include weight
loss or death in transit (sometimes resulting in early sale en route), forced sale or loss of grade
at sale, crop damage or pasture use during transit, causing conflict or the need for cash
compensation and the costs of government services to help avoid these costs.
In many parts of Africa, trekking is the primary means of moving livestock to consumer
markets. Ansell (1971) looked at one indirect cost, animal weight loss resulting from lack of
adequate feed and water during trekking, and found that the cost was not as large as expected.
Without facilities for food and water, weight losses can be expected to range from 8-13%.
These could be reduced to about 5% by providing both adequate water points along the trek
routes and rest, food and water at pre-slaughter holding grounds. During bad years, losses from
trekking can be expected to be much higher but not necessarily higher than when other modes
of transportation are used. Although trekking results in high indirect costs, trucking can produce
high direct costs (fuel, depreciation, capital etc). Rail and trucking can also lead to high
mortality and weight loss. An exception is Nigeria where an improved road network and low
fuel costs have led to a large-scale replacement of trekking by trucking. The level of trucking
costs are also affected by return loads and alternative uses for vehicles. Large specialist vehicles
could produce economies of scale, but only if used frequently (to avoid the cost of "dead
time"). Small multi-purpose private vehicle transport is usually more cost-efficient because of
alternative vehicle uses. Improved roads would lower trucking costs and reduce the risk to
animals from transportation breakdowns and accidents. Tansporting live animals is usually more
cost effective than transporting slaughtered animals because of refrigeration costs.
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Reference values of marketing margins for evaluating market efficiency
Reference standards can be used to set up a point at or beyond which performance is judged to be
"satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory". Market margins of more than 15%, for example, could be
considered unacceptable. These are best used, however, as an indicator that more examination, using
other measures of evaluation, is needed.
Because economic conditions generally, and marketing systems in particular, tend to change
rapidly of their own accord even when governments do not deliberately intervene, infrequent one-time
evaluations may be inadequate. Thus, permanent monitoring systems may be required. However, these
can be expensive, and careful planning is required to ensure that a monitoring system will be viable
over the longer term, with data not only being collected with satisfactory accuracy, but also analysed
and utilised. A permanent monitoring system needs to collect some data without reference to specific
criteria for evaluation. Data of this kind include export and import flows, price trends and information
on functions, flows, participants and stages (Figure 5.4).
Great care must be used in making conclusions based on comparisons of marketing margins,
especially between different countries. Policy decisions based solely on simple margin analyses are
likely to be based on erroneous conclusions. Efficiency in performance of marketing functions is not
in all cases equated with small marketing margins. Similarly, large margins are not necessarily a firm
indication of inefficiency or excess profit by traders. Marketing margins and costs can only be
meaningfully discussed in relation to the services and functions which are provided. We return to the
question whether marketing services provided are "worth" the cost.
Widening margins over time may reflect an increased demand by consumers for additional
services. In that case, consumers may begin to prefer more processing or better presentation or
handling, increasing the value added and the margin between producer and consumer prices.
Consumers may demand meat which is refrigerated and packaged, and be willing to pay for the
additional value added because they perceive the worth of such product handling. This change in
demand points toward one reason why it is difficult to measure market efficiency. Markets must
encourage new production and consumption by introducing new products. Thus, equilibrium and
stable margins may not always exist.
In cross-country comparisons, a higher margin may only mean lower production costs per unit
or more value added in the form of services. In developed country markets for beef, the proportion
of retail price which goes to the producer is likely to be small, reflecting the large value added of
handling and packaging. Such comparisons are really valid only when production systems, marketing
systems and consumer preferences are similar. Thus comparisons between marketing channels within
an economy can be useful. The existence of large differences in margins between marketing channels
would justify further examination of services, costs and market conditions. Because there are no
absolute indicators of efficiency, evaluation depends on comparisons between enterprises and between
marketing sectors within an economy.
5.6.2 Price analysis
Price analysis is a widely-used evaluation method which looks at the spatial correlation of markets
through time. The assumption is that if market prices in different regions move together, then the
overall market is operating effectively, in that supply is being distributed regionally in a way which
meets local demand. It also assumes information and transport are operating effectively. However,
there is some criticism of this method because markets with no strong trade links may show correlated
price simply due to similar demand and supply conditions. Further, a monopoly firm could control
prices in several regional markets. If price correlation occurs, other evidence needs to be used to
discover how prices are being determined.
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5.6.3 Services
Marketing services may be difficult to evaluate directly, although cost comparisons can provide some
indication of availability. Evidence of excessive mortality and weight loss may indicate that feed,
water points or other services during transport are lacking. The functioning of services can also be
seen in the structure of the market. Large numbers of intermediaries in the market indicate a lack of
capital and risk-avoidance services such as banking and insurance. Without capital, traders are forced
to deal in small quantities at a time. This leads to a preponderance of small traders in the market.
Lack of livestock insurance can have the same result. The presence of numerous traders can thus be
seen as an effective adaptation of the market to a situation where services from external and public
source are lacking.
Box 5.5: Pooling transport costs.
Differences in transport costs will affect the pattern of production and marketing. Farm-gate
prices can be expected to be lower at greater distances from the market, until, at some point,
the price traders are willing to pay to producers is lower than production costs. This point is
the effective limit, under a free market system, to the area supplying the market. Governments
in Africa, however, have often intervened to create cost pooling where a single producer price
is paid and profitable routes support unprofitable routes. This allows the inclusion of otherwise
non-viable production areas into the market supply zone (an example is the KCC in Kenya).
This is a difficult policy to implement because of the possibility of overall losses,
particularly if some external shock occurs which changes the cost structure. Thus, the producer
price must be carefully chosen. Also, a price remaining constant over the year does not
acknowledge seasonal changes in supply and demand. Even if overall losses occur, cost pooling
is often justified on the basis of equity considerations which are seen to outweigh the efficiency
criteria.
Encouraging production in remote areas may be desirable for equity reasons. Indeed this
is true of any policy which equalises charges for government services, such as veterinary or
artificial insemination services delivered to dispersed pastoral producers at great cost. Choosing
to pursue such a policy depends on which of the objectives, efficiency or equity, is considered
more important.
Exercise 5.4: Transportation costs.
Example. Table 5.6 compares the costs of transporting cattle to market by truck and mixed
trek-rail. The largest trucking cost is from truck rental. A trek-rail system requires higher costs in
terms of salary, (note the greater number of days in transit), as well as additional costs for damaged
fields etc. The overall costs of trek-rail, however, are significantly less than those of trucking and
animal mortality rates are lower (1.5% compared to 2%), but the table does not reflect the costs of
animal weight loss while in transit. Instead, it assumes that the animals are sold for the same price
(40,000 CFA) even though those trekked may have lost significant weight.
Exercise: (estimated time: 2 hours).
Question 1. Group the costs from Table 5.6 into direct and indirect costs. Convert them into percentage
total costs. How do the two transportation methods compare in terms of proportion of
direct and indirect costs?
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Table 5.6. Comparative costs oftransporting 50 head of cattlefrom Koutiala, Mali, to Abidjan by a) truck and b)






Total animal Total animal
Salary, food, return trip for 24,000 480 75,000 1,500
drovers
Round trip and food for owner 14,400 288 14,400 288
Health certificate 4,000 80 4,000 80
Indemnity for damaged fields 250 5
Salt for animals 500 10
Loss of animals 2% of 50 animals @ 40,000
each = 40,000
800 1.5% of50 animals @ 40,000
each = 30,000
600
Forced sales 2% of 50 animals @ 20,000
loss each = 20,000
400 2% of 50 animals @ 20,000
loss each = 20,000
400
Cattle market tax 25,000 500 25,000 500
Merchant license, 220,000 4,400 220,000 4,400
vaccination, export tax
Transport charges
Truck rental/rail car 2 trucks = 2 rail cars =
700,000 14,000 125,116 2,502
Straw 1,000 20
Loading/unloading 2,500 50 2,500 50
Other 2,500 50
Unofficial charges 105,000 2,100 5,000 100
Total costs (excluding weight 1,154,000 23,098 517,266 10,445
loss)
Days in transit 3 31
Source: Delgado and Staatz (1980: p. 68).
Question 2. Suppose that, under the trek-rail method, animal mortality increased to 4% and forced
the sale of animals to 8%. How do the two transportation methods compare?
Question 3. Suppose that weight loss under either method amounted to 0.5% each day and that this
was directly reflected in a lower sale price for each animal (i.e. a 10% weight loss during
transit resulted in a sale price 10% less than 40,000 CFA). How do the two transportation
methods compare when weight losses are taken into account?
Question 4. At what daily rate of weight loss do both methods result in the same costs? Is such a
rate plausible?
Exercise 5.5. Market area determination on basis of transport costs.
Since transport costs increase with distance, there is a certain distance from a market at which
it is no longer profitable to transport goods. The area around a consumer market in which
transportation is profitable is called the market area. The radius, or limit of the area, is calculated
by the following equation:
Radius (kms) = P/T
where:
P = profit per head of livestock
T = transport cost per head per km.
The further producers are from the consumer market, the greater the transport costs and the
lower the producers' profits (all costs of transportation are passed from the trader to the producer).
135
A change in price at the market centre affects mainly those producers who are on the edge of the
market area, since the relative price change differs.
Example: Figure 5.6 illustrates a hypothetical African country and the system of roads
connecting the capital with main points in the interior. In the interior traders purchase livestock which
they truck to an abattoir in the capital. Producers close to the capital receive $ 360/head at the abattoir
and pay an average of $ 300/head in production costs.
Figure 5.6. Hypothetical country and transport routes.
 
Exercise: (estimated time required: 1.5 hours).
Question 1. What is the average producer profit?
Question 2. If transport costs an average of $ 0.40/head per km, what is the radius of the market
area?
Question 3. If producers require a $ 10 minimum profit on each head of cattle, what is the radius
of the market area?
Question 4. What would transportation costs have to be for the market area to reach point D?
Question 5. What would be the maximum price a trader would be willing to offer at point A?
Exercise 5.6: Cost pooling in transport.
Use the information given in Figure 5.6. The government is considering establishing a livestock
marketing system which would purchase cattle from all willing buyers, no matter how distant they
are from slaughter facilities (pooling costs). The government proposes to offer a uniform price of
$ 310/head. The selling price at the abattoir is proposed at $ 360/head. An examination of transport
costs shows that for points A and B, in mountainous and sparsely populated areas, transport costs
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are $ 0.70/head per km. Transport costs from point C are only $ 0.35/head per km. Costs from other
points remain at $ 0.40/head per km. The expected annual livestock purchases are:







Exercise: (estimated time required: 1 hour).
Question 1. What will be the annual costs and revenues of the government marketing system from
the total purchase?
Question 2. Will the government be obliged to provide a subsidy at the price, and if so, of how
much?
Question 3. At what farm-gate price will revenues in the system cover costs?
5.6.4 Structure, conduct and performance analysis
Because marginal analysis alone may be limited in value, it can be included in a wider analysis. A
measure of market evaluation which can complement the market margin analysis is a classic approach
called structure, conduct and performance analysis. The three elements of the analysis, as the
name implies, are conduct, structure and performance.
The approach, based on ideal competitive market conditions, holds that if the market is
"structured" in a particular way, it will tend to make participants conduct their business in particular
and rather predictable ways with, again, particular and partially predictable consequences for market
performance. This approach focuses on the continuous monitoring of the market on structural issues,
(which are easier/cheaper to monitor), leaving a full investigation of performance (e.g. price-margin
analysis) only to those cases where monitoring of structure suggests that some undesirable conduct
and performance are likely to arise.
Structure is determined by the number and size of firms in the market, the degree of product
differentiation and the conditions for entry of new firms into the market. The number of participants
operating in a particular market or related markets can be indicative of the extent to which buying
and selling power is concentrated amongst them. A few large firms can dominate a market and control
prices. The concentration ratio, which measures the proportion of total sales in a market by a given
firm, can be used to indicate the level of concentration of market share. Monopoly elements in the
performance of market functions will not necessarily disadvantage consumers or producers. Economy
of scale, which may lower market costs, has been the basis for government interventions.
Entry, or the ease with which individuals can join and leave business, is important to a
competitive environment and to market structure. This may refer to the process of getting a license
or professional qualification or skill, or to the need for having a minimum amount of capital or other
resources in order to operate successfully. Lack of available capital could effectively restrict entry
of new firms if a large initial outlay is required. Structure can also include the nature of information
transfer in the market, which might require an examination of the institutional and other facilities
available for acquiring and transmitting market information. This could include weigh scales, an
auction system, trader registration and accessible information on prices at which deals are concluded.
Conduct refers to the strategies that firms pursue with regard to price, product and promotions,
and the linkages/relationships between and among firms. The market behaviour of firms will determine
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 whether or not they compete and whether they are acting innovatively to improve market efficiency.
Informal association between even a small number of firms (collusion) can cause price distortions,
and seemingly independent firms can have joint ownership (subsidiaries). These conditions can
sometimes be seen in African markets where one ethnic group, often from another country, can
dominate a particular market and, through cohesive behaviour, affect market conditions. Thus, a point
of examination might be the social composition and distinctiveness (e.g. in terms of ethnic group,
income class, membership of associations) of one kind of market participant (e.g. traders) and the
practical social opportunities that this gives to collude in operating against the interests of other
market participants (e.g. farmers or consumers).
Performance is the focus of the margin analysis discussed in section 5.6. It is exhibited by
trends and stability of prices, margins and profits. A monitoring scheme which focuses on the relatively
easy-to-monitor issues of structure will not itself provide the raw material needed to evaluate the
efficiency of a marketing system. It may, however, provide information at relatively low costs on
changes indicating the opportunity for monopolistic tendencies to prevail.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 provide an example based on Ethiopia of the monitoring of one of the
elements of market structure, i.e. the number of traders and the number of sheep they offer for sale.
Data for only one year are presented. Monitoring over several years would indicate trends.
Table 5.7. Average number ofsheep offeredfor sale by individual trader by market and period.






No. of Average no. of
sheep offeredMarket traders
Shola 67 24.6 90 25.1 24.9
Addisu Shola 25 56.1 6 52.8 55.5
Deneba 16 15.7 7 10 14.0
Degollo 10 17.7 12 20.6 19.3
Ginchi 12 11.4 9 12.2 11.8
Debre Zeit 5 9.6 6 11 10.3
Dejen 8 5.4 3 5.3 5.4
143 25.9 133 23.2 24.6
Source: Kebede Andargachew (1990: p. 86).
Table 5.8. Distribution oftraders by number ofsheep offeredfor sale.
No. of % of Percentage of all

















































Source: Kebede Andargachew (1990: p. 87).
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5.6.5 Market information and intelligence
Market information is crucial to producers, wholesalers and consumers to help them make decisions
on what and whether to buy and sell. In general, information is required on prices, traded or available
quantities, forecasts of future supplies and demand, and general market conditions. Information must
be relevant, accurate and timely and reflect all sectors of the market, especially consumer demand.
Such information can be used by traders to shift to those goods with high consumer demand. An
effective market information system reduces risks to traders, eventually reducing market margins.
When reliable information is not available, traders increase their margins to protect themselves from
risk (e.g. if information on distant cattle markets is not reliable, traders face the risk of finding low
prices at the end of a long trek).
In most African livestock markets, evidence suggests that information flows relatively freely
through traditional information systems, although this may not be the case for markets that are not
trading regularly throughout the year. Even external consumer preferences are conveyed well, as
evidenced by a quick shift in the suggested export patterns when international demand changes.
Researchers in West Africa found it easy to obtain price information for livestock transactions.
Further, prices reported by buyers and sellers showed close correlation. Information about prices and
market conditions is spread rapidly by returning merchants and word of mouth (the price of live
cattle in Ouagadougou reaches Abidjan in about the time it takes trains to travel the distance).
An efficient market information system needs to address information flows in both directions
between consumers and producers. Information should be evaluated in terms of its accuracy, how
promptly it reaches those who need it and its degree of detail. These can be determined by comparing
the results of surveys of traders and agents with known information about the market.
Methods of collecting market information vary from country to country. Central agencies may
be poorly trained and the same market figures may be reported in successive years. Price information,
perhaps the easiest to gather, is usually collected by reporters who go into the market and randomly
sample. The systematic collection of reliable market data is a tedious and difficult task and is often
avoided because of large recurring costs. In cattle markets, collecting systematic data may not be
feasible because of the large volume of informal trading that takes place. Whether information about
the number of animals presented at market or slaughtered can be transmitted rapidly depends on the
effectiveness of the market information collection and dissemination system. The cost effectiveness
of weekly and monthly statistics on this type of information is uncertain, because such information
is likely to be more readily and efficiently disseminated through informal communication channels.
Whatever system is used, it should be simple. Data should be generated quickly and disseminated
promptly.
Atttempts to disseminate price information on cattle have suffered from a lack of uniform
standards (e.g. animal weights, grades etc). Grading systems are particularly important to market
information systems. The need for grading is based on the idea that buyers recognize differences in
quality. Thus, some buyers are willing to pay more for the quality they want and may buy other
qualities only at lower prices or in smaller quantities. Sellers can benefit from grading because
negotiating contracts becomes easier.
Exercise 5.7: Market information systems.
Choose from your country some livestock commodity market with whose market information
system you are familiar. (If the participant is not familiar with such a system, a description of the
system in the literature can be used.)
Exercise: (estimated time required: 2 hours).
Question 1. Describe in detail the level of development of the market information system, both formal
and informal.
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Question 2. Describe how market information is collected. Evaluate the market information collection
system in terms of accuracy, regularity and relevance.
Question 3. Evaluate market reports and forecasts in terms of timeliness and accuracy. How well are
they prepared, how are they disseminated and how well do they meet the needs of users?
Question 4. Suggest what improvements could be made to the market information system and discuss
how this could be done.
5.7 The role of government interventions in markets
Despite recent free market trends in the world and in Africa, markets in general remain a subordinate
instrument of national political systems and their policies. Government interventions must work to
facilitate market competition and to help the market achieve national policy objectives.
Government policies and interventions must address more than the objective of "rationalising"
trade, which often results in efforts to make marketing practices conform mechanically to a modern
model. Marketing interventions should take into account the proven capability of the marketing
network. Policies should be aimed at working with the existing system, not at replacing it. Government
attempts to replace free market systems have often raised the costs of marketing, thereby hurting
consumers, distorting resource allocations and damaging the economy. It is important that policy
makers view trading as a necessary and socially desirable activity carried out in an environment of
risk.
The questions to be asked in considering any intervention are: is it really necessary or is it
simply for the sake of government control? What would happen if the intervention was removed?
Studies of cattle marketing systems in Africa have, in fact, shown that markets often perform well
when left to private entrepreneurs.
It is generally recommended that governments play a facilitating rather than a direct role in
markets. Regulatory interventions should be limited. Appropriate interventions are thus indirect in
nature and have three general aims:
• to improve market infrastructure
• to improve information
• to improve institutional infrastructure.
5.7.1 Improve market infrastructure
Interventions to improve market infrastructure would target roads, rail, market facilities, water points
and health-control infrastructures (i.e. quarantine facilities). Projects for market-sale points, such as
auction yards, need to be better designed and located. In Abidjan, for example, a new concrete
livestock market remained unused next to the traditional open-air market (Ariza-Nino et al, 1980).
In this case, the informal market was already serving an existing need. If market facilities are provided,
they need to be built on existing traditional sites and should not be so heavily regulated that agents
avoid them.
Investment in water points along trekking systems may prove wasteful. Water points can cause
crop damage to neighbouring fields. Often, traders are taxed at these points, which makes them use
traditional routes. Market trails could be created if well located in terms of supply and demand areas
and grazing areas, along the route and water points. Providing grazing reserves near major livestock
markets helps to stabilise the flow of cattle, but fees for such use must be reasonable if traders are
to use them. Such reserves could reduce price fluctuations, reduce risk and animal weight loss.
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5.7.2 Improve information
Information is important for facilitating effective marketing. While traditional information systems
seem relatively effective for livestock markets, one unfortunate consequence of regulated prices is a
lack of information on real market prices.
5.7.3 Improve institutional infrastructure
Improving the institutional infrastructure may be the most important government role in marketing.
Government interventions should promote an open and stable institutional framework. This may take
the form of improving security (i.e. protecting property rights and contracts) and controlling corruption
and violence.
A major difference between "traditional" and "modern" markets lies in the degree of personal
involvement of marketing agents. In a "modern" market system, personal involvement is minimum;
traders operate through institutions which guarantee legality and value. While in traditional livestock
markets transactions are guaranteed by a broker who is known to the traders, transactions in modern
markets are guaranteed through regulations and supporting legislations. Unfortunately, attempts to
provide these regulations have often been badly handled. As a result, traders have shifted back to
operating within the informal sector.
Box 5.6: Government intervention in livestock.
In Africa, government interventions in the market have primarily been in terms of providing
abattoirs, meat packing facilities and milk processing plants. These interventions set prices,
grades and standards for livestock products. Such interventions are usually implemented in
order to control consumer and producer prices through a monopoly framework. Control would
be over grades and quality for standardisation, health or export. The view held is that private
trading is exploitative and inefficient. Thus, government monopolies would produce economies
of scale.
These interventions may, in fact, result in inappropriately-located processing facilities,
such as abattoirs in pastoral, low-density areas which cannot supply to plant capacity. In
practice, it is difficult to exploit the potential economies of scale because of chronically
under-utilised capacity.
Capacity under-utilisation is also caused by price policies which pay low prices to
producers, uniform across regions and seasons. The result is an unwillingness by producers to
supply at the controlled price level. Instead, goods are diverted to the informal economy,
because private agents may be able to offer higher farm-gate prices. The result is less use of
existing processing capacity, higher average processing costs and a general decline in the
economic viability of the system.
Institutional attempts to "organise" trade through restrictive licensing or limiting the number
of intermediaries have forced traders to move into the informal sector. In some Sahelian countries,
authorities have tried to limit or reduce the number of traders and organise them along artificial
functional lines. The result has been less competition, less new entry into the market and the creation
of informal markets. Attempts at regulation should promote rather than discourage competitive
marketing to reduce costs. Finally, any new interventions should be made gradually, since new policies
often cause severe market disruptions.
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Most governments have not been able to resist the temptation to intervene directly in markets,
particularly by setting prices to create low prices for urban consumers. In general, price-control efforts
reduce the efficiency of marketing systems.
Direct government intervention in the form of marketing boards is now also recognised as
generally undesirable. The result has often been to incur additional costs and wastage which might
not occur in a competitive marketing situation. Problems of marketing boards tend to be:
• Government management styles and procedures can be too cumbersome for efficient marketing.
• Few incentives exist for efficiency.
• Low salaries can produce corruption.
• Marketing boards are too often a convenient means for taxing producers and traders.
• Since, for marketing boards to operate efficiently, marketing channels need to be few and
concentrated, livestock markets are generally not suited to them.
Box 5.7: The case of Alphabeta: Price intervention.
In Alphabeta, the government adopted a system of uniform producer prices for milk delivered
to the National Dairy Co-operative (NDC). The government gave no consideration to seasonal
and regional variations in milk supply and production. Because informal milk market prices
could not be effectively controlled by the government, they varied seasonally. During the dry
season, when milk was in short supply, producers sold their milk to the informal market which
offered higher prices. The effect of the uniform price policy was, thus, to divert milk to the
informal market during the dry season. During the flush season when informal milk prices
were low, milk was delivered to the NDC. The result was under-supply to the NDC during
the dry season and over-supply in the flush season. The consequent need for additional
manufacturing capacity to cope with the flush supply led to capacity under-utilisation during
the dry season and higher overall processing costs. Further, uniform producer prices in all
locations, no matter how remote, led to higher transportation costs. The higher processing and
transportation costs were passed on to consumers in the form of higher dairy product prices.
5.8 Marketing and national policy objectives
An effective marketing system can contribute to national policy objectives. This section relates the
features of marketing to the five main broad groups of policy objectives as identified in module 2.
The independence objective aims at obtaining and preserving a satisfactory degree of political
and economic autonomy. Although in general increased trade could be seen as acting contrary to this
objective, an effective domestic marketing system reinforces independence by enabling a nation to
supply its own needs more easily. For example, improvements in the West African livestock marketing
system could enable regional supply of high-quality beef which in some cases is now imported.
Regional marketing systems which replace supplies from world market sources work towards regional
independence.
The self-sufficiency ratio, discussed in module 2, reflects the performance of the production
and marketing systems combined. If the marketing system is defined broadly to include the external
trade factors, then changes in the NPC (module 4) are a measure of changes in the incentives given
by the marketing system to domestic producers in comparison with imports. But when NPC is
calculated, the least reliable data are typically the costs of internal marketing for both domestic
products and imports. They are the key issues in any discussion of the performance of a marketing
system in respect to independence objectives.
142
The economic efficiency objective focuses on increasing the level of real national income and
its growth rate over time (maximising real income). The attainment of this objective is the most
important contribution of an effective marketing system. In a country where livestock production is
important, improvements in livestock marketing can make a significant contribution to national
economic efficiency and thus growth. The contribution of marketing to this objective is a result of
the optimal allocation of resources which can occur with the meaningful price signals that a
well-working market can deliver. Producers and traders will move in response to price and other
market signals to activities which return the greatest value to the economy. Over time and on a large
scale, the increased wealth made possible from an effective marketing system can add significantly
to national income growth. Livestock, because of its positive income elasticity of demand, offers
opportunities for creating wealth not only for rural smallholders but for the economy as a whole,
due to the development of many new marketing services.
The resource conservation objective concentrates on preserving the natural resource base to
ensure the above two objectives. An improved marketing system may or may not contribute to this
objective. Indeed, market activity in general is often criticised for working against the goal of resource
conservation. It is sometimes argued that, especially in dry areas in Africa, resource degradation has
increased due to integration of these areas into world commodity markets. In South America, forests
have been cut in order to raise livestock for export. If some economic actors are given the opportunity
to exploit natural resources without being responsible for the long-term damages and costs, resource
degradation could indeed occur. Large firms exploiting natural resources for the market must be
monitored by appropriate government agencies.
On the smallholder level in Africa, there have been some cases where increased market
integration has caused environmental degradation. One such example is making charcoal from trees
in rural areas to supply urban demand in Addis Ababa, an activity which accelerated with the change
of government in 1991. But here the factor which led to the problem was uncertainty of land
ownership and use rights. The effect of market integration on natural resources is closely tied to
property rights and land tenure issues (module 7).
There is no conclusive evidence either way concerning the impact of African livestock markets
on the environment. Traditional land tenure systems may moderate the effects. Improved marketing
which causes producers to offer more cattle for sale, rather than hold them for wealth, may increase
offtake rates and eventually reduce the stock using natural grazing resources.
The stability objective attempts to avoid abrupt and large changes in income, in the price and
availability of domestically-produced basic commodities and inputs. One of the main forms of
instability in the livestock sectors of countries with unreliable rainfall is a huge increase in the flow
of livestock into markets when drought strikes, as farmers sell their stock when they are threatened
by starvation. The huge increase in livestock flows, at a time when many potential consumers are
also suffering from drought-induced declines in income, quickly leads to a total collapse in livestock
prices. An improved livestock marketing system is unlikely to avoid this problem. Better marketing
of inputs such as feed and operating capital may allow some farmers to withstand a drought situation
until prices return to normal. In general, effective marketing systems create stability in supply and
prices by allowing surplus regions to supply areas with net demand, smoothing price and availability
differences. Whether this will be effective at the national or even regional level is uncertain, as the
1992 Southern African drought has shown.
The equity objective promotes the fair distribution of income and wealth within society, among
different types of farms, among regions and between producers. Again, the impact of greater market
integration on this objective is not necessarily positive or negative. If some economic agents are able
to control large market shares, they may increase wealth at the expense of others. This is unlikely
to occur in African livestock markets which are typified by a large number of small producers and
traders. Indeed, a shift from monopoly marketing boards to free market trade carried out by numerous
private enterprises is almost certain to improve the distribution of income and thus aid the equity
objective.
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 Important points (5.6-5.8)
Marketing interventions should be preceded by an evaluation of existing marketing systems.
Some commonly used methods of market evaluation are:
♦ assessing the degree of market efficiency in terms of marketing margins
♦ price analysis
♦ evaluation of marketing services
♦ structure, conduct and performance analysis
market information and intelligence.
Marketing margin is the difference between the farm-gate price and the retail sale price
received. However, there are several basic types of marketing margins, based on market
levels or stages being considered.
A value is added to the cost of a product at each successive stage of the marketing system.
Marketing margins of more that 15% indicate unacceptable market performance. However,
great care must be used in making conclusions based on marketing margin values alone as
many other factors influence the performance of a marketing system.
Price analysis, as a method of marketing evaluation, examines the price correlation between
markets separated by space and through time.
Marketing services, as an indicator of the effectiveness of marketing systems, are difficult
to evaluate. However, the cost of a commodity and marketing structure give an idea of the
effectiveness of marketing services.
Structure, conduct and performance analysis is used with margin analysis to evaluate
marketing systems. This approach holds that the structure of a market controls the conduct
of the participants and consequently the performance of the marketing system. Accordingly,
continuous monitoring of structural issues should form the basis of market evaluation.
Market information is crucial for producers, wholesalers and consumers taking decisions on
what to buy and sell. Information on prices, traded or available quantities, forecasts of future
supplies and demand and general market conditions are needed for such decisions.
Government policies and resulting interventions should play a facilitating rather than a direct
role in markets.
Three appropriate types of government intervention in marketing systems are:
♦ improving market infrastructure
♦ improving information
♦ improving institutional infrastructure.
An effective marketing system contributes to national objectives by:
♦ Enabling a nation to supply its own needs of goods and services.
♦ Facilitating optimal allocation of resources.
♦ Creating stability in supply and prices by integrating surplus and deficit.
♦ Improving the distribution of income under competitive marketing.
5.9 Feedback exercises
All answers can be found in the text.








2. There are six major components of a marketing system that influence the market price of a






3.a. Marketing system functions are classified as: i) exchange functions; ii) physical functions;
and iii) facilitating functions. Indicate which of the following fall in category i), category ii)
and category iii).









3.b. Identify which of the following form the role of a broker and a retailer. Write B for broker
and R for retailer.
assembling goods from rural markets
transferring goods from producers to retailers
bringing buyers and sellers together
presenting goods to the consumer in the manner, location and form desired
.reinforcing informal systems which enforce contracts






5. Circle T for True and F for False.
i) Marketing margin is the difference between the retail price and farm-gate price of
a product.
T F
ii) The retail price is established where primary and derived demand curves intersect.
T F
iii) The farm-gate price occurs at the point where the derived demand curve and
the primary supply curve intersect.
T F
iv) The wholesale margin and retail margin are the same.
T F
v) When the marketing margin is expressed in money terms, it is called the price spread.
T F
vi) At each successive stage in the marketing system the product is sold or bought at the
value-added costs.
6. Explain the main premise behind structure, conduct and performance analysis.
7. Market information is crucial to market agents to take decisions on what and whether to buy




iii) forecast of future supply and demand
iv)
8.a. Tick (•) the correct answers.
Why do government interventions aimed at improving markets not show the desired results?
i) They attempt to bring about radical changes in marketing systems.
ii) They work with existing systems.
iii) Most of the time their objective is to control the markets.
iv) They ignore the proven capability of existing marketing networks.
b. The government of Tanzania proposes to improve physical and institutional infrastructure for










To which of the five national objectives listed below could the role of marketing be
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Module 6 is intended to enable you to:
1 . List seven steps in budget and manpower planning.
2. Explain some basic principles and issues involved in budget and manpower planning.
3. Prepare capital and recurrent cost budget requests for livestock development projects and
programmes.
4. Demonstrate, by examples, the linkage between budget and manpower planning, and operational
efficiency of animal health services in sub-Saharan Africa.
5. List and discuss three important indicators used in assessing the effectiveness of government services
provided to the livestock subsector in Africa.
6. Describe three options in improving the effectiveness of African animal health services.
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6.2 Introduction
Livestock policy analysts may propose new projects or programmes as instruments of policy
implementation. Or, they may be asked to investigate the operational problems of existing livestock
services with a view to increasing their efficiency. In either case, an understanding of the principles
of budget and manpower planning is essential to the task. Those responsible for formulating and/or
monitoring the budget and manpower plan for livestock services frequently lack both the training
and the skills for doing so. One purpose of this module is to introduce some of the principles and
issues involved in planning and to provide an opportunity to carry out some planning exercises.
Budget and manpower planning could be made more reliable and less time-and-paper
consuming if more were known about past experiences. Policy scientists at ILCA and elsewhere have
analysed experiences in African animal health services. Some useful rules-of-thumb regarding ratios
between broad categories of expenditure and resources have emerged from this analysis. These are
presented in the second section of the module, which also discusses some approaches to improving
the effectiveness of the services provided.
6.3 Steps in budget and manpower planning
Seven major phases involved in planning and managing any rural development policy, project or
programme can be roughly sketched as follows:
1 . Identification
2. Formulation and control






Policy, programme or project monitoring and evaluation activities feed information into new
designs, generating potentials for improvement in formulation, implementation and impact. In
practice, however, courses of action identified often proceed little further than the formulation stage.
If implemented, they are rarely monitored or evaluated. Feedback relevant to the design of new
projects, programmes or policies is therefore either scant or non-existent and reports on causes of
"success" or "failure" tend to be vague.
It is at the formulation stage and during monitoring that an understanding of the principles of
budget and manpower planning becomes critical. Poor formulation and/or monitoring of budget and
manpower needs can, for example, result in the following problems:
150
• The rejection of projects, programmes or policies because of over-stated budget and/or
manpower requirements at the formulation stage.
• Non- or incomplete implementation of projects due to understated costs and manpower needs,
leading to chronic shortages of human and physical resources.
• A tendency for personnel costs to rise with time, "squeezing out" other important project cost
items and preventing effective implementation.
The need for careful budget and manpower planning is, therefore, crucial to the success of
any project, programme or policy.
6.4 Some principles of budget and manpower planning for
livestock development
Budget and manpower planning in Africa is complicated by the fact that information on the availability
of resources is often completely lacking, not only when projects are being formulated, but also during
their implementation. As a result, planning is fraught with uncertainty and implementation must be
continually adjusted as circumstances change. The central problem of budget and manpower planning
is how to deal with this uncertainty. Careful formulation and monitoring are thus important in
minimising this uncertainty—which also arises from the absolute and relative limitations in the
availability of financial and manpower resources.
A number of principles are important in this respect:
• Understand the relationship between capital and recurrent costs.
• Understand the relationship between staff and non-staff recurrent costs.
• Clearly identify those resources critical for success and seek consensus to ensure that they will
be made available.
• If resources will not be made available, modify the project accordingly.
• Understand the relationships between inputs.
• Include contingency allowances in budget projections.
6.4.1 Capital and recurrent costs
Capital expenditure breeds future recurrent costs. When capital development is proceeding apace,
planners and policy makers tend to forget that heavy recurrent costs will be incurred several years
down the line. Capital funds are often (though not always) easier to acquire, for instance from donors,
than are recurrent funds, which traditionally come from the Ministry of Finance. Typically, there is
little analysis of the relationship between capital and recurrent costs, and recurrent funds tend to be
committed more or less automatically in order to secure capital funding. As Chambers (1974) notes,
"In planning activities, recurrent resources...have been relatively neglected, and there is a strong case
for subjecting recurrent allocations and their use to more stringent appraisal, evaluation and
management".
(Hint to instructors: Not all countries use their resources equally efficiently. Another use of
the ratio between capital and recurrent costs is to ask whether one's own country has the same ratio
as others with similar conditions, and if not, why not. Get the participants to form pairs in order to
look into this question, comparing their own country with a neighbour's.)
6.4.2 Staff and non-staff recurrent costs
The same principles which apply to the ratio between capital and recurrent costs also apply to the
ratio between staff and non-staff costs within the recurrent cost category. Staff costs breed non-staff
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Box 6.1 : Recurrent costs and the planner.
Let C be the capital cost of 1 unit (a dip) enabling a certain activity (dipping) and R the annual
recurrent costs of operating that unit. Then, C/R is the ratio between them. Let I be the amount
of investment funds available for building dips and O be the amount of funds available for
operating them. The limit on the number of dips which can be successfully built and operated
will be set by whichever is smaller, I/C or O/R. Project planners habitually ignore R and O
and concentrate on C and I, assuming that O will increase to meet the needs generated by I.
But the future size of O is limited by the following factors:
• The rate of growth in the economy as a whole.
• The relationship between the rate of economic growth and the rate of growth in the
government's budget.
• The priority government gives to the agricultural sector, as expressed by its share of the
government's budget.
• The priority given to the livestock subsector, as expressed by its share of the agricultural
budget.
Planners in the livestock subsector have to learn to live with these factors, which are
not going to change simply because they spend too much I. However, the planner responsible
for budgeting the dipping programme should think about, and perhaps seek to influence, the
following:
• The desirable proportion that dipping should represent of the ministry's total activities in
the livestock subsector.
• The C/R ratio of dips and dipping.
Clearly, the planner must know what the C/R ratio is in order to allocate sufficient
recurrent funds, thereby avoiding building dips that cannot subsequently be operated. But he
or she may be able to do more than this. First, the project may need to be modified if the C/R
ratio looks unrealistic. This might be done either by reducing the number of dips, by changing
their design (e.g. making them sturdier), by delaying their construction or by replacing them
with some other input. Second, the planner can investigate the feasibility of introducing users'
charges, with the aim of reducing the amount of R needed from the government budget. For
equity reasons, planners are often reluctant to charge for services. But if O is finite, then the
issue is whether users (or some of them, at least) will be better off not paying for a service
which is in very short supply, or paying for one which is plentiful.
The planner can use the C/R, I/C and O/R ratios to check whether users should pay a capital
subscription (because I is the limiting factor) or a users' fee.
costs and the planner must know what the ratio between them is if resources are not to be wasted.
Rising staff costs, coupled with a relative (and real) decline in funds available to meet other recurrent
costs, has been a major cause of failure in animal health services of many countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. As this trend continues, staff are unable to perform their functions effectively, as operational
funds are steadily depleted.
6.4.3 Critical resources
Resources critical to success need to be established at the outset of the planning process. They may
consist either of staff or of physical inputs (or of both). In either case, given the competition for
scarce resources in most developing countries, it is likely that those considered necessary for one
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project will also be in demand for several others. Under these circumstances, rather than plan in i
vacuum, it is vital to seek consensus on which project(s) should take priority. This may require
consultation with other ministries and institutes besides one's own. Critical inputs should not only
be identified but, where necessary, their continued availability in the future should be ensured. This
is particularly true of manpower needs in livestock services, requiring some highly specialised skills
which take a long time to develop (e.g. veterinarians). Hence, there is the need to monitor changing
staff ratios and to relate these to future manpower and training needs. The following steps are normally
followed:
• Project/programme objectives are determined and critical manpower needs are established by
category.
• These needs are then related to the output of existing educational institutions for each category
and for each period; transfers of staff from other sources are considered and negotiated.
• Allowances are made for wastage, caused by factors such as retirement, resignation, emigration,
dismissal or death. (Wastage rates are frequently neglected in manpower planning, leading to
the inefficient use of resources arising from unexpected manpower shortages.)
This procedure yields information on expected staff surpluses or deficits by category. A plan
can then be devised to compensate for any anticipated shortages, giving careful consideration to the
capacity of existing institutions to meet demands, the funds available for expanding them where
necessary and the time that will elapse before additional manpower will come on to the market (e.g.
trained veterinarians).
6.4.4 Project modification
The approach taken to project design will determine the size, scope and nature of resource needs. If
critical resources cannot be obtained for the project as currently designed, it will have to be modified.
Modification will involve one or several of the following options:
• Reducing the size of the project, thereby scaling down the demand for scarce resources.
• Redesigning the project by substituting scarce resources with others which are cheaper and/or
more plentiful.
• Rescheduling project operations to allow more time for resources to become available.
There may be considerable scope for resource modification without altering basic
project/programme objectives.
6.4.5 Relationships between inputs
The relationships between inputs should be understood and specified. All, not just some, inputs may
need to be available before a given new technology can work. For instance, a new printing press
cannot function unless paper, plates and ink are also provided. Alternatively, certain inputs may be
vital over one period but not needed over another. For instance, seed is required during the planting
season but not thereafter; peak labour requirements will occur during planting, weeding and
harvesting, but not during the dry season.
Techniques such as critical path analysis and bar chart planning have been used to establish
resource-to-resource and resource-to-activity relationships more precisely and to improve the
scheduling of operations. The former relies on a precision of control rarely achievable in livestock
projects/programmes in Africa. However, the latter can be of use in:
• identifying and establishing resource linkages
• examining the assumptions regarding the availability of critical components
• examining potential conflicts in the scheduling of project activities
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lonitoring capital and recurrent expenditures.
Figure 6.1 relates project activities to labour availability. Activities are first scheduled according
to specified time periods, then the labour needed for each period is calculated. The labour requirement
is then compared with the amount of labour available to determine the surplus or deficit for each
period. Any necessary rescheduling or redefinition of activities can then be carried out.
Figure 6. 1. Labour resource and activity relationshipsfor a hypothetical project plan.
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TLU 10 10 9 9 6 6 5 5 5 3 3 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 10 10 6
AL 12 12 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 10 10
S/D 2 2 1 1 4 4 5 0 0 2 2 -3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 -2 0 4
A = activity.
D = duration.
LRU = labour resource used.
TLU = total labour used.
AL m available labour.
S/D = surplus/deficit.
6.4.6 Contingency allowance
Provision should be made for unforeseen delays or shortages by including contingency allowances
for all inputs in budget projections. Contingencies are of two kinds:
• Physical contingencies, which compensate for the under-estimation of infrastructural needs in
the capital budget. It is normal to allow between 10 and 15% for such items. Where capital
expenditures are tied to specific components (e.g. housing to staff) or where there is no
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uncertainty with respect to physical needs (e.g. construction of standard buildings to design
specifications), physical contingencies should not be applied.
• Price contingencies, which compensate for inflation of both capital and recurrent cost items.
If necessary, variable inflation rates may be applied to different items in the budget.
Contingency allowances should not be so large as to cover all conceivable cost over-runs,
since this will reduce the incentive for careful cost estimating, relax the pressure for tight control
during implementation and lead to misleadingly low estimates of rates of return on the proposed
project (Gittinger, 1973).
Contingency allowances are best shown separately in cost tables, with appropriate footnoted
explanations on how they were arrived at.
6.4.7 Relevant exercises
Exercise 6.1: Budget and manpower planning.
Example. The exercise which follows is based on data from a rural development project
document in an imaginary country. Eight areas, designated as Rural Development Zones, have been
identified as suitable for intensive development. The project is intended to improve crop and livestock
production through the provision of extension and marketing services, the construction of roads, input
supply depots and stock water supplies, the development of small irrigation schemes and the
rationalisation of land use practices through resettlement. Rangeland areas are to be fenced and
improved pastures will be introduced on a trial basis in selected areas. Veterinary services are to be
increased and breed improvement schemes will be implemented.





Capital development and recurrent cost budgets are given for area A in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
Note that:
• Major recurrent and capital cost categories are broken down by item in sufficient detail to
ensure that all important cost components are included. Where detailed itemisation is not
needed, costs may be aggregated (as in the case of office running costs).
Financial budget projections have little meaning beyond a three- to five-year time horizon. The
time period chosen will normally depend on the budgetary planning period adopted by the
government and/or donor agency involved (e.g. triennial review period or a five-year national
plan period).
• While the tables presented here only summarise the project's capital and recurrent costs,
government and donor commitments will normally need to be clearly specified and separated
out for negotiation purposes.





Table 6.1. Capital cost budgetfor Rural Development Zone A (years 1-5) (A$).
Item of expenditure No.
Cost/




Housing: Class 1 1 6,200 24,800 18,000 42,800
Junior QRS 2 650 1,300 1,300
Depots 2 3,500 3,500 3,500 7,000
Domestic water supplies 16 3,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 48,000
Diptanks 2 1,800 3,600 3,600
Poultry distribution centre 1 1,000 1,000 1,000
Subtotal 46,200 33,500 12.000 12,000 103,700
Vehicles
Cattle truck 1 18,000 18,000 18,000
Tractor 4 7,250 14,500 14,500 29,000
Land development
Terracing (ha) 2,436 65 31,670 31,670 31,670 31,670 31,670 158,350
Road construction (km) 60 300 6,000 6,000 6,000 18,000
Drifts (no.) 3 2,500 5,000 2,500 7,500
Grass strip removal (no.) 2,436 10 4,870 4,870 4,870 4,870 4,870 24,350
Artificial waterways 12 1,500 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 18,000
Waterway fences (km) 12 475 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 5,700
Site levelling 600 20 4,000 4,000 4,000 12,000
Gully reclamation 10 750 1,875 1,875 1,875 1,875 7,500
Subtotal 58,155 55,655 53,155 41,280 43,153 251,400
Livestock development
Stock water (dams) 5 7,000 14,000 14,000 7,000 35,000
Fencing - perimeters (km) 50 375 6,250 6,250 6,250 18,150
- internal (km) 80 375 10,000 10,000 10,000 30,000
Rehabilitation (seeding) 4,000 8 10,665 10,665 10,665 31,995
Bull camps 1 1,050 1,050 1,050
Subtotal 41,965 40,915 33,915 116,795
Irrigation development
Dam 1 2,500 2,500 25.000
Canals (km) 5 700 3,500 3,500
Rice Paddies 30 800 12,000 12,000 24,000
Weirs 4 600 1,200 1,200 2,400
Minor canals 4 700 1,400 1,400 2,800
Reservoirs 10 3,000 15,000 15,000 30,000
Levelling 20 125 1,250 1,250 2,500
Subtotal 59,350 30,850 90,200
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Table 6.2. Recurrent cost budgetfor Rural Development Zone A (years 1-5) (A$).
Total recurrent cost Grand
Item of expenditure No. Cost/unit Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 total
Salaries
Project manager 1 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 30,000
Extension officer: 1 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 17,400
ACO 1 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 13,300
AEO 10 2,660 26,600 26,600 26,600 26,600 26,600 133,000
ALEO 1 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 13,300
Mechanisation assistant 2 2,660 5,320 5,320 5,320 5,320 5,320 26,600
Veterinary assistant 4 1,100 4,400 4,400 4,400 4,400 4,400 22,000
Watchman 1 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 5,000
Clerk/Typist 1 950 950 950 950 950 950 4,750
Artisans 5 1,510 7,550 7,550 7,550 7,550 1,510 31,710
Labourers 15 640 9,600 9,600 9,600 9,600 1,920 40,320
Domestic demonstrator 1 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 7,250
Volunteer 2 1,200 1,200 1,200 2,400
Driver 5 1,100 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 27,500
Allowances 1 400 400 400 400 400 400 2,000
Subtotal 77,570 78,770 78,770 77,570 63,850 376,530
Vehicle costs
Tonne truck 2 4,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 40,000
Cattle truck 1 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,800 24,000
4WD vehicle 2 4,250 8,500 8,500 8,500 8.500 8,500 42,500
Pick-up truck 1 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 12,500
Mileage allowances 30,000 0.1 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 15,000
Subtotal 26,800 26,800 26,800 26,800 26,800 134,000
Tractor pool costs
Mechanic 1 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 7,250
Driver 4 840 3,360 3,360 3,360 3,360 3,360 16,800
Fuel cost (tractor hours) 3,000 0.9 2,700 2,700 2,700 2,700 2,700 13,500
Repairs and maintenance 3,000 0.4 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 6,000




Buildings, diptanks, 5% 2,260 3,965 4,565 5,165 5,165 21,120
domestic water
Fences 2% 350 695 1,045 1,065 1,090 4,245
Gullies 2.5% 45 95 140 190 190 660
Roads, drifts 2.5% 275 490 640 640 640 2,685
Terraces, levelling 2.5% 925 1,850 2,740 3,530 4,320 13,365
Rice paddies 5% 600 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 5,400
Waterways, canals 59S 425 675 855 1,035 1,215 4,205
Stock water, dams, 5% 2,760 4,270 4,620 4,620 4,620 20,890
reservoirs, weirs
Bullcamps 5% 50 100 100 100 100 450
Poultry distribution centre 5% 50 50 50 50 50 250
Miscellaneous
Demonstration plots 1 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 12,500
Dip materials/tank 1,700 11900 15,300 15,300 15,300 15,300 73,100
Office running 750 500 500 500 500 2,750
Subtotal 22,890 31.690 34.255 35.895 36.890 161.620
1 Running costs for vehicles include allowances for replacement, repairs, fuel; tractor replacement costs are excluded.
2 Maintenance allowances have been included from the first year of capital investment.
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Exercise: (estimated time required: 4 hours).
Question 1. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 make no provision for physical or price contingencies. All costs are
expressed in terms of constant prices. Complete the summary cost tables (Tables 6.3-6.5),
given the following contingency allowances:
• a physical contingency allowance of 10% for capital expenditures on land, livestock and
irrigation development
• A price contingency allowance of 10% per annum on all capital and recurrent cost items
(compound interest tables may be used).
What proportion of the total 5-year budget is made up of contingency allowances? Note the
impact of a 10% inflation rate on annual and total budgetary needs. Note as well the changing
relationship between capital and recurrent costs in the budget, as portrayed in Figure 6.2. Assuming
inflation continues at 10% a year until year 10, plot recurrent cost commitments to that date in Figure 6.2.
Question 2. Table 6.6 gives some illustrative examples of recurrent expenditure as a proportion of
investment expenditure, also known as "r" coefficients, for some agricultural
development projects.
• Assuming that no capital costs are incurred from year five onwards and that recurrent costs
continue to year 10 at year 5 levels, calculate the "r" coefficient for Rural Development Zone
A using the total financial costs you calculated in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.
• Suppose now that you did not take account of price contingencies in your calculations of capital
and recurrent costs. Recalculate the "r" coefficient for Rural Development Zone A on this basis.
Compare this coefficient to the one you obtained previously and comment on the results.
• The preceding calculations use total recurrent costs and include costs which do not necessarily
recur in every year of the project. Identify and list some of these cost items from Table 6.2.
Question 3. Table 6.7 summarises programme needs for junior level extension agents. Staff for these
categories can be obtained from the 2-year National Agricultural Certificate Course.
Twenty junior level staff currently in the field are also available for immediate transfer
to the new programme.
Table 6.3. Summary capital costsfor Rural Development Zone A (years 1-5) (A$).
Item Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Grand total
a) Construction 46,200 33,500 12,000 12,000 103,700
b) Vehicles 18,000 14,500 14,500 47,000
c) Land development 58,155 55,655 53,155 43,155 41,280 251,400
d) Livestock development 41,965 40,915 33,915 116,795
e) Irrigation development 59,350 30,850 90,200








Table 6.4. Summary recurrent costsfor Rural Development Zone A (years 1-5) (A$).
Item Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Grand total
a) Salaries
b) Vehicle costs
c) Tractor pool costs
d) Other recurrent costs
Total recurrent costs
(constant prices)
+ Price contingency @
10% on items (a-d)
Total financial cost
77,570 78,770 78,770 77,570 63,850 376,530
26,800 26,800 26,800 26,800 26,800 134,000
8,710 8,710 8,710 8,710 8,710 43,550
22,890 31,690 34,255 35,895 36,890 161,620
Table 6.5. Summary capital and recurrent costsfor Rural Development Zone A (years 1-5) (A$).





















Complete the table, calculating the surpluses or deficits of junior staff available for the
programme. Discuss what courses of action may be considered to ensure that adequate numbers are
available during and after the implementation phase. Retirements, transfers and dismissals are
expected to be 10% per year.
Assume now that 20% of certificate graduates are absorbed by the private sector and are not
available for government employment. Recalculate the table. Comment on the sensitivity of the
programme to changes in the availability of certificate graduates. Discuss possible courses of action
open to the programme planning staff.










Rural health centres 0.27-0.71
Feeder roads 0.06-0. 14
1 If a livestock development programme including water supply system, fencing, internal roads etc costs $ 1 million, we can
estimate that it would cost an average of $ 140,000 in each subsequent year to meet salary, operating and maintenance costs.
Table 6.7. Junior staff requirements and availability in all zones.
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Transferred junior 20 18 16 14 13
officers at start of year
Retirements, transfers and
retrenchments
2 2 2 1 1
New junior staff required
by programme:
25 30 28 14 0
Agricultural credit officer
(ACO)
2 1 1 - -
Agricultural extension
officer (AEO)
10 25 25 14 -
Agricultural livestock
extension officer (ALEO)
5 2 - - -
Mechanisation assistant (MA) 4 1 1 - -
Grain storage officer (GSO) 4 1 1 - -
Total junior staff required 45 48 44 28 13
Total available certificate
graduates




 Important points (6.2-6.4)
Seven major steps in budget and manpower planning for a project, programme or policy
are:
♦ identification
♦ formulation and control





Knowledge of the principles of budget and manpower planning is critical at the formulation
and monitoring stages.
Budget and manpower planning in Africa is characterised by uncertainties because of the
lack of information on the availability of resources.
Four important considerations in budget and manpower planning are:
♦ Understand relationships between recurrent and capital costs, and personnel costs and
non-personnel costs.
♦ Identify resources critical to project success and find out the possibility of project
modification in case of non-availability of these resources.
♦ Understand the relationship between inputs.
♦ Include contingency measures for all project inputs.
Capital expenditure incurs future recurrent costs. Likewise, staff costs breed non-staff costs.
During formulation, it is important to identify which inputs are crucial for the success of
the project and to negotiate to secure them.
When assessing the future availability of manpower, allow for wastage and for the time
required to train replacements and additions.
If crucial resources will not be available, modify the project.
Think about phasing inputs. Bar charts can be a useful tool for scheduling operations.
As a safety measure, include contingency allowances in budget projections. Contingency
measures are of two types:
♦ physical contingencies
♦ price contingencies.
6.5 Staff and non-staff costs: The crisis of animal health
services
6.5.1 Decline in performance of animal health services
Healthy animals are a prerequisite if the livestock subsector is to perform productively. Yet, animal
health services in sub-Saharan Africa have deteriorated alarmingly during the past decade, with the
control of economically important diseases increasingly jeopardised. Some indicators of the magnitude
of the problem in sub-Saharan Africa are:
• Direct and indirect losses from animal disease and health-related causes amount to billions of
US dollars per year.
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• Many of these losses are directly caused by mortality in cattle, sheep and goats and in other
species, mainly pigs and poultry.
• Rinderpest, foot-and-mouth disease and tick-borne diseases are major causes of animal loss
and/or lowered animal productivity. Corresponding losses in terms of trade and foreign
exchange earnings also result.
• Internal parasites are a major cause of death in pre-weaned calves and lambs.
The declining performance of animal health services highlights the need for careful budget and
manpower planning. There is a clear link between inadequate planning and operational inefficiency.
After briefly examining the evidence for this link, some possible solutions to the problem will be
discussed.
6.5.2 Budget trends
Post-independence relative levels and trends in budget and manpower allocations, and ratios in the
animal health services of West/Central and East/Southern Africa have been studied and analysed by
Addis Anteneh (1983; 1985a; 1985b; 1991) and de Haan and Solomon Bekure (1991). These studies
compared the relative shares of recurrent expenditures on livestock services with recurrent
expenditures on all agricultural services. By 1979, the share of livestock services in total agricultural
services was, in most cases, proportionately lower than the share of livestock output (livestock GDP)
in total agricultural output (agricultural GDP). This indicated that in most of the countries studied,
livestock services did not receive an allocation proportionate to the contribution of the livestock
subsector to GDP (Table 8).
In both regions studied, real recurrent expenditure allocated to livestock services increased over
time. The most important factor contributing to the poor performance of livestock services was the
disproportionately high amount of resources spent on staff, relative to non-staff costs.
Within the West and Central Africa region, growth in total recurrent budgets and staff
expenditure allocated to livestock services continued into the mid 1980s for most countries studied.
Overall, staff costs tended to rise faster than the total recurrent cost budgets, further "squeezing"
non-staff costs in the process.
Table 6.8. Share of livestock in agricultural GDP and livestock service in agricultural budgets, 1978/1979.
Share of livestock Budgetary share of livestock
GDP in agricultural services in agricultural
Region/Country GDP (%) services (%)
West & Central Africa




Sierra Leone 7 5







Source: Addis Anteneh (1991).
1 Estimates from various sources.
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In East and southern Africa, recurrent expenditure per TLU not only declined in real terms,
but the share of staff expenditure in total recurrent expenditure also rose. This probably reduced the
effectiveness of livestock services even more than in West and Central Africa .
6.5.3. Manpower ratios
IEMVT expresses the ratio between staff and non-staff recurrent costs as the coefficient of efficacy
(CE), such that:
CE = non-staff expenditure/staff expenditure
Table 6.9 summarises trends in the coefficient of efficacy over the period 1969-79 for 14 West
African countries. In all but two cases, the coefficient declined over the period. Similar patterns were
observed in East Africa and in Zambia. This decline represents both a failure on the part of
governments to provide the necessary operational funds to support staff activities and a failure on
the part of animal health services to limit staff numbers and salaries.
As a result, staff have been underemployed and unable to provide an effective service-even
when the will to do so existed. The production and distribution of vaccines to control serious diseases
has been seriously affected, as has support for public health control measures. Solutions to this
problem must be found if further deterioration in the provision of basic animal health services is to
be prevented.
Table 6.9. Changes in the efficiency coefficient in African animal health service budgets (1969-79).
Country 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Mauritania 0.87 1.03 1.13 1.34 0.40 0.75 0.49 0.24 0.44 0.38 0.59
Senegal 0.29 0.33 0.43 0.34 0.61 0.49 0.20 0.18 0.17
Gambia 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.36 0.33 0.22 0.42
Mali 1.10 1.20 1.29 0.50 0.47 0.43 0.37 0.35
Burkina Faso 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09
Niger 0.70 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.65 0.73 0.69 0.59 0.64
Chad 0.44 0.42 0.24 0.27 0.19 0.24 0.04 0.03
Cameroon 0.67 0.59
Sierra Leone 0.82 1.29 1.31 1.20 3.21 1.80 2.49 2.58 3.58
Cent. Af. Rep. 0.72 0.59 0.59 0.43 0.67 0.61 0.82 0.59 0.19 0.05
Benin 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.28 0.23 0.23
Togo 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.10 0.09
Cote d' Ivoire 0.67 0.56 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.35 0.35 0.45 0.41 0.35
Madagascar 0.85 0.75 0.85 0.72
Source: Bremaud et al (1976a; 1976b; 1976c; 1976d; 1976e; 1976f; 1977) and IEMVT (1980).
... = data not available.
TLU = one tropical livestock unit of 250 kg live weight. The TLU is the equivalent of 1 camel, 1.25
horses, 1.43 bovine, 2 donkeys, 5 pigs, 10 sheep or goats or 100 poultry.
The ratio between staff and non-staff costs is likely to be affected by the environment . A large country in
the arid/semi-arid zones with relatively low disease incidence will have a different ratio to another country
in an environment with higher disease incidence (Anteneh, 1985a).
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Box 6.2: Performance indicators for animal health services.
Besides the ratio of staff:non-staff costs, two further ratios affect the delivery of national animal
health services and are therefore important indicators of their efficiency. These ratios are:
• the ratio of senior (highly qualified) to junior (auxiliary) staff.
• the ratio of staff to TLUs.
The optimum levels for both these ratios depend on the range of services being offered,
the location of staff, the species of livestock receiving attention, the size of individual herds
and their dispersion, and the ease with which subordinate staff can be supervised. The following
broad guidelines have been suggested (Sandford, 1983; de Haan and Nissen, 1985).
When the functions of the veterinarian are primarily confined to visual diagnosis in the
field, supervision of mass vaccination and enforcement of quarantine, ratios of 1 veterinarian
to 20-30 auxiliary staff and up to 200,000 TLUs are feasible, the implied auxiliary staff: TLU
ratio in these circumstance being 1:6667-10,000. When the veterinarian's functions extend to
more sophisticated diagnosis and preventative care on a herd/flock basis, rather than on a mass
vaccination basis, ratios of 1 veterinarian to 10 auxiliaries and 1:10-30 000 TLUs are feasible,
the implied auxiliary staff: TLU ratio in these circumstance being 1:1000-3000.
When the functions entail a full range of animal health services (including artificial
insemination and individual animal care), ratios of 1 veterinarian to 1-5 auxiliaries and 1:5000
TLUs are feasible, the implied auxiliary staffTLU ratio in these circumstances being
1:1000-5000.
Because staff numbers have been allowed to increase, most sub-Saharan African countries
appear, in the light of these ratios, to be endowed with enough senior and junior staff to provide
basic preventative animal health care (Sandford, 1983; Cheneau, 1986; de Haan and Nissen,
1985). However, the appearance is deceptive, since in most countries there has been a
corresponding shortfall in funds available to meet the costs of veterinary inputs and other
supplies.
6.6 Approaches to improve the effectiveness of African animal
health services
It is impossible to define an optimal staffnon-staff expenditure ratio, since the conditions determining
it vary from one country to the next. However, the evidence suggests that a ratio of 1:1 is generally
desirable. In order to achieve such a ratio without reducing staff, a budget with a current ratio of
3:1 would have to be increased by 50% and additional investments might also be required. The
chances of such a budgetary increase are remote in most sub-Saharan African countries. Measures
must therefore be taken within the financial constraints imposed. Such measures are difficult to take
wherever entrenched organisational conventions, rigid training philosophies or pressure from
professional interest groups inhibit change. Nevertheless, the following approaches are possible:
• cost recovery and the removal of subsidies
• privatisation
• organisational reform.
6.6.1 Cost recovery and the removal of subsidies
In the majority of West African countries, animal health services are provided free of charge. In at
least nine countries, all vaccines and drugs are provided at no cost to the producer. In at least four
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others, vaccines are provided free but charges are levied for drugs and for curative treatments. Only
two countries pursue a policy of cost recovery for most materials and services.
In East and Southern Africa, the majority of countries provide free vaccinations but charge the
producer for drugs. Several countries have introduced a fee for individual treatments and services.
However, the revenue recovered represents only a small fraction of total operating costs (between 5
and 20%; see de Haan and Nissen, 1985).
There is the potential for greater cost recovery in West Africa, and some scope for cost recovery
in East and Southern Africa. However, in nearly all cases, the impact on operational budgets is likely
to be limited at first, since at present, veterinary inputs account for a low proportion of overall
operating costs.
The following arguments have been used in support of zero to low cost-recovery:
• Animal health services benefit all members of society, so the costs should not be borne only
by those who own or raise livestock.
Livestock producers will make less use of animal health services if full payment is required.
• Leakages in the system would not permit full cost recovery.
• The livestock subsector is already taxed in various ways (e.g. head tax, slaughter fees, internal
trade tariffs etc) and the revenue from these taxes should be used to finance animal health
services. (In fact, most revenue from the livestock sector tends to be absorbed by the central
government and is not directly recycled to livestock services.)
The extent to which animal health services should be subsidised is debatable. There are sound
arguments for continuing to subsidise some services, particularly mass vaccination against diseases
such as Rinderpest and CBPP (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia). Subsidisation has been shown
to increase the response to vaccination programmes in Kenya, whereas the imposition of fees for
dipping in Tanzania has had the reverse effect (Sandford, 1983).
However, de Haan and Nissen (1985) argue that at least partial cost recovery is justified, and
that all non-salary costs should be recouped to ensure that services can be maintained. When the
service provided is more of an individual (or curative) nature, governments should give serious
consideration to the recovery of all costs, since producers receiving individual attention are normally
quite willing to pay for it.
The best approach to use in recovering costs is also open to question. Attempts to establish
revolving funds to finance drugs and services have been generally unsuccessful (Sandford, 1983; de
Haan and Nissen, 1985) and have done little to alleviate the chronic shortage of operating funds. It
has been suggested that cost recovery could be improved if veterinary field staff were allowed to
sell drugs to farmers at a profit to themselves, increasing the incentive to provide effective services
(CTA, 1987).
6.6.2 Privatisation
Greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of veterinary services and supplies might
improve the overall efficiency of health services. The funds and/or personnel released could be used
to provide services deemed to be more specifically the responsibility of government.
The decision whether or not to privatise will often depend on the nature of the service provided,
i.e. whether it promotes a public good or a private good. A public good (strictly defined) is one
which if supplied to one person can be made available to others at no extra cost, and from which
others cannot be excluded. National defence is an example. By a looser definition, public goods are
ones in whose production or consumption there are externalities, i.e. they confer costs and benefits
to others which are not reflected in the costs or prices paid by the immediate producers or consumers.
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According to de Haan and Nissen (1985), animal health services which fall into the public good
category include:
• veterinary inspection to ensure that public health standards are adhered to
• veterinary reporting and the collection of relevant statistics
• the detection of notifiable diseases and vaccination against diseases of national economic
importance
• quality control of vaccines produced within the country.
These are services for which, because of this "public" nature, it is difficult to charge a full
cost user fee.
The supervision, enforcement and funding of mass vaccination campaigns falls rightly within
the responsibilities of government. Including the private sector in the implementation of a campaign
may nonetheless be justified, and subcontracting activities under government supervision may reduce
costs significantly.
When the benefits of treatment accrue predominantly to the individual and when those who
refuse to pay for a service can be denied access to it (the exclusion principle), disease control can,
in theory, often be more efficiently handled by the private sector, with the government retaining
responsibility only for quality control of the services provided. The problem is that the private sector
is often not sufficiently developed to take on a curative role on the scale required. In these
circumstances, governments may need to concentrate first on encouraging private enterprise.
(Hint to instructors: Ask the participants to think of ways of encouraging private enterprise.
For example, could middle-order veterinary staff, often in over-supply in government services, form
the basis for a viable private sector? Is there scope for relaxing the rules on out-of-hours private
practice by government-employed veterinary surgeons or for creating professional veterinary
associations to work alongside state services?)
In the pastoral zones, it may be difficult to attract private operators, and mobile personnel
attached to specific communities may be better at providing low-cost services in more remote areas.
Livestock owner associations might be formed for this purpose (CTA, 1987). Such a service needs
to be carefully planned, with the definition of government/community responsibilities in terms of
salary payment, supervision and staff selection being clearly defined at the outset.
6.6.3 Organisational reform
Restoring the balance between staff and non-staff costs implies careful examination of the organisation
and management of animal health services. For example, the automatic recruitment of veterinary
graduates and/or the continued recruitment of new junior staff will be inappropriate when existing
staff are already underemployed. There may be a case for introducing early retirement (with
incentives) or even for dismissing staff—a measure rarely used at present.
Again, for specific campaigns or seasonal programmes, hiring temporary staff or using staff
from other departments may obviate the need to recruit permanent staff who will be under-utilised
at other times of the year. When the private sector is relatively underdeveloped, the two latter options
are likely to prove more effective in the short term than attempting to privatise. In any reorganisation,
the following variables should be carefully considered:
• Staff densities, as exemplified by the ratio of senior to subordinate staff (Box 6.2).
• The allocation of functions among different organisations actually or potentially involved in
the provision of services.
• The location and mobility of services relative to the livestock populations they serve, i.e.
whether they should be centralised, dispersed, stationary or mobile.
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• The level of skills required by staff in the field, and hence the type of support training needed.
• The degree of integration possible among the various services, e.g. whether to provide a single,
multi-purpose service or a range of specialist services. In the choice between specialist and
multi-purpose services and/or their integration at different levels, technical considerations,
availability of skilled staff and finances play important roles. By far the dominant influence
on such a choice is technology, i.e. the types of improvements developed by research, the need
for technical skills and facilities to handle inputs, and the frequency with which these inputs
have to be delivered.
The important point is that options for adjustment do exist in most countries. The pros and
cons of all relevant options for increasing operational efficiency should be carefully considered.
6.6.4 Relevant exercises
Exercise 6.2: Budgeting for animal health services.
Data. Refer to Exercise 3.4 for an understanding of herd projection models. Now study the
following production parameters for a regional or national cattle herd raised in a communal area:
Number of cattle by age and sex category ('000 head) in 1989
Calves:
0 to 1 year-old males: 312
Other stock:
females: 312
1 to 2 year-old males: 150
females: 150




Excluding calves, the total herd in 1989 was estimated at approximately 2.5 million head.
Expected performance parameters (1989-94)
Annual mortality rates:
Calves: 25%
1 to 3 year-olds: 8%
3 year-olds: 5%
Calving rate: 60%
Average annual offtake rate: 8% of the herd, excluding calves.
The offtake rate for cows is assumed to be 10% per year, with the residual number of stock
slaughtered consisting of males over three years old.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 3 hours).
Question 1. Project herd numbers by category of stock in the table provided, and calculate the annual
growth rate of the herd for the period 1989-94.
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Question 2. Complete the following animal health staff and recurrent budget table:
Item
Annual 1989
growth rate (%) 1994
Total staff (no.)
Veterinarians 20 3%




Auxiliary staf 1,000 7%
Staff budget (L$) 740,000
Non-staff budget (L$) 500,000
Total recurrent
budget (L$) 1,240,000 6%
Question 3. Relate the above table to the herd projection results you have derived and:
• Estimate the total herd:senior staff ratio and total herd:total staff ratio for 1989 and 1994.
• Calculate the staff: non-staff budget ratio for 1994; compare this ratio to that for 1989 and
comment on the results.
• Calculate the level of non-staff expenditure/head of cattle for 1994 in real terms, assuming the
appropriate price indices for 1989 and 1994 are 100 and 112, respectively (1989 prices).
Compare this result with that obtained for 1989. What does the result imply about the
effectiveness of the veterinary service?
• Do you think that the projected herd size and production levels can be achieved as assumed,
given the envisaged changes in manpower and budget resources? If not, why not? Which
production parameters are most likely to be affected by these changes?
Question 4. What could be done to maintain or even improve the effectiveness of the animal health
service if these budgetary and manpower trends continue?
Question 5. The information given in Tables 6.10 and 6.11 relates to the animal health services of
two African countries, A and B. Examine the financing and staffing structure for each
country and compare the two countries in terms of:
• The absolute level of expenditure in US$/LU, taking into consideration such factors as livestock
density (LU/km ) and staffing density (LU/staff).
• The average annual rate of change in total, staff and non-staff expenditure per LU between
years one and nine.
• The operating funds available per staff member per month for years five and eight.
Exercise 6.3: Group Exercise: Budget and manpower planning for the livestock services.
Policy making involves people and organisations at different levels within government. Discuss
the extent to which managers of livestock services, in one country to be selected by the group, are
able to influence policy changes with respect to the following:
• the total budget available for livestock services
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• staff: non-staff cost ratios
• the ratio of high level:auxiliary staff.
To pursue the discussion, let the group divide into subgroups of three. Assign one of the
following roles to each member of the subgroup:
• Minister of Agriculture
• Director, National Livestock Services
• Head, Livestock Policy Analysis Unit.
Persuade the Minister on a proposed change of policy.
Table 6.10. Financing and staffing of livestock services in Country A .
Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Expenditure (US$ '000)2 470 495 507 510 507 508 510 514 512
Staff costs 250 265 270 270 265 268 272 275 275
Non-staff costs 220 230 240 240 242 240 238 239 237
Livestock population
('000 LU)
1000 1020 1046 1010 987 972 986 1009 1032
Staff numbers: High level 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
: Auxiliary 40 46 49 53 54 54 55 56 58
: Total 45 52 56 60 61 61 62 63 66
21 For country A, the total area of agricultural land (arable plus grazing land) is 76,200 km .
2 In year 6 constant prices.
Table 6.11. Financing and staffing of livestock services in Country B .
Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Expenditure (US$ '000)2 405 429 459 463 378 515 544 544 534
Staff costs 360 369 395 412 336 458 495 495 486
Non-staff costs 45 60 64 51 42 57 49 49 48
Livestock population
('000 LU)
2025 2145 1765 1363 1400 1610 1699 2267 2319
Staff numbers: High level — — — — 30 — — 16 —
: Auxiliary — — — — 199 — — 179 —
: Total — — — — 229 — — 195 —
21 For country B, the total area of agricultural land (as defined above) is 56,460 km .
2 In year 6 at constant prices.
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 Important points (6.5-6.6)
• Africa's animal health services are in decline primarily because of poor budgeting and
manpower planning by governments.
• Livestock services in African countries do not receive an allocation proportionate to the
contribution of the livestock subsector to GDP.
• The major cause of poor performance in animal health services is the disproportionately
high expenditure on staff costs in relation to non-staff costs.
• The ratio between staff and non-staff recurrent costs is expressed as the coefficient of
efficiency (CE) where:
CE = non-staff expenditure/staff expenditure
• The CE has declined in recent years for most African countries.
• Besides CE, two other ratios affecting the efficiency of animal health services are:
♦ the ratio of senior to auxiliary staff
♦ the ratio of staff to tropical livestock units (TLU).
• In order to improve the effectiveness of animal health services, a staff: non-staff expenditure
ratio of 1:1 appears desirable. The chances of attaining such a ratio are remote in most
sub-Saharan African countries.
• Three major approaches to improving the effectiveness of animal health services are:
♦ cost recovery and removal of subsidies
♦ privatisation
♦ organisational reforms.
• Cost recovery may not prove effective since revenue recovered from such a measure will
constitute only a very small fraction of the total operating cost.
• Privatisation of veterinary services and supplies seems promising in improving the efficiency
of animal health services However, some essential services should not be privatised.
• Privatisation will not be successful unless governments encourage private enterprise.
6.7 Feedback exercises
All answers can be found in the text.







b. Why are monitoring ami evaluation considered important stages in budget and
manpowei planning?
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3.a. Which one of the following statements fully describes the difficulties confronted in planning
and monitoring budget and manpower requirements for livestock development? Tick (*^) the
correct answer.
i) lack of information on the availability of resources
ii) administrative deficiencies
iii) competitive sectoral requirements for manpower
iv) chronic shortages of recurrent funds.
b. What questions should be asked when identifying critical resources for the success of
a project? Tick (•) the correct answer.
i) Which resources will be necessary for the project and in what priority order?
ii) What would be the relative cost of each resource?
iii) Which resources could be substituted?
iv) Could a re-scheduling of project operations remove certain resource needs?
c. What are the main reasons for including contingency allowances in planning for
budget and manpower requirements? Tick (•) the correct answer.
i) overestimation of project/programme needs
ii) inflation of capital and recurrent cost items
iii) unforseen delays and shortages
iv) building extra housing facilities for staff
v) covering any cost overrun.







b. What do you consider the two most important factors, connected with budget and









5. Describe two main advantages and two implementation problems of the cost recovery,
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7.3 Land tenure policy and African livestock development
7.3.1 Concept of tenure
7.3.2 Types of land tenure






7.5 Land tenure policy instruments: Government-led tenure reforms
7.6 Other policy instruments
7.6.1 Tax policy
7.6.2 Stock control
7.6.3 "Spontaneous" tenure changes
7.6.4 Relevant exercises
7.7 Tenure as a factor in mixed farming systems
7.7.1 Security of tenure




Module 7 is intended to enable you to:
1. Define land tenure and discuss three principal forms of land tenure.
2. Describe the effects of different forms of land tenure on attaining the four national policy objectives.
3. Cite case studies of land legislation to convert communal tenure into individual tenure and open-
access tenure into well managed group tenure. Discuss the potential conflicts and trade-offs among
national policy objectives in the implementation of these tenure reforms.
4. Discuss the roles of tax policy and stock control in controlling overstocking.
5. Describe important factors contributing to "spontaneous" tenure changes led by herders.
6. Discuss the merits and demerits of customary tenure in relation to mixed farming systems.
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7.2 Introduction
Land tenure, with respect to the livestock sector, is concerned with the nature and range of rights
that livestock producers have to land, water and other natural resources necessary for livestock
production. Land tenure policy is concerned with the effects of different tenure arrangements on
range and livestock productivity and on the distribution of grazing rights.
In this module, the two principal forms of grazing tenure are defined: individual tenure and
communal tenure. Under communal tenure, we again distinguish between two principal forms viz
"common property" tenure and "open-access" tenure. Next, the effects of different forms of land
tenure on attaining four (of the five) main policy objectives are considered.
The potential conflicts and trade-offs among policy objectives are summarised and illustrated
through case studies of the Botswana Tribal Grazing Land Programme and the Kenya Maasai group
ranch programme. Other policy instruments for influencing stocking decisions, grazing fees and taxes
and stocking controls are also discussed.
Spontaneous tenure change is discussed next. In many parts of the rangelands of Africa, tenure
change is being led by herders. Some government land policies, such as land titling and registration
programmes in Kenya, encourage farmers and herders to assert private claims to rangelands.
Herder-led tenure changes will raise equity and other issues which require the attention of policy
makers and policy analysts.
Finally, there is a discussion of two particular issues in relation to tenure in mixed farming
systems: security of tenure and how more efficient farmers can gain access to more land.
7.3 Land tenure policy and African livestock development
7.3.1 Concept of tenure
Tenure refers to the nature and range of rights that individuals have to land, water and other natural
resources in relation to rights exercised by other individuals, social groups and the state. Tenure to
a given area of land may be vested in an individual, in some group of individuals who may exercise
co-equal use rights to the land, in some corporate entity such as a co-operative or a church, or in
the state, which may establish rules or regulations defining who may use the land and for what
purposes.
Tenure is usefully described in terms of the bundle of rights an individual, group or the state
holds to the land. With respect to individual tenure, the minimum, definitive right in the bundle of
rights is the right of exclusive use for certain purposes. Other rights in the bundle might include the
right to use the land in perpetuity, the right to designate heirs, the right to sell the land etc. Rarely,
if ever, are an individual's rights unlimited. For instance, in the interests of public health or safety,
it is common for states to prohibit certain uses which may cause pollution or injury. In many customary
tenures, the local ethnic group retains the right to allocate individual farms only to qualified members
of the group. Most states retain the right to confiscate land for public purposes, with or without
compensation, if this should be deemed necessary. Thus, states invariably hold at least a few of the
rights in the bundle. An individual's right to harvest for his or her exclusive use of a crop may be
conditioned by the right of all stockholders in the community to graze their livestock on that crop's
residues after harvest. Here, there are overlying individual and community use rights to the same
area of land.
7.3.2 Types of land tenure
Individual tenure
There are different forms of individual tenure. However, two major forms of individual tenure are
freehold and customary tenure.
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Freehold tenure is common in Western countries. Freeholders have what are considered private
property rights over the land, which include the ability to sell the land, rent it to others and to use
it as collateral for a mortgage. Under most forms of customary land tenure in Africa, the bundle of
rights farmers may hold over individual farms is not as large as those under freehold. Typically, land
cannot be bought or sold. Rather, it is allocated to qualified applicants (e.g. bona fide members of
the community or local ethnic group) by the local land trustee on the basis of need. Land is not
alienable from the community trust, so it cannot be used as collateral for loans. Usually, however,
an individual's land use rights are very secure, subject to certain conditions; i.e. that land be more
or less continuously cultivated, subject to periodic fallow. Land is usually heritable, another measure
of long-term, essentially perpetual, tenure.
Controversy surrounds the question of the effects of customary tenure on agricultural investment
and productivity on the individual farm (Cohen, 1980). Some critics argue that customary tenure
provides insufficient security, thus contributing to low levels of investment, is inflexible in responding
to market signals affecting choice of technology and crops, and, because land is not marketable,
better farmers have difficulty gaining access to land that they are capable of farming more productively
than their fellows. Alternative views are that, although there are disadvantages for some people,
customary tenures provide low-cost access to land for the majority of the rural population, that farmers
have long-term and secure usufruct rights, and that in many places, customary tenures are evolving
to accommodate new technologies and formal land markets, at costs lower than would state-run land
titling and registration systems. This debate over the effects of customary tenure on investment on
individual farms is particularly relevant when considering questions of investment in on-farm
infrastructure and adoption of technologies necessary for intensive production, such as dairy.
Communal tenure
Communal tenure refers to situations where a number of people use the land simultaneously. In much
of sub-Saharan Africa, livestock are grazed on communal pastures. Grazing rights, in terms of the
number of livestock an individual may graze, or where they may graze at different times of the year,
may or may not be limited by some local governing structure or by the state. A group's rights may
extend to prohibiting non-group members from using the pastures. Alternatively, the pasture may be
open to all who own livestock and have the labour and other necessary inputs to maintain them.
When considering communal tenure, it is useful to distinguish between two types of situations,
namely common property and open access. In common property situations, there are relatively high
levels of control over who has the right to use the resource and at what intensity. Common property
situations are characterised by rules which define individual rights to a common resource. In
open-access situations, individuals of any ethnic or other group have more or less unrestricted use
rights to the resource. Open-access situations are characterised by an absence of defined property
rights.
In most pastoral areas in sub-Saharan Africa, access to grazing is minimally restricted to
members of the community or ethnic group which claims territorial rights over the area. In these
cases the areas would be considered common property, in terms of the definitions offered for common
property tenure and open access. However, an important concern for the analyst is the extent to which
a common property system asserts effective controls over the range-use practices of those who have
access to a given range. Very few of these systems apply such controls.
7.4 Tenure as an issue in rangeland management
Tenure policy bears on four of the five national policy objectives of concern to the policy analyst:
resource conservation, economic efficiency, stability and equity. With regard to the fifth objective,
economic independence, the relevant issues are similar to those raised under economic efficiency. In
the past, policy analysis has focused principally on the effects of tenure, and specifically communal
grazing tenure, on resource conservation and economic efficiency. Most analyses have not given
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much attention to the stability and equity issues arising in tenure policy, with the effect that some
of the more important tenure reforms in the range sector have been promulgated without the benefit
of a complete understanding of the issues at stake.
In this segment of the manual we will present first the conventional critiques on the relationships
between tenure and resource conservation and economic efficiency. The analysis of the relationship
between tenure and economic efficiency is complex, and will receive special attention. Relationships
between tenure policy and stability and equity will be taken up in subsequent discussions of
experiences with state-led tenure reforms, where their importance became apparent in the course of
implementation.
7.4.1 Resource conservation
Most livestock in sub-Saharan Africa are grazed on communal pastures. Many analysts describe
pasture tenure in Africa in terms of open access. Open access, uncontrolled grazing, is considered to
be a principal cause of overgrazing and land degradation. Grazing land is a renewable resource. It
regenerates at rates determined by natural factors, such as soil fertility and especially rainfall, and
by management factors such as intensity of use. Any given area of land has a carrying capacity,
the number of livestock which it can sustain while maintaining biologically optimum levels of forage
production. Overgrazing is defined as a reduction in forage production below the biological optimum,
when considered in terms of some unit of time. Degradation will result when natural forage
productivity is reduced more or less permanently, because of long-lasting damage to the productivity
of the resource base. This might be due, for instance, to soil erosion caused by chronic overgrazing
or change of vegetation composition towards less desirable forage species (Jarvis, 1984).
Maintaining optimum levels of long-term forage production requires that livestock numbers be
maintained at carrying capacity. Livestock holders who wish to maximise the forage production and
livestock over the long term must make their short-term stocking decisions consistent with long-term
maximisation criteria. On communal rangelands this would require individual users to group together
to determine the optimum number of total livestock to be allowed on the range, and to distribute
grazing rights among all users so that the total number of livestock does not exceed carrying capacity.
Experience has shown that, in the absence of strong institutional controls over individual stocking
decisions, it is difficult to achieve this kind of co-operative outcome. In communal use situations an
individual herder has no incentive to limit his or her stock numbers in order to conserve the range
resources, if other herders are able to increase their herds to take advantage of the additional forage
made available by one farmer's decision to hold down stock numbers. Hardin (1968) described the
logic of over-exploitation of common resources, including communal pastures, as the tragedy of the
commons.
"As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly,
more or less consciously, he asks, 'What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to
my herd?' This utility has one negative and one positive component.
The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman
receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly
+1.
The negative component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since, however, the
effects of overgrazing are shared by all herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular
decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the
only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd."
For Hardin, the only practical solution to this dilemma was to internalise the costs and benefits
of pasture use by converting communal pasture lands to individual tenure.
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7.4.2 Economic efficiency
Land tenure also has implications for economic efficiency. The objective of economic efficiency
implies maximising the current national income and securing an acceptable rate of growth in it.
National income is maximised when the net social value of output is maximised; that is, the gross
social value of the benefits of an activity exceed the gross social costs by the widest possible margin.
Although there are often divergences between social and private values, we shall assume for the
moment that the two values correspond. Thus, net social value is equal to profit and economically
efficient land tenure is one where profits are highest. Two main conditions must be fulfilled for a
land tenure system to be economically efficient:
Land is allocated to that activity whose marginal product is most valuable to society. Imagine
a hectare of land which can be used for the production of either milk or wool. If it is used
for milk production the net value to society (i.e. the gross value minus production costs) per
additional unit of output is $ 90; if used for wool production, $ 95. In this case, an economically
efficient land tenure system would be one which allocates land to someone who is prepared
to produce wool rather than milk.
• In whatever activity the land is used, it is combined with the other factors of production (e.g.
human labour or capital in the form of livestock) in proportions such that the value to society
of the marginal unit used of each factor is at least as high as it could be in other activities. If
the marginal value would be higher in another activity, then more of that factor should be
attracted to that activity.
In what follows, we shall focus on the issue of the optimum combination of land and capital
in the form of livestock, i.e. on stocking rate. Overgrazing occurs when, as a result of there being
too many animals on the range, profits (i.e. the difference between the value of output and the costs
of production), are below the maximum achievable level. Jarvis (1984) suggests that overgrazing
occurs whenever the present value of all future livestock production is below its potential as a result
of an excessively high current stocking rate.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the short-term relationship between productivity per animal (measured in
terms of annual weight gain per animal) and stocking rate (measured in terms of number of animals
per ha). At low stocking rates, feed is abundant. But as stocking rate increases, animals begin
competing for feed. At this point, average productivity per animal declines. At N\ each animal will
be consuming only enough forage to maintain itself, and will gain no weight.




Figure 7.2 presents the same information as Figure 7.1, but superimposed is the relationship
between productivity per ha and stocking rate. This second relationship is obtained by multiplying
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the average productivity per animal by the number of animals at each stocking rate. At low stocking
rates, productivity per ha rises with stocking rate. At higher stocking rates, declines in productivity
per animal offset increases in the number of animals. The productivity per ha rises to a maximum
(at point N) and then declines to zero (at point N').









At what stocking rate or "density" is economic efficiency (the level of national income)
maximised? In the hypothetical case in which livestock production occurred without inputs (or costs)
except land, then, in the short term at least, economic efficiency would be maximised at the stocking
rate where per ha output is maximised (N). In reality, however, land is not the only input to livestock
production. Other inputs are livestock, labour, water, veterinary supplies and so forth, and these inputs
have costs.
Costs are introduced in Figure 7.3—initially just the costs of livestock, which we can for the
moment consider as equal to the interest foregone on the capital invested in the herd. If we assume
that all the weight gained by the animals will eventually be sold and that every kg of weight gain
has the same value, then the "value of livestock output" curve in Figure 7.3 is identical to the "weight
gain per ha" curve in Figure 7.2.
In Figure 7.3, maximum profit occurs at the stocking density where the output value curve is
at its maximum vertical distance above the cost curve (point N*). Here, total profit is equal to q* -
c*. Thus, N* is the economically optimal number of animals to graze. Note that this point is to the
left of the stocking density at which output per ha is maximised (N). Unless costs per animal stocked
are zero (a practical impossibility), the profit maximising stocking rate will always be lower than the
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output maximising stocking rate. N+ is the open-access equilibrium, the point at which profits are
zero. In an open-access situation, this is the stocking level beyond which rational herders will add
no livestock to the range, because the value of output per animal is exceeded by per animal costs.











Some aspects of these relationships merit further discussion. First, the precise values of N*,
N, N+, and N' will vary depending upon the average gain per animal, the price of the gain and the
costs per animal. The distribution of animal locations will always be the same.
The model predicts open-access ranges will be stocked more heavily than those under individual
tenure. It also suggests that if controls are put in place to limit access to communal ranges, thereby
reducing stocking density, then total output and profits will be higher than they would be under open
access. Any stocking density to the left of N+ but to the right of N will yield higher output and
higher profits than will the open-access equilibrium.
Why does the stocking density under open access exceed the levels at which economic
efficiency and profits are maximised? Profit maximisation is achieved at stocking densities below
maximum total output. Where there is no control over access to the commons, new entrants will
know that they will benefit by adding livestock to the range. As long as the aggregate stocking density
remains below the open-access equilibrium livestock production is profitable, although net profit will
be less than the maximum. In terms of the model, profit maximising stocking density will more likely
result when an individual or some grazing authority has exclusive control over the range. The profit
maximising stock density will be maintained where potential users can be prohibited from adding
their stock to the range. Once that restriction is removed, the animals added will shift the stocking
density above that yielding maximum profit.
The relationship between weight gain per head, output per ha, and costs and profits at different
stocking densities is illustrated in Table 7.1. Results are hypothetical but realistic. The table shows
how, on a 10-ha piece of land, stocking rate and weight gain per head determine levels of output,
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costs and profits. They also determine stocking densities under different forms of tenure if
stockholders are profit maximisers.
Table 7.1. Maximum, optimum and defacto stocking rates.




(kg/head) (kg/ha) Output Costs Profit Output Costs
Profit
0.1 262.5 26.25 262.50 40.00 222.50 262.50 40.00 222.50
0.2 225.0 45.00 450.00 80.00 370.00 225.00 40.00 185.00
0.3* 187.5 56.25 562.50 120.00 442.50* 187.50 40.00 147.50*
0.4 150.0 60.00 600.00** 160.00 440.00 150.00 40.00 110.00
0.5** 112.5 56.25 562.50 200.00 362.50 112.50 40.00 72.50**
0.6+ 75.0 45.00 450.00 240.00 210.00 75.00 40.00 35.00+
0.7++ 37.5 26.25 262.50 280.00 -17.50 37.50 40.00 -7.50++
0.8 0.0 0.00 0.00 320.00 -320.00 0.00 40.00 -40.00
Note: 1 kg weight gain = $ 1 . Costs are $ 30/animal irrespective of stocking rate.
* = Level of maximum profit (optimaiyha (N*).
A
** = Level of maximum output/ha (N).
+ = Limit (defacto) at which existing stockowner with one animal will add one further animal.
++ = Limit (defacto) at which new stockowner will introduce one animal.
Defacto = What will probably happen in practice when there is no unity of control and benefit.
Under individual tenure, the single herder or enterprise will stock the land at a level of 0.3
head/ha (3 animals/ 10 ha)—the point at which aggregate profits are maximised. This is less than the
stocking rate of 0.4 animals/ha (4 animals/10 ha) at which the gross value of output per ha is at
maximum. Under open access, the stocking rate is unlikely to stabilise at either the maximum profit
or the maximum output level because individual enterprises do not bear the costs of the decline in
all animals' productivity caused by adding an additional animal to the grazing area. Herders will
continue adding livestock to the range as long as the benefit for doing so outweighs the cost. For
enterprises with no animals on the range (but entitled to put some) this, for the situation shown in
Table 7.1, is true of all stocking rates below and including 0.6 head/ha. However, if an enterprise
already has one animal on the range, it will add another at all stocking rates below and including
0.5 head/ha (but not 0.6) because at the level of 0.6 head/ha the joint profit it makes from two head
(i.e. 2 x $ 35.00) is less than the profit it makes on its single animal (i.e. $ 72.50) at the lower
stocking rate.
The analyses presented above suggest that stocking rates are higher and levels of economic
efficiency and profit (but not necessarily total output) are probably lower under open access than
they would be under individual tenure. Although much lower stocking rates are expected with
individual tenure than with other tenure forms, they may not correspond to carrying capacity. Carrying
capacity is a biological optimum. The stocking rate associated with the economically efficient
optimum (N* in Figure 7.3) may diverge from this for a variety of reasons. This may be especially
true if individual herders attempt to maximise short-term profits without concern for long-term
consequences. Thus, there may still be scope for public policy intervention to encourage resource
conservation, even under individual tenure.
Despite the lower stocking rates and improved resource conservation associated with individual
tenure, reforms which attempt to convert communal tenure to individual tenure are likely to have
implications for two other policy objectives, stability and equity.
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7.4.3 Stability
Areas of livestock production in Africa tend to be characterised by low and variable rainfall. Rainfall
varies in time and in space. On a year-to-year basis, a given area of rangeland may receive highly
variable levels of rainfall. Forage production will, of course, vary with rainfall. Livestock producers
in many arid and semi-arid regions of Africa maintain their herds at stable levels by moving livestock
among areas which have received relatively higher rainfall levels. Livestock may range over extensive
areas and follow regular patterns. For instance, during dry seasons, stock may be kept near permanent
water sources. During rainy seasons, stock may be dispersed to pasture areas where ephemeral water
supplies have been recharged by rainfall. Such opportunistic grazing strategies may in fact contribute
to optimal utilisation of available forage in areas where forage production varies significantly in space
and time (Sandford, 1982). Long-distance nomadism and transhumant pastoralism are rational
adaptations to variability in forage production over extensive grazing lands.
If, under such circumstances, livestock were maintained within individual "blocks" of land, the
number of livestock which could be maintained within the blocks on a year-to-year basis would be
highly unstable. The smaller the block of land, the greater the inter-year instability in the number of
animals which can be kept. If stable levels of production were to be maintained, the carrying capacity
of the area would be determined by the amount of forage produced in low rainfall years. If herd size
were permitted to increase to the carrying capacity of the block during high rainfall years, or even
to average long-term carrying capacity, the stockowner would be forced to dispose of a high
percentage of the herd, probably at depressed prices, during low rainfall years, assuming that he or
she wished to maintain proper stocking rates.
These principles are illustrated in Table 7.2. Areas A, B and C are contiguous blocks of land
which can either be allocated separately under an individual form of land tenure or merged together
to form a single block under a common property or open-access system. On average (i.e. over several
years) block C can support somewhat more animals than block A, which in turn can support more
animals than block B.
The table contrasts three different scenarios. In scenario one, there is no inter-annual variability
in rainfall or carrying capacity. In scenario two, there is inter-annual variability but each block varies
between years in the same direction and to the same degree, i.e. rainfall varies in time but not in
space. In scenarios one and two, there is nothing to choose, in terms of stability, between individual
tenure and common property or open-access tenure.
In scenario three, however, rainfall varies not only over time but also over space. Block A
may be having a "good" year while block C is having a "bad" one. It now makes a great deal of
difference (almost 100%) to the maximum number of animals which can be kept in the "worst" year,
whether animals are kept in three small blocks or in one large one, since the latter option would
allow them to move further afield in search of better conditions. Herders would be realising higher
levels of overall long-term average income by moving among the three grazing areas in pursuit of
available forage. Open access and common property tenures, more so than individual tenures, permit
herders to move over extensive areas in pursuit of available forage. The importance of mobility to
livestock production in areas where rainfall is spatially variable is borne out by the fact that in some
areas where individual grazing units have been demarcated and titled, herders will still graze their
stock outside their own areas, as grazing conditions warrant.
7.4.4 Equity
Where land is a principal input to production, land tenure will have crucial implications for equity.
In theory, open-access tenure should be more equitable than individual tenure or even common
property. The smallest holder, regardless of his or her social affiliation, will have an opportunity to
put livestock on the communal range. In practice, however, largeholders get a disproportionate amount
of the communal forage by virtue of their large aggregate holdings. Smallholders may face labour






400 600 200 200
300 450 150 150
500 750 250 250
200 1800 600 600
Table 7.2. Capacity ofthree areas to support livestock under different rainfall scenarios.
Rainfall (mm) and number of animals Number of animals which can be kept
for which there is sufficient feed in the worst year
Years
Area 1 2 3











Scenario three: Rainfall varies from year to year and is not





Many land-improving investments involve economies of scale. For example, it costs only a
third as much per ha to put a perimeter fence round a 100-ha square block of land as around a 10-ha
square block. Similar economies can apply to other investments, e.g. livestock water supplies. Not
only may it be more economically efficient to install such facilities on large common property or
open-access blocks than on smaller individual ones, but also forcing poor producers to accept the
individual tenure of small blocks which they cannot afford to develop may make them uncompetitive
producers and drive them out of business. Where a general land reform is contemplated, which would
convert large areas of communal land to individual tenure, smallholders could effectively be denied
access to grazing land altogether.
7.4.5 Relevant exercises
Exercise 7.1: Land tenure theory (estimated time required: 1 hour).
Question 1. The data in Table 7.3 relates stocking rate in animals per ha to weight gain in kg live
weight per head. In addition, it is known that 1 kg of weight gain is worth $ 1.00 and
that the costs per animal remain constant at $ 27.50, irrespective of the stocking rate
applied. Complete Table 7.3 as per Table 7.1 above and graph the results as per Figures
7.2 and 7.3.
400 600 200 200
150 300 450 150
750 250 500 250
1300 1150 1150 600
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Table 7.3. Stocking rate, weight gain and output value.
Stocking
rate Weight gain Value ($)/10 ha Value ($)/marginal animal











Question 2. Assuming intentions to maximise profits, derive the following:
The stocking rate limit for an individualised land tenure system.
The de facto limit at which an existing owner with one animal will add one further animal.
The de facto limit at which a new stock owner will introduce one additional animal.
 
Important points (7.2-7.4)
• Tenure refers to the nature and range of rights that individuals have to land, water and other
natural resources in relation to rights exercised by other individuals, social groups and the
state.
• Land tenure policy is concerned with effects of different tenure arrangements on range and
livestock productivity and distribution of grazing rights.




• There are different forms of individual tenure. Of these, customary tenure is most prevalent
and involves exclusive use rights on a long-term basis with no right for buying and selling
the land.
• Common property tenure involves collective use, subject to rules of access.
• Open-access tenure also involves collective use of land but without defined individual
property rights.
• Tenure policy has important implications on four national policy objectives: resource
conservation, economic efficiency, equity and stability.
• Open-access tenure with uncontrolled grazing causes overgrazing and land degradation in
Africa.
Important points (7.2-7.4) cont...
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 Important points (7.2-7.4) cont...
• Since most grazing lands are communal, a strong institutional control over individual
stocking rates is essential.
• An economically efficient land tenure system should fulfil two conditions:
♦ It must ensure that land is allocated to that activity whose marginal product is most
valuable to society.
♦ It must ensure that in whatever activity the land is used, it is combined with other factors
of production in such a proportion that each factor gives more return than if used for
any other activity.
• Studies in Africa have shown that economic efficiency and profit are lower under an
open-access system than under individual or common property tenure.
• In Africa, where most areas under livestock production are characterised by low and variable
rainfall, communal land tenure provides greater stability of income than individual tenure.
• Both communal and individual tenure may cause equity problems. Open-access tenure is
more equitable than common property and individual tenure.
7.5 Land tenure policy instruments: Government-led tenure
reforms
In sub-Saharan Africa, most livestock are grazed on communal rangeland under open access or rather
loosely controlled common property tenure. Herds are owned and managed by individuals and
families. Overgrazing is widespread on communal pastures. In many places, overgrazing is
contributing to permanent land degradation. For these reasons, legislation to reform land tenure is
likely to emerge as a policy instrument which analysts must be prepared to evaluate thoroughly.
A tenure policy intervention often recommended by those who concentrate on the effects of
communal grazing on range productivity and output is land legislation which converts communal
tenure to individual tenure. However, we have seen that individual tenure may have implications for
stability and equity objectives, and that given the extreme temporal and spatial variation of rainfall
in many of Africa's pastoral zones, open access and common property tenure may result in higher
long-term returns to livestock and range than individual tenure. Recognising this, other analysts have
suggested interventions which attempt to achieve better control over how individual herders utilise
communal rangelands. This would involve establishing more effective common property institutions
in areas where open access or very loose common property prevails. Two case studies are presented
below which review attempts to reform grazing land tenure. In Botswana, the policy instrument
chosen was individual tenure; in Kenya, group ranches.
Box 7.1 : Botswana case study: The Tribal Grazing Land Programme and
the establishment of individual rangeland tenure.
Few African government have contemplated policies which would convert communal tenure
to individual tenure. Only Botswana has attempted to implement a policy where extending
individual tenure rights was seen as a key policy instrument for improving range productivity
and conservatio. The Tribal Grazing Lands Policy (TGLP) granted large stockholders exclusive




of the more densely populated areas of eastern Botswana. The rationale for the policy was
drawn directly from the tragedy of the commons critique of resource management under
communal tenure.
The TGLP provided that in areas zoned for commercial production individuals and small
groups would be granted exclusive rights to ranches. Ranches would be about 6400 ha.
Commercial areas were to be designated aftter the grazing land requirements of smallholders
in communal zones were properly taken into account. Areas of reserve land for future expansion
were also to be identified. Policy planners generally assumed that there was sufficient land in
Botswana to accommodate the needs of different kinds of producers. Many potential benefits
were expected to follow upon granting individual title to commercial producers. With exclusive
rights, commercial producers would be more likely to undertake permanent investments in
water development and fencing. These investments would increase range and livestock
productivity. With exclusive rights, individual lease holders would be in a position to limit
stock numbers at carrying capacity. Grazing pressure in overcrowded communal areas would
be reduced, as largholders would move their herds to commercial areas. Revenues generated
by leases would be used for development purposes in communal areas.
During policy implementation problems arose which emphasised the difficulties of
pursuing conservation and economic efficiency objectives without regard to the impact upon
stability and equity considerations. Some of the important outcomes are summarised below.
• Most of those granted long-term individual rights to grazing land did not ajust their
grazing practices so that stock numbers remained at grazing capacity. Large stockholders
who were granted leases to ranches enjoyed exclusive grazing rights. But provisions that
ranch hoders graze their stock only on their ranches were not enforced. Many
stockholders allowed their ranches to become overgrazed and shifted excess stock on to
communal areas. By allowing holders to move stock between individual and communal
areas, the new "mixed" tenure system was not providing a test of the benefits to range
productivity attributed to the individual tenure model. Total livestock output may have
increased due to the fact that loan capital for ranch development financed water
development in previously unsettled areas. However, research found that livestock grazed
on communal range in eastern Botswana were 95% more productive in terms of
live-weight production equivalents than the commercial ranching systems, when
measured on a per ha basis (Ridder and Wagenaar, 1984).
• Rights of smallholders to rangeland were reduced. In areas where ranches were
demarcated, an estimated 20,000 people, including smallholders, persons without stock
and hunter-gatherers, lost their rights to utilise or occupy the land. Solomon Bekure and
Dyson-Hudson (1982: p. 30) noted:
"Virtually all persons so far allocated ranches dispossess the people [living] there;. ..for
the ranchers exclusive use rather than commercial use best defines their immediate
concern; [and] dispossessed people will be removed to already overcrowded communal
areas."
• In many cases, the ranches proved too small to provide herds with sufficient forage on
a year-to-year basis. Some stockholders developed a seasonal strategy where they grazed
stock in communal areas during the wet season and retreated to their exclusively-owned




Although the government sought to implement a balanced policy which would improve
the management of communal grazing lands as well as those areas under individual tenure,
the bulk of planning and development resources were, in practice, channelled to the commercial
sector and to individual ranches. The policy did not contribute to a significant improvement
in range management or livestock productivity. In some areas, it resulted in a reduction of
smallholder welfare.
Box 7.2: Kenya case study: Maasai group ranches.
In Kenya's Maasai areas, herd sizes are highly unequal. Rainfall is relatively low and variable
in space and time. Periodic drought forces herders to move over extensive areas in search of
grazing. Herders have worked out reciprocal arrangements with neighbouring and even distant
herders to share available forage. Taking into account the environmental and production
conditions in Maasailand, the Kenya Government designed a range development programme
based on group ranches. Exclusive rights to defined grazing areas were granted to groups of
users instead of individuals. Groups were composed of persons with traditional use rights to
an area, as determined in an adjudication process which settled competing claims. Group
ranches varied considerably in size. In Narok District, for example, the smallest group ranch
was 891 ha with 43 members, while the largest was 78,700 ha with 200 members (Helland,
1977).
Although group ranches were intended to preserve communal use rights, the rationale
for the group ranch model was drawn from the tragedy of the commons model.
The specific objectives of the group ranch programme were to:
• Increase the productivity of rangelands by bringing them into commercial production.
• Maintain production by keeping the stocking rates of the ranches within limits set by the
carrying capacity of the rangelands.
• Provide the human population of those areas with an adequate standard of living (Helland,
1977: p. 100-101).
Range development plans stipulating overall stocking and culling rates were prepared
by staff from technical agencies. Members of each ranch elected a management committee to
supervise implementation. Committee responsibilities included: enforcing the grazing system
and culling rate stipulated in the management plan, supervising construction and maintenance
of facilities and supervising the purchase, distribution and fattening of steers purchased on
credit.
The key to success of a common property grazing system is the ability of the group's
management structure to control how individual members utilise the resource. It was the
intention of the programme designers that management committees would be able to limit
stocking rates to the carrying capacity. Individual members were to be granted grazing quotas,
basically a limit on the number of stock they would be able to graze on the ranch.
Management committees immediately encountered difficulties in reaching agreement




based upon the existing distribution of livestock. This would have limited smallholders' herd
sizes permanently. On some ranches, a compromise agreement was worked out, where all
members were granted a minimum quota, large enough for an individual household to meet
its basic income requirements. Additional allocations were given to wealthier members. The
net effect was that richer members would have to reduce their holding. Some wealthier members
agreed to cull their stock, but none actually did so. Elected management committees tended to
be dominated by wealthy and influential stockholders.
Technical agencies lacked sufficient staff and transport to provide management
committees with up-to-date information on stocking rates and carrying capacity.
As important, management committees had no social authority or legal sanctions
necessary to enforce stocking limits. While Maasai have a long tradition of co-operating on
herding and other management activities, the question of stock controls is a property rights
issue, and private control over herd numbers and most other management decisions is sacrosanct
to the Maasai.
Management in other key respects did not change appreciably. For instance, Maasai still
grazed beyond the area of their demarcated ranches when forage conditions warranted, using
agreements which had long been in existence for sharing grazing.
Of particular interest to the Maasai was that the groups received title to the ranches,
forestalling competing claims to the land by neighbouring cultivator groups. Clarification of
tenure rights was seen as a principal benefit of the group ranch scheme (Galaty, 1980).
Why was it so difficult to achieve voluntary co-operation in setting overall stock limits
and agreeing upon individual stock quotas? A partial answer might be that there may exist
divergences between individual and social benefits if all costs (e.g. externatlities) have not been
properly accounted for. This may complicate the achievement of co-operative outcomes and
make them difficult to secure. Individual assessments of optimum herd size and composition,
and growth and development strategies will vary among individual producers for a number of
reasons. For instance, Lawry et al (1984: p. 249) argued that the changing nature of intra-group
economic relationships works against co-operative strategies.
"A key aspect of economic change is the emergence of entrepreneurship, a term used
in the broadest possible sense. Simply stated, as herd ownership becomes less constrained by
collective economic and managerial controls, private rather than collective benefits are
maximised. Or, put another way, the economic interests of the household or herd ownership
unit are pursued with increasing reference to external market institutions, and commensurately
less so to local social obligations. This process of increasingly autonomous decision-making
reinforces the breakdown of local-level management controls".
It is also possible that "opportunistic" strategies, which in the Maasailand environment
allow herders to make optimum use of available forage production on a yearly basis, may, in
fact, result in higher levels of long-term animal output than would be possible where controls
limit stock numbers to a "conservative" stocking rate based on worst-year forage production.
An opportunistic strategy is one which varies the number of livestock according to current
forage availability, so that the extra forage available in good years can be converted into greater
economic output (milk, meat) or into productive capital in the form of a bigger herd. A




level yearly without overstocking. There may be less range degradation, but economic losses
result also from under-utilisation of the forage available in relatively good rainfall periods
(Sandford, 1982).
The Maasai group ranches avoided some of the problems associated with individual
tenure. Smallholders were incorporated into the scheme and ranches were sufficiently large so
that, in most years, grazing needs were met within the confines of the individual group ranch.
However, no range management institutions emerged to regulate individual herd sizes so that
aggregate stocking rates approached or exceeded carrying capacity. Individual livestock owners
continued to exercise management prerogatives over their herds, and especially over
determination of herd size. The Kenya experience brings out some of the problems involved
in extending a greater range of common property controls over individual range users.
7.6 Other policy instruments
Granting individual tenure rights is one option for addressing overstocking problems. Two reforms
intended to improve communal tenure are tax policy and stocking controls administered by national
governments.
7.6.1 Tax policy
Unable to control the stocking decisions of others, individual herders will compete for available
forage by increasing their individual herd sizes. The net effect is that total profits and economic
efficiency will be less than that which could be achieved at carrying capacity. However, stocking
levels above those which maximise profit are still profitable, up to open-access equilibrium, where
profits equal zero.
One possible external control on the stocking decisions of individual herders would be a
livestock tax levied per animal grazed on the range. The purpose of the tax would be to make the
cost to the owner of keeping an extra animal equal to the total cost of doing so to the community
as a whole. This would include the opportunity costs of the feed the animal eats on the common
pasture and which it diverts from the mouths of animals already there, thus lowering production. As
illustrated in Figure 7.4, the optimal tax rate from the point of view of the nation as a whole would
be one that made total costs (tax cost plus other costs) to producers equal to the total value of output
at stocking rate N*. Herders would then have no incentive to stock beyond the level of N*. Of these
total costs at stocking rate N*, c* would represent other costs and q* - c* would represent tax costs.
However, q* - c* also represents the totality of the profits which would otherwise have accrued to
the community of herders, who will probably be violently opposed to the imposition of this tax unless
it is redistributed to them. However, this must be done in a way which does not restore the incentive
to stock above stocking level N*.
How this works at the level of the individual producer is shown in Table 7.4. It shows the
effect of an animal tax (at the rate of $ 129/animaI) on outputs and stocking rates. As a consequence
of the tax under open-access conditions, the marginal new stockholder wondering whether to put one
animal on the (10 ha) range will do so only if the existing stocking rate is less than 0.3 head/ha,
which is the (socially optimum) level of maximum profits in the no-taxed situation.
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Table 7.4. Maximum, optimum and defacto outputs and stocking rates with and without an animal tax.
Stocking







-tax profitOutput costs Tax Output costs Tax
0.1 250 30 129 91 250 30 129 91
0.2 440 60 258 122 220 30 129
6100
0.3* 480 90 387 3 160 30 129 ] **
0.4 500 120 516 -136 125 30 129 -34
0.5+ 510 150 645 -285 102 30 129 -57
0.601 400 180 774 -554 67 30 129 -92
0.702 220 210 903 -893 31 30 129 -128
0.8 0 240 1032 -1272 0 30 129 -159
* = level of maximum profit (optimal) per ha before tax.
+ = level of maximum output per ha.
01 = limit defacto where in the absence of tax. existing stock owner will add one further animal.
02 = limit, defacto, where in the absence of tax. new stock owner will add one animal.
00 = limit, de facto, when tax must be paid, existing slock owner will add one animal.
** = limit, defacto, when tax must be paid, new stock owner will add one animal.
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Jarvis (1984) points out several problems with grazing taxes. First, precise information on the
relationship between stocking rate and livestock output would be needed to determine the appropriate
tax. This is difficult to do and subject to variability in time and place. Unless adjusted, taxes would
remain too high during a drought and too low during a recovery. A centralised government
bureaucratic institution would be unable to determine the optimum stocking rate at a particular time
sufficiently promptly and would thus be unable to adjust the tax appropriately. Collecting the tax
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would incur high administrative costs, offsetting much of the benefits resulting from achieving the
optimal stocking rate.
According to Jarvis (1984), pastoralist income over the short and long run would also decline.
Over the long run, total profits might rise but pastoralists would receive none of the additional profits
because they would accrue to the government in the form of the tax.
In the short run, imposing a tax will force herders to reduce their herds dramatically, thus
flooding markets and depressing prices. Paying the tax might force pastoralists with small herds
yielding only minimum subsistence to reduce their holdings to sub-subsistence levels. However, as
a matter of policy, holdings below a certain minimum level could be made exempt. Jarvis believes
that the most likely outcome of a livestock tax would be a herder revolt and a political crisis.
There is an urgent need to analyse various tax policy options. Three policies or programmes
have been proposed to relieve a perceived overstocking problem. These are:
• improved livestock marketing
• range improvement measures
• cost recovery.
Improved livestock marketing
One of the most widely advocated proposals is to improve livestock marketing to increase the
marketed offtake. A variety of measures have been proposed including improved or more extensive
marketing infrastructure (sale yards, trek routes, water points en route, transport equipment), higher
prices or producer subsidies, better market information and direct government participation in
marketing. To the extent that these measures are successful, they will raise the farmer's return on
livestock sales and/or lower selling costs. Figure 7.5 plots how these measures will raise the value
of output curve and/or rotate the cost curve downwards.
 
Figure 7.5. Effect ofmarketing and range improvements on open-access equilibrium.
Output and
costs/ha
Output curve with range improvement
and some marketing improvements




The result would be to shift open-access equilibrium from N+ to N++ (if both actions occur
simultaneously). Thus, improved marketing will tend to increase rather than decrease stocking rates.
This apparent paradox can be understood once it is realised that stock owners can increase offtake
rates in only two ways: from more favourable herd dynamic parameters or from larger herds. In the
absence of the former (which marketing programmes do nothing to address), stockowners will build
up their herds in order to take advantage of the higher incomes from higher off-takes that the
improvements imply. Whatever may be the usefulness of marketing improvements in raising rural
incomes, improving urban meat supplies or as an adjacent to a sound culling programme, they will
not stimulate destocking. In fact, they will tend to worsen the problem.
Range improvement measures
These are aimed at improving range productivity or quality and are often proposed to relieve
overstocking. Range improvement measures may include reseeding the range, rotational grazing or
providing watering points. If successful, these will shift the weight gain/ha curve in Figure 7.2 upwards
and, as a result, also the value of output curve (as in Figure 7.5). Thus, incentives will be provided
for stockholders to increase herd size. While short-term improvements in range condition may be
registered, these are likely to be eliminated in the long term by increases in the stocking rate.
Cost recovery
Proposals are increasingly being made that subsidies currently provided to livestock keepers be
eliminated and that the costs of veterinary, marketing and, perhaps, extension services be at least
partially recovered from users. While these proposals are motivated primarily by declining livestock
service recurrent budgets, they can contribute to solving the overstocking problem. By increasing the
costs of livestock keeping, they make it less profitable for farmers to retain low productive animals.
As costs rise, farmers reduce herd size, as can be seen from N to N in Figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6. Effect ofcost recovery measures on open-access equilibrium.
Output and
costs/ha





Governments could attempt to control stock levels by assigning quotas on grazing rights. As is the
case with determining an appropriate tax, timely information on carrying capacity would be needed
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to make such a system work. In addition, widely acceptable principles for distributing grazing rights
among herders would have to be worked out. This would be difficult.
One approach sometimes suggested would be to divide the overall quota of grazing rights in
a given area equally among all qualified users. In this case, those having livestock in excess of an
individual's quota could seek out persons owning less stock than their quota and negotiate to rent or
purchase surplus grazing rights. Establishing such a "market" in grazing rights would assure a flow
of income holders of few or no livestock and would provide a mechanism by which larger holders
could maintain larger than average holdings. This approach overlooks the fact that in most of Africa,
grazing rights are exercised through owning and grazing livestock. In most pastoral societies there
is no recognised a priori grazing right apart from that asserted by grazing one's animals; and it may
be difficult to obtain public acceptance of such an a priori right.
7.6.3 "Spontaneous" tenure changes
Tenure change will not result from state action only. Herders themselves may assert privileged rights
to rangelands in relation to other herders or groups. At minimum, common property tenures establish
some qualifications by which individual rights to use a commons are determined. Qualifications will
often be based on some social criterion, such as residence in a village or membership in an ethnic
group. Often, these qualifications are not established or enforced by the state, but are nonetheless
recognised to be legitimate by all affected.
In the future, it is likely that policy analysts will be faced increasingly with situations where
individual herders assert exclusive rights to extensive areas of previously communal rangeland.
Attempts at "spontaneous enclosure" have already taken place in several countries, including Somalia,
Sudan, Kenya and Botswana.
In central Somalia, land around concentrated borehole development has become intensively
utilised and subject to overgrazing. Those living closest to the wells have extended their fences around
cropping areas to incorporate extensive range areas as well. Commercial producers and livestock
traders, because they are able to employ labour, have enclosed far larger areas than poorer households
(Behnke, 1986). Since the late 1960s, collective forms of range management based on claims by
clans to grazing areas have broken down, giving further scope to individuals to assert private claims
to rangelands.
The Idd el-Ghanam District in south Darfur Province of Sudan is on well-drained soils and
provides a refuge for nomadic stock fleeing seasonally flooded areas to the south and the west. Under
open-access tenure, local herders are forced to share their wet season grazing with nomads. The result
is that the amount of forage available for local use during the dry season is much depleted and the
economic welfare of local producers is reduced considerably. Local herders responded by enclosing
a portion of the local rangelands for their exclusive use (Behnke, 1986).
As problems with group ranches in Maasailand became apparent, some Maasai refused to allow
their traditional grazing areas to be adjudicated as group ranches and argued instead for individual
holdings. Jacobs (1984) noted that by 1979, 29 of the 52 group ranches in Kajiado District had passed
resolutions calling for the ranches to be sub-divided into individual holdings.
Pressures for individualisation and attempts to enclose rangelands will result from the
interaction of a number of social and economic factors. Behnke (1986) believes the myriad of factors
can be summarised in terms of a process. The process has three interrelated components:
• a decline in the supply and a corresponding increase in the scarcity value of grazing land
• increases in the commercial value of range or livestock production
• decreases in the relative costs of enclosure, costs which are social and political in nature as
well as monetary.
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Governments can consider a number of options in response to enclosure. One option might be
to sanction and accommodate the enclosure process by officially recognising the de facto distribution
of tenure rights in law. Such a response would be likely to accelerate the process of enclosure by
setting off a scramble by herders to make claims before others. However, "spontaneous"
individualisation may have serious implications for stability, equity and even economic efficiency
considerations. Policy analysts would need to consider these implications.
7.6.4 Relevant exercises
Exercise 7.2: Group exercise: Land tenure problems in Alphabeta.
Question 1. Identify and briefly describe the principal land tenure systems in Alphabeta relevant to
the livestock subsector. In your view, are communal grazing pastures more accurately
described as open access or common property? Explain. What are the principal controls
operating under common property systems in Alphabeta?
Question 2. How well does the model portrayed in Figures 7.1-7.3 describe rangeland conditions in
Alphabeta? Explain. What impact does this have on stockholder investment in rangeland
improvements?
Question 3. Although many factors can affect the condition of the range (e.g. drought), do you consider
land tenure to be a major policy issue for the livestock subsector of Alphabeta? Why
do you think so? How does it affect stocking rates?
Question 4. In Alphabeta, have individual herders attempted to assert private control over grazing
land by enclosing previously communal areas? What are the factors behind and
circumstances leading up to such enclosure? What has been government's response?
Question 5. What could be done to improve tenure systems in Alphabeta? How might these
improvements be geared to overcome the problem of overgrazing and land degradation?
Question 6. What would be the implications for the stability and equity objectives if the Government
of Alphabeta undertook to individualise land tenure in grazing areas?
(Hint to instructors. Alternatively, the questions in Exercise 7.2. can be posed about
participants' own countries. However it is ILCA's experience that, in the absence of carefully
pre-digested data and under time pressure, participants often do not analyse their own country situation
rigorously enough).
7.7 Tenure as a factor in mixed farming systems
Thus far we have considered tenure issues which arise where livestock are produced on natural
rangelands. However, tenure problems may arise where farmers undertake intensive livestock
production, such as dairying, on small-scale, individual farms. Here, the policy analyst will usually
be concerned with the effects of customary tenure rules on security of tenure and on the functioning
of land markets.
7.7.1 Security of tenure
A common criticism of customary tenures is that they do not provide farmers with sufficient assurance
that their long-term land rights are secure, so that they will benefit over the long run from investments
in fixed capital and other improvements.
This interpretation of the nature of farmer security under customary tenure is often based on
an incorrect interpretation of individual land rights under customary tenure. Because original
allocation rights are vested in the community (or delegated to the community by the state), there is
a tendency for outsiders to attribute to the community or to its trustee the ability to act with the full
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force of ownership in the Western sense. In this view, farmers are sojourning on the land and can
be ejected at the will of the land authority. In practice, and in customary law, this is not an accurate
characterisation.
Under most systems of customary tenure, an individual's long-term use rights are secure, and
virtually permanent, as are his or her rights to the returns on any improvements. In most places, land
is heritable. Usually, conditions for losing land are explicit and well understood. The most common
condition for maintaining use rights is that the land be cultivated, taking account of periodic fallow.
(In places, some classes of farmers have more limited rights. Stranger farmers, an important
phenomenon in parts of West Africa, are treated as guests in the community. Undertaking permanent
improvements may be interpreted as an assertion of permanent rights and will be resisted by the host
community. Women do not usually qualify for independent use rights, but gain access through
marriage and may lose them through divorce or death of the husband.)
When considering the effects of customary tenure on security of investment, the analyst should
assess the tenure/security relationship. Appropriate questions would include:
• What are the individual farmer's land rights in relation to the community and the state? Are
the farmer's long-term rights insecure? What are the specific tenure issues giving rise to
insecurity?
• Are there factors other than tenure causing farmers not to invest in new technologies or
practices, such as the unavailability of product markets or low returns to investment? If
non-tenure factors become less constraining, will tenure still constrain adoption or might tenure
rules themselves adjust?
• What are the options for enhancing security, taking into account the whole array of costs
associated with any given strategy? Achieving tenure change is not a matter of simply changing
land law. Land titling and registration systems based on Western models require establishment
of costly administrative machineries which could place severe strains on many budgets.
A second common criticism of customary tenures is that prohibitions against land transactions
mean that farmers better able to put land of a certain quality or in a certain location to more productive
use than a farmer currently occupying it will be unable to buy or rent the land. Of course, this
constraint affects both parties to prospective transactions. The current landholder may be able to
reaiise higher income from the land by renting it out than he or she could by farming it, but is
prohibited by customary tenure from doing so. Land as a factor of production is less mobile in
relation to other factors. As such, customary tenure may be a source of inefficiency.
This could become a particular problem in the case of dairy production. Dairying is a relatively
capital intensive activity and is economical near urban or other densely settled areas with a relatively
high and reliable demand for milk. Two constraints must be overcome. First, the farmer will need
assurance that returns to investments in fixed capital such as fencing, watering facilities, milking
parlours etc will accrue to him or her over the long run. This is the security of tenure issue which
was addressed above. The second constraint relates to rights to land transactions. This will be
addressed in the following section.
7.7.2 Rights to land transactions
The second constraint will arise when an entrepreneurial farmer, possessing skilled labour and
sufficient capital to start a dairy enterprise, is unable to secure suitable land. The farmer might be a
local person and already hold a small piece of land, but would need to rent or purchase a neighbouring
field to expand forage production. The farmer may originate from a distant province and have no
customary land rights in the farming areas near the town.
The farmer needs functioning markets in land rights to allow him or her to purchase or rent
a holding of appropriate economic scale. In the absence of thorough-going land reform, the policy
maker's options would appear to be severely constrained. However, options do exist.
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First, the analyst should determine if formal or informal markets are not in fact operating. As
farming land takes on increasing value near urban centres, customary tenure rules are accommodating
a greater variety of transactions, including long-term rental and sale of customary land rights. For
instance, in Lesotho, dairy producers are successfully negotiating purchase of customary land rights
near urban areas (Lawry, 1988). Once purchased, they believe the customary right provides sufficient
security to warrant all types of fixed investment.
Second, the state could sanction transactions in customary land rights, subject to certain
conditions and limitations. For instance, approval for each transaction might be sought from local
land allocation authorities. When the state or a local authority witnesses rental contracts and sale
agreements, both parties to transactions will have greater assurance that the agreements will not be
subject to subsequent dispute and litigation. By reducing uncertainty, the state enhances security.
Changes affecting tenure rights on the farm will have far-reaching consequences and must be
carefully considered. An important social goal of customary systems is to provide the largest possible
number of qualified members of a community with sufficient land to make a basic living. Where
competitive land markets supplant traditional allocative principles, poorer households will undoubtedly
find it more difficult to secure land.
 
Important points (7.5-7.7)
One policy instrument to control overgrazing and land degradation is legislation to reform
existing tenure systems.
One tenure policy intervention is land legislation to convert communal tenures to individual
tenure.
An additional tenure policy intervention attempts to achieve better control over how
individual herders utilise communal rangelands.
Both types of interventions have been tried in Africa. Individual tenure could deny
smallholders access to extensive communal rangeland.
Interventions aimed at resource conservation and economic efficiency may conflict with
stability and equity objectives.
Besides tenure reforms, two important measures to control overstocking are tax policy and
stocking controls administered by national governments.
A grazing tax may lead to optimal stocking rates from the national point of view, but it
hurts herders. Further, implementing a grazing tax is not a simple task.
Stock control could be exercised by assigning the right to graze a certain number of animals
to individual herders. This is again likely to be resented by herders.
Spontaneous land enclosure and individualisation of rights may become more common in
the future. However, spontaneous tenure reform may conflict with national objectives.
Two main criticisms of the customary tenure system are:
♦ insecurity to long-term land rights
♦ prohibition against land transactions.
Customary tenure is not usually as insecure as outsiders believe.
Economic efficiency requires that the state sanction transactions in land rights subject to
certain conditions and limitations.
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7.8 Feedback exercises
All answers can be found in the text.
1 .a. Land tenure is defined as a bundle of rights to resources. Name three entities in whom








c. Write one most important difference between freehold tenure and customary tenure.




3. Circle T for True and F for False.
i) Rainfall and soil fertility determine the rates of regeneration of grazing irrespective of
intensity of use.
ii) Livestock output under open-access tenure will be higher but economic efficiency will
be lower than under individual tenure.
iii) Where rainfall is highly variable in space, mobile herds provide less stability of
income than do static ones.
iv) The problem of equity is more serious under open-access tenure than under communal
tenure.
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4.a. Which of the following constitute the major causes of failure in implementing the Tribal
Grazing Land Programme in Botswana? Tick (*/ ) your answer(s).
i) The rationale for the programme was derived from the tragedy of commons which is
not a valid concept.
ii) Provisions that ranch holders graze their stock only on their allotted ranches were not
enforced.
iii) In many cases, the ranches proved too big to be properly managed by their owners.
iv) Government did not take into account the lag time between policy formulation and
implementation.
v) Levels of rent collection on leases were very low and could not suffice for the
originally planned development programme in communal areas.




c. Explain the terms: opportunistic strategy and conservative strategy for controlling livestock
numbers.
5.a. List two major hurdles each for implementing grazing tax and stock control policy by







b. Describe briefly the concept of "spontaneous" tenure charges.
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8.3 The institutional structure for policy formulation
8.3.1 Some models for the policy formulation process
8.3.2 Relevant exercises
8.4 Communication




Module 8 is intended to enable you to:
1 . Sketch and explain some alternative policy formulation models.
2. List the components of a policy paper.
3. Prepare a policy paper.
8.2 Introduction
In module 8, we shall discuss how to write a policy paper. To accomplish this, we shall consider
briefly the institutional structure of livestock policy formulation by governments and how the policy
analyst can be an effective actor in the overall process of policy formulation and implementation.
8.3 The institutional structure for policy formulation
The level at which policy decisions are taken (e.g. by officials, minister(s), the cabinet or president)
is in part determined by the intrinsic importance of the particular policy issue in question. However,
other aspects are important as well and include: where (organisationally) new ideas influencing policy
are generated; which organisation(s) plays the lead role, who evaluates alternatives and formal
proposals for policy changes, and the extent to which each organisation formally involved is given
a genuine opportunity to influence outcomes.
Numerous actors may be involved in the policy formulation process. Actors will often have
their own roles to play in this process and their own agendas for action. Actors in the livestock policy
formulation process may include: policy implementers (e.g. officials in the veterinary, extension or
livestock marketing services), planning or policy analysis units, academicians, major donors and
special interest (pressure) groups. The interplay between these actors, and their relative "power" base
in the policy formulation and implementation hierarchy, can have major impacts on policy change
in terms of, for example:
• the extent to which implementers of policy feel a sense of commitment to policy change
• the expertise available for policy analysis
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• the degree to which policy proposals take a wide, national rather than a narrow, sectarian point
of view
• the political, bureaucratic and financial support for new proposals, regardless of their intrinsic
merit.
8.3.1 Some models for the policy formulation process
Figures 8.1-8.5 show alternative models of the policy formulation process. Each model gives a central
position to a different actor, relegating other actors to subordinate roles or to the sidelines. Each
model reflects, in exaggerated form, the policy formulation process observed in some African
countries. All are based on a common set of assumptions:
• an overall national interest can be defined, legitimised and gain commitment
• rational solutions emerge from thought and discussion
• there is a general expectation that policy decisions will be implemented in practice
• policy makers welcome, rather than punish, dispassionate advice and information
• the zeal with which policy commands are executed is fairly independent of the precise process
leading to the commands' issue.
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Exercise 8.1: Group Exercise: Matching institutional models to reality and identifying characteristics
determining effective performance.
The group should consider the models presented in Figures 8.1-8.5 in terms of the
characteristics of effective processes of policy formulation and the basic assumptions underlying all
models. The answers to the questions below should be presented at a plenary session.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 2 hours including plenary).
Question 1. Which model (J-N) best fits your country or countries in your region? If none fits well,
describe a more realistic one, defining where policy ideas come from, who makes formal
proposals, who decides and who implements.
Question 2. What are the advantages/disadvantages of each model?
Question 3. Examine the assumptions underlying models J-N. Are they valid in your country and
region?
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Effective policy formulation and implementation require skill in policy analysis and the ability to
articulate the rationale behind the analysis, and convey conclusions to policy makers and others
clearly and persuasively. The policy paper is the key form of expression and communication in the
policy formulation process.
8.4.1 Preparing policy papers
The most important aspect of policy papers is that they present policy options to decision makers
and provide a balanced summary of advantages and disadvantages for each option. Policy papers
should:
• Minimise the risk of taking inappropriate decisions.
• Indicate the need (or lack of need) for taking a decision.
• Present complex issues in a straightforward fashion.
• Ensure that decisions which are taken are based upon a sound understanding of the issues involved,
a reasonably good database and an appreciation of the consequences.
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Policy papers are advisory in nature. They may or may not advocate a particular course of
action. However, they should examine the trade-offs between alternative courses of action.
There are normally five main components of a policy paper:
• A statement of the particular problem, or problems, that need(s) to be addressed.
• A summary of the various objectives involved (drawn from existing policy) including, when
relevant, the various objectives of different interested parties.
• The information that is needed to take a decision.
• An assessment of the problem(s) in terms of the particular policy issue involved. (In some cases,
there may be problems which are not appropriate for any immediate decision; there may be other
decisions which are already in hand elsewhere.)
• A presentation of policy options on the particular issue or issues identified.
If the policy paper is to be discussed in a meeting, the Chair of the meeting should be able
to use the structure of the paper to guide discussion, agree on the problem and the objectives, survey
the information, identify the issue to be decided upon and, finally, make a choice.
In practice, the process of formulating and presenting policy options is not orderly. Often,
competing interest groups and agendas will have an impact on both the policy options chosen and
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Key:- -► General Ideas
► Specific Advice
-► Commands
policy implementation. However, the key for the policy analyst is to present options in as objective
and reasoned a fashion as possible—acknowledging perhaps the special interests and agendas at
play—but standing apart from these interests and agendas.
8.4.2 Relevant exercises
Exercise 8.2. Group Exercise: Preparing a policy paper.
Example: The policy for marketing of beef in Alphabeta.
You have been asked by your Permanent Secretary to prepare a paper for the Minister of
Agriculture to present to Cabinet. The paper will relate to beef marketing policy in Alphabeta since
an argument has arisen between the Meat Marketing Corporation (MMC) and the Urban Retailers
Association over proposals for modified relaxation of laws governing the operations of private
butcheries in urban areas.
The proposals, in the last stages of legislation, would permit (under license) a restricted number
of butcheries to operate slaughter facilities in the main urban centres of the country. Until now, such
operations have been illegal and the MMC has been vested with full control of all beef marketing
operations, supported by government price controls. Government price controls at the producer,
consumer and retail levels would remain unchanged according to the proposal.
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The Board of the MMC is completely opposed to any revision of laws governing private
slaughtering and retailing of beef in urban areas. Such operations have been active in the past (despite
regulations) and have been difficult to control. They have eroded MMC's urban market outlets and
serious problems of excess capacity and escalating costs of operation have caused the parastatal to
run at a loss in recent years. Figures on the extent of this loss have just been leaked to the press
and resulted in public protest and wide comment.
The Board of the MMC argues that a relaxation of laws controlling urban butcheries will both
encourage licensed traders to expand operations and develop the tendency for more illegal butcheries
to enter the trade. This, the Board argues, would further threaten the viability of MMC's operations.
It would also become increasingly difficult to maintain adequate health standards for urban consumers.
The argument is that MMC was initially empowered with monopoly control over the beef
market in order to provide subsidised beef to the consumer and to develop export outlets. MMC's
capacity to perform these functions has diminished with time and it is the responsibility of government
to support its original intention, not to undermine it. The proposed legislation would do the latter
according to the Board. Furthermore, proposals by some segments of the community (notably the
commercial farmers) to remove the consumer subsidy and hence raise the producer price (which is
held at an artificially low level) would be opposed by the Board. This, it is argued, would reduce
the demand for beef and would at the same time be politically contentious. An increase in producer
prices would, however, be supported by the Board since production would increase and the MMC's
throughput of beef would increase. A reconsideration of grade differentials to encourage greater
production of prime quality beef for export would also now be supported by the MMC. The Board,
therefore, now proposes that:
• producer prices be increased
• present consumer price subsidy policy be retained
• proposals for deregulating the urban beef trade be scrapped.
Representatives of the Urban Retailers Association, on the other hand, vigorously support a
relaxation of the restrictions currently imposed on butchering operations. They argue that trading
controls on private butchers should be scrapped and that this would stimulate competition and
efficiency within the industry. Both consumers and producers would then benefit from a deregulation
of the urban beef trade. Inefficient operators would be driven out of practice and competition would
help to maintain or even improve current health standards of private operators
MMC's poor performance is, according to the Association, a consequence of the fact that it is
an outmoded service and that it will never effectively compete with the private trade even under the
present system of controls. This is supported by the recent growth in urban demand for private trader
beef at the expense of MMC and by the drift in supply towards these outlets. The MMC has failed
to meet its mandate and has become costly for the taxpayer. It now merely serves the interests of
large commercial producers who have an aversion to uncontrolled marketing and of a select group
of high income earners in the urban sector. Its operations should therefore be phased out or its original
objectives altered.
The Association, on the other hand, opposes any alteration in consumer or producer price
policy. An increase in consumer price, by relaxing the subsidy, would shift urban demand away from
beef and this could threaten the viability of operation for a number of butcheries. It would also
discourage new entrants because of the narrow margin between producer and consumer prices. Any
attempts to increase the price paid to the producer would be opposed for similar reasons. The
Association, therefore, recommends:
• a continuation of existing price policies
• a further relaxation of laws governing the private butchering trade
• a phasing out or complete redefinition of MMC's meat marketing operations.
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Exercise: (estimated time required: 2 hours).
(This exercise should be done in groups of 4-8 people). In the light of this information and
given the data and discussion on the operations of the MMC in the central case study, examine the
consistency of the arguments presented and prepare a draft Cabinet paper as requested by the
Permanent Secretary. Your Minister will shortly present the paper to the Cabinet for a decision.
In preparing your paper you must ensure that the Cabinet does not confuse the short-term
problems with the longer-term issues involved. You must draw upon what you understand of
government policy to reiterate the objectives that the Ministry has to keep in mind in executing policy
decisions. You should ensure that the Cabinet has the information it needs to take the decisions from
among the various options you are suggesting to them. But they should not be inundated with data
(use appropriate statistics where possible, but sparingly). Remember that your Minister will have only
ten minutes to present his case and the Prime Minister will allow thirty minutes' discussion at most.
Exercise 8.3. Group Exercise: Preparing and making an oral presentation to ministers.
Exercise: (estimated time required: 1.5-2 hours).
The central element of this exercise is a simulated cabinet meeting to discuss a policy paper
on marketing of beef in Alphabeta. Versions of that policy paper will emerge from Exercise 8.2. The
instructor may need to prepare a definitive version drawn from the various drafts. If he or she has
no time to do this, a version of the draft, prepared in advance, would be appropriate. Individual
participants should be selected to play the role of ministers at the Cabinet Meeting at which attendance
should be restricted to 8-10 ministers.
Other participants, not selected as ministers, should act as "advisers" to individual ministers
in considering (prior to the Cabinet Meeting) the view each minister should adopt.
Subsequent to the simulated cabinet meeting there should be a plenary of all participants to
discuss what happened and what the implications are for policy formulation in general and, in
particular, the preparation of policy papers.
(Hints to instructors: The proceedings can be enlivened if you prepare an imaginary personal
profile of each minister giving his political views and background including his or her political
ambitions and alliances or disagreements with other individual ministers. This "personal profile" is
then communicated to the minister concerned but not to other participants).
• Ministers and their advisers confer about policy paper prior to cabinet meeting (30 minutes).
• Simulated cabinet meeting (45 minutes).
• Plenary post-mortem discussion (15-30 minutes).
 
Important points (8.3-8.4)
The structure and functioning of policy formulation institutions differ greatly in Africa.
There may be important differences in roles played by different organisations and groups
of people in generating new ideas, evaluating and approving proposals and influencing
outcome.
Important characteristics of the policy formulation infrastructure are:
♦ sense of commitment of the implementers to changes in policy
♦ expertise available for policy analysis
♦ national interest as a basis for proposals
♦ availability of required support.
Important points (8.3-8.4) cont...
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 Important points (8.3-8.4) cont...
• The policy formulation process can be represented by various models. However, all models
are based on a common set of basic assumptions.
• Policy papers provide policy options to decision makers and describe advantages or
disadvantages of each option.
• The five main components of a policy paper are:
♦ statement of the problem
♦ summary of policy objectives
♦ available information
♦ assessment of problem for decision
♦ policy options
8.5 Feedback exercises
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Module 9 is intended to enable you to:
1 . Describe the main features of Alphabeta's economy and identify internal and external factors which
have contributed to its recent decline.
2. Discuss agriculture's contribution to Alphabeta's economy.
3. Describe the basic features of agriculture in terms of ecological regions, land tenure arrangements,
land holdings and government services.
4. State briefly the distinguishing characteristics of the livestock sector.
5. Identify the four main livestock production systems in Alphabeta.
6. Describe the "pastoral production system" and compare it with the "agropastoral production system".
7. List the five main types of production systems in the small-scale dairy subsector and briefly describe
them.
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8. Discuss the role of the National Livestock Development Programme in increasing beef production
on the four main types of ranches in the large-scale livestock production system.
9. Identify the three principal types of dairy operations on the basis of management intensity and
ecological location in the large-scale livestock production system.
10. Describe beef and milk marketing in Alphabeta and discuss the impact of government pricing policies
on the production, consumption and marketing of these products.
9.2 Introduction
This case study draws on data from a number of African countries. Alphabeta is therefore a composite.
The study will be used to demonstrate important features of the livestock sector common to many
African countries and will, in particular, form the basis for discussions of livestock policies and
marketing issues. In addition, data for Alphabeta will be useful for answering questions and exercises
in earlier modules.
9.3 The economic background
Following independence, Alphabeta recorded an impressive economic growth. However, in recent
years, a number of problems have arisen and its economy has shown indications of decline. Important
indicators of this decline include:
A fall in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth from 6% annually in the immediate
post-independence period to between 2-3% annually in recent years.
A deteriorating balance of payments, currently in excess of 15% annually.
Rising urban unemployment and rural underemployment.
A decline in per caput food production.
Declining terms of trade for agriculture.
In addition, high population growth (approximately 4% annually) continues to place stress on
the economy in terms of public expenditure, food production, resource conservation and employment
prospects. The combination of high population growth rate and low GDP growth rates has resulted
in a negative growth in per caput GDP (2 or 3% minus 4%) in recent years. This decline in living
standards has been perceptible.
Two major factors have contributed to the decline of Alphabeta's economy: external factors
beyond the direct control of government and internal factors involving inappropriate development,
trade and pricing policies.
Principal amongst the adverse external factors are declining prices for Alphabeta's major
agricultural export commodities and rising costs of imported goods (in part because of increased
petroleum prices) which have led to a deteriorating balance of payments. An excessive dependency
on agricultural exports has also made the economy vulnerable to world market price fluctuations and
seasonality in internal supplies. In an attempt to ameliorate the impact of falling export revenues,
Alphabeta borrowed heavily. The debt service ratio now stands at 20% of export earnings. Although
the government of Alphabeta could exert little or no influence on commodity prices, policy action
to diversify exports could have relieved some of the commodity export dependency and made
Alphabeta less vulnerable to world markets.
Internal influences include lack of incentives for agricultural export industries, protection of
certain manufacturing industries which has penalised agriculture directly and indirectly, high
government expenditure resulting in large budget deficits, over-valuation of the currency and an
over-reliance on imported materials and equipment. Protection, for example, has encouraged resources
to flow out of agriculture and into the manufacturing sector. Protection of the latter sector has also
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resulted in higher manufacturing wages. These higher wages were ultimately passed on to other
sectors of the economy, including agriculture. As a result, the terms of trade between agriculture and
the rest of the economy have deteriorated.
Due to these difficulties, political unrest has become more prevalent and the popularity of the
government has declined. In addition, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and many
bilateral donors are imposing increasingly stringent political and economic conditions on additional
assistance. In consequence, policy options are increasingly constrained by domestic political factors
and international pressures.
(Hint to instructors: Discuss some of the economic terms used in this section, e.g. GDP, per
caput GDP and balance of payments. Make sure participants understand them.)
9.4 The agricultural background
9.4.1 Agriculture in the economy
Agriculture's contribution to Alphabeta's economy is significant, presently accounting for 30% of
GDP and 60% of export earnings. Agriculture absorbs 20% of the work force in paid employment.
Roughly 80% of the total population (16 million) depends predominantly on agriculture for
subsistence.
The principal export earners, coffee, tea and pyrethrum, contribute about 54% of the total export
earnings (Table 9.1). The main food crops are maize, beans, wheat and pulses. Maize is the staple
food of the majority of the population. Livestock are important for local consumption (beef, dairying
and poultry) but export earnings from this source contribute less than 10% of the total (Table 9.1).
Table 9.1. Value ofprincipal overseas export commodities at current pricesfor selected years.
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9.4.2 Rainfall and agricultural regions
Rainfall in Alphabeta follows a bimodal pattern. The short rains come in November-December,
followed by longer rains in March-May. This pattern prevails in the lower rainfall regions of the
country as well, but the length of each rainy period is shortened. Short-season crops such as beans
can be grown during the short rains in high potential regions but most cropping activities occur
during the longer March-May season.
The country is divided into four ecological regions on the basis of production potential.
Management practices, poverty levels and land holdings are highly diverse within and across most
regions. Approximately 20% of the total area has been classified as medium-to-high potential and
suitable for commercial cropping and intensive livestock production. The remaining 80% is classified
as: marginal for cropping but suitable for extensive livestock systems (10%); suitable only for
extensive livestock systems (50%); and suitable only for nomadic pastoralism (20%). In the semi-arid
and arid regions, rainfall averages less than 600 mm/year. As expected, human population density is
greatest in the medium-to-high potential regions but population growth is placing pressure on all land
resources. Cultivation is being extended on to higher slopes and into more marginal areas. Excessive
tree felling is evident. On rangelands, increasing stocking rates are leading to a loss of vegetation
cover and species diversity and the invasion of less palatable species. As a result, soil erosion is
considered to be an increasingly severe problem. Already, 25% of the country is at high erosion risk,
while 60% is under moderate risk. Only 15% of the land area is not presently under threat and much
of this is in the medium-to-high potential regions.
9.4.3 Land tenure
Following independence, efforts were made to redress the imbalance between land occupied by
Europeans and Africans and to alter tenure arrangements in some of the communal areas. Land
purchase and resettlement schemes became a major ongoing feature of government development
policy with titled units being offered to African farmers in the medium-to-high potential regions of
the country. In smallholder areas, the government has continued its programme of consolidating and
registering land rights, previously under customary tenure. There are now some 900,000 smallholder
units registered in this way. Land classification on the basis of size and title is shown in Table 9.2
Table 9.2. Distribution ofhouseholds by size and type of land holdings.
Classification %of No. of % total available
Resettled farms
households households land area
large (> 20 ha) 3,500 0.1 0.1
small (< 20 ha) 35,000 1.6 1.0
Privately owned large farms and estates 450 - 2.3
Smallholders
registered 900,000 40.4 7.0
unregistered 585,000 26.4 17.6
Communal pastoralists (estimates) 300,000 13.5 72.0
Landless households (estimates) 400,000 18.0 -
Total 2,223,950 100.00 100.0
1 Available for agriculture; excluding national parks, reserves and areas unsuitable for agriculture.
9.4.4 Major production systems
Alphabeta has a relatively diversified agricultural sector in terms of production systems. For the most
part, these systems are determined by agro-ecological constraints, although smallholding and estate
farms coexist in the medium-to-high potential areas, and commercial livestock production may coexist
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with pastoralism in the more arid regions or with cash cropping in the higher potential regions.
Briefly, the following features characterise these production systems.
Smallholder agriculture. Smallholders are found mostly in the medium-to-high potential areas.
Maize is the dominant crop and is normally grown in conjunction with beans or other pulses.
Small-scale farmers with less than 5 ha produce 90% of the country's maize and normally sell or
store surpluses above subsistence needs. They also account for over 50% of the value of gross
marketed production of agricultural commodities (Tables 9.3 and 9.4). Techniques of farm
management are basic; cattle are important for draft, manure and milk. Yields are generally low. The
use of fertilisers on maize, as well as other crops, is limited. Sorghum and millet are grown more
extensively in the marginal cropping areas but maize is the preferred staple. Tea, coffee and small-scale
dairying are important sources of cash in the higher potential regions of the country.
Table 9.3. Total value and percentage of gross agricultural marketed production contributed by small-scale
farmersfor selected years.
Total value of ;gross Value of smallholders' Smallholders'
Year marketed production contribution contribution
(A$ '000) (A$ '000) (% of total)
7 105.9 55.6 52.5
8 123.3 63.3 51.3
9 148.4 75.0 50.5
10 162.0 90.1 55.6





Wheat 3,865 6,625 8,275
Maize 8,571 6,482 17,022
Others 2,055 2,251 3,626
Subtotal 14,491 17,658 28,928
Temporary industrial crops
Pyrethrum 3,259 4,206 4,551
Sugar cane 4,453 5,916 8,230
Others 1,660 2,080 3,041
Subtotal 9,372 12,202 15,822
Other temporary crops 3,563 5,356 7,123
Permanent crops
Coffee 32,772 35,326 35,345
Sisal 7,051 18,350 7,038
Tea 16,766 19,255 22,914
Others 2,817 3,177 3,274
Subtotal 59,406 76,108 68,571
Livestock and products
Cattle and calves 16,353 17,610 19,827
Dairy products 11,305 10,100 10,781
Others 4,514 4,747 5,515
Subtotal 32,172 32,457 36,123
Unrecorded marketed production 4,299 4,668 5,404
Total 123,303 148,449 161,966
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Table 9.5 presents the frequency distribution of smallholder households by size of land holding.
Of the 1.5 million smallholder households, approximately 30% have less than 1 ha, 60% less than
2 ha and 90% less than 5 ha of arable land.
Pastoral production. Pastoralists occupy the semi-arid and arid range areas and subsist
primarily on cattle, sheep and goats. Purchasing food from cropping areas, through the sale of livestock
and to supplement food of livestock origin, is now common.
Table 9.5. Frequency distribution ofhouseholds by landholding classes.
Arable holding No. households Cumulative %
(ha) ('000s) % households households
0.5 206.4 14 14
0.5-0.9 265.8 18 32
1.0-1.9 400.4 27 59
2.0-4.9 462.9 31 90
5.0-7.9 96.4 6 96
>8.0 53.1 4 100
1485.0 100
Agropastoral production. On the margin of the cropping and pastoral areas of the country,
agropastoralists subsist mainly by cropping and the sale of cattle and/or smallstock which provide
cash to meet food deficits. These deficits are common because of the unsuitability of the environment
for cropping activities.
Estate and large-scale agriculture. Crops grown in the large-scale farming sector include
wheat, sugar, rice, barley, coffee and tea. A number of large, privately owned co-operative, group
and company ranches exist but these account for a relatively small proportion of the total national
livestock herd.
9.4.5 Government services to agriculture
The agricultural sector is served by five ministries and 18 statutory boards which assist in the
marketing of various agricultural products. Marketing boards are broadly empowered to control
production and marketing, pricing and related activities. Several boards (e.g. the Maize Board) also
have monopoly control over the movement of their products between districts. Local co-operatives
and private enterprises also play an important role in the marketing of products from the smallholder
sector (e.g. coffee, tea, pyrethrum and dairy goods) and in the provision of inputs and credit facilities.
Agricultural research is conducted by a variety of departments within the Ministry of
Agriculture, statutory boards and Alphabeta University (AU). Despite widely dispersed responsibility
for research, most of the emphasis to date has been on export crops. Little attention has been given
to other farm commodities from the smallholder sector.
The extension service is relatively well staffed and works through various Provincial Directors
of Agriculture. The impact of the service on smallholder production has, however, been limited, partly
due to lack of co-ordination with input delivery systems and partly because of the narrow focus of
agricultural research.
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 Important points (9.2-9.4)
Agriculture makes a significant contribution to Alphabeta's economy in terms of GDP,
employment, exports and provision of subsistence requirements.
Smallholder mixed farming systems predominate, comprising approximately 2/3 of rural
households.
Livestock are integrated in the cropping systems in three out of the four ecological zones
of the country.
In most production systems, farm management techniques are traditional and use of modern
inputs in agriculture is limited.
Agricultural research is mainly oriented towards cash crops.
The impact of most government services on agriculture has been limited because of lack
of coordination and the narrow focus of agricultural research.
9.5 The livestock sector
9.5.1. Distribution of livestock populations
Livestock represents a major national resource in Alphabeta. The livestock population is comprised
of about 10.0 million cattle and 8.5 million sheep and goats. Donkeys and pigs are relatively
insignificant in number. Data on poultry in the smallholder system are lacking but surveys indicate
that they constitute an important source of protein for rural households. Out of the total cattle
population, 11% are grade dairy cattle, bred in the high potential areas of the country for production
of meat (4%) and milk (7%). The remaining 89% are indigenous zebu stock.
Approximately one-half of the cattle and one-third of the sheep and goats are concentrated in
the better agricultural regions of the country. The remainder are found in the semi-arid and arid
pastoral zones, where rainfall is less than 600 mm/year. The livestock industry is divided into
traditional and modern commercial sectors. Grade beef cattle are mostly bred on commercial farms.
They include stock of European and Asian origin and some local breeds. For dairying, the African
smallholder has become important in recent years with a growing number of grade dairy cattle
(currently at approximately 0.4 million head) being owned by this group. Table 9.6 gives data on the
distribution of livestock units by species, category of ownership and agricultural area potential.
9.5.2 Livestock output and marketing
Although they account for less than 10% of export earnings, livestock products are important
domestically, contributing 23% of the gross value of marketed agricultural production (Table 9.4).
Of marketed livestock production by value, about 51% consists of stock for slaughter and 35% of
dairy products. The remainder is divided among hides, skins, wool and eggs. However, most of the
livestock industry is outside the money economy since 75% of milk production, 80% of beef and
over 90% of goat and sheep output is consumed on farm, where produced. Thus, livestock make an
important contribution to rural nutrition and well-being.
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Total no. LU Total no.
headdistricts
Grade dairy cattle 627.0 ' 85.5 1.5 340.5 1,054.5 703.0
5.02 0.7 0.0 2.7 8.4
Grade beef cattle 49.0 58.8 - 483.0 590.8 421.4
0.4 0.5 - 3.8 4.7
Indigenous zebu
cattle
3,446.5 2,291.6 3,069.0 - 8,807.1 8,807.1
27.5 18.3 24.5 - 70.4
Total cattle 4,122.5 2,435.9 3,070.5 823.5 10,452.4 9,931.5
32.9 19.5 24.5 6.6 83.5
Sheep and goats 311.5 392.5 353.3 53.4 1,110.7 8,545.0
2.5 3.1 2.8 0.4 8.9
Donkeys 35.5 30.5 115.7 - 181.7 181.7
0.3 0.2 0.9 - 1.4
Camels - - 774.0 - 744.0 516.0
- - 6.2 - 6.2
Total livestock 4,469.5 2,858.9 4,313.5 876.9 12,518.8
35.7 22.8 34.5 7.0 100.0
1 Calculation of LU = grade dairy cattle x 1.5; grade beef cattle x 1 .4; indigenous zebu cattle x 1.0; wool sheep x 0.2; hair sheep
and goats x 0. 1 3; donkeys x 1 .0; camels x 1 .5.
2 Per cent of grand total (total livestock x total LU).
In terms of livestock units (LU), cattle are the most important, accounting for about 83% of
total LU (Table 9.6), 90% of marketed livestock production and 95% of livestock exports. Meat sold
on the world market is offered in chilled or frozen form (which must originate in foot-and-mouth
disease-free zones) or canned. With some exceptions, however, rising local demand has contributed
to a stagnation of beef exports (Table 9.7).
Table 9.7. Production and disposal ofbeefby the Meat Marketing Commission.









4 26,219 14,232 2,011 9,976 45.7
5 27,993 15,621 2.680 9,692 44.2
6 26,094 13,611 2,780 9,703 47.8
7 26,905 12,780 3,992 10,133 52.5
8 22,694 11,752 3,068 7,874 48.2
9 19,770 8,374 2,873 8,523 57.6
10 16,600 3,239 3,335 10,026 80.5
11 26,219 5,903 4,457 16,501 78.0
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Although beef cattle on commercial ranches constitute only 6% of the total herd, they account
for almost half of the official sales for slaughter. An unknown number of cattle are sold through
alternative outlets, bypassing the official marketing organisation. Rough estimates suggest that about
20% of cattle are sold through official channels. Surveys indicate that the average slaughter offtake
through all channels is approximately 9% annually. This rate is higher for commercial ranches and
lower for agropastoralists and smallholders. However, since about 80% of cattle are marketed through
unofficial outlets, the official beef offtake rate is only about 3% annually.
9.5.3 Livestock production constraints
The two major constraints to livestock development in the pastoral, agropastoral and smallholder
subsectors, in particular, are overgrazing and animal diseases.
Overgrazing is a difficult concept to define precisely since it implies both a given range area's
carrying capacity and a given level of livestock productivity. Production systems geared to multiple
livestock outputs (draft, milk, meat, customary functions) from the same animal can ordinarily sustain
rather higher stocking rates than systems aiming for high productivity in a single output. Although
there has been heated controversy around this issue in Alphabeta, a consensus has begun to emerge
concerning the magnitude of the problem. On communal lands, a figure of between 30-40%
overstocking is now widely accepted. This implies a carrying capacity in these areas of between 5.1
and 5.5 million LU. While estimates of the magnitude of the problem are not available, it is felt that
overstocking is serious amongst some smallholders, but not all.
Overstocking provides a major challenge to Alphabeta's livestock development planners. For
a long time, acceptance of the cattle complex explanation for large, seemingly low-productivity herds
prevailed. Believing that pastoral livestock holders accumulated animals largely for traditional,
customary purposes and as a display of wealth, range specialists sought to control numbers through
grazing regulations and fines. These aimed to supplement traditional controls on range use. Traditional
authority no longer has the legitimacy or effective power it once had, however, and the regulations
were widely ignored and had little or no impact on the problem. Livestock economists at AU are
arguing that so-called traditional motivations probably play a relatively minor role in pastoralist and
agropastoralist stocking decisions. Instead, they are emphasising the economic value that livestock
contribute to the household. In the agropastoral system, cattle provide crucial draft power. With an
average of less than two oxen per household (and some 30% of households with no cattle at all)
most households find their herd size too small. In addition, cows provide milk as a supplement to
the household's nutrition, and progeny, sheep and goats provide meat (as do cattle also, infrequently)
and livestock sales provide ready cash when needed. Amongst pastoralists, this is particularly
important since livestock sales provide them with the cash to purchase other staples. In addition,
livestock serve as one of the few repositories of savings open to pastoralists and agropastoralists.
The value of bank savings accounts is unable to keep pace with inflation, private land sales in these
areas are not sanctioned (although they take place unofficially) and stores and taxis are too "lumpy"
to be feasible investments for most households.
Analysis of overstocking now locates the pressure to expand herds in the interaction of low
grazing costs (owing to an increasingly free access of communal range, cheap family herding labour
and low level of production inputs) and high livestock values. Reinforcing this pressure is the impact
of erratic rainfall in the arid and semi-arid regions, which necessitates large herds being built up
during good seasons in order to ensure survivors during bad ones.
In addition to overstocking, animal diseases and various parasite infestations cause great
economic losses. For the export trade, foot-and-mouth disease, endemic in pastoral areas and difficult
to control, remains a major problem. East Coast fever and other tick-borne diseases, measles and
internal partite infestations are also of economic importance.
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 Important points (9.5)
• Livestock contribute 23% to the gross value of marketed agricultural production in
Alphabeta.
• Amongst livestock, cattle account for 90% of marketed production and 95% of livestock
exports.
• Almost one-half of official cattle sales for slaughter comes from commercial ranches.
• Although livestock's contribution to export earnings is insignificant, its contribution to rural
well-being and domestic income generation is great.
• Overgrazing and animal disease problems are major livestock development policy issues.
9.6 Major livestock production systems
The foregoing discussion forms the necessary context for a detailed examination of the four major
livestock production systems in Alphabeta. After the production systems are described, marketing
policies and development strategies relevant to the livestock sector will be discussed.
9.6.1 The pastoral system
Pastoralists derive most of their income or sustenance from keeping livestock where most feed is natural
forage rather than cultivated fodders and pastures. Invariably, pastoralists occupy arid and semi-arid regions
that are not conducive to rainfed agriculture. In most cases, the bulk of their working time and energy
is spent in looking after livestock rather than in other economic activities.
Pastoralism
Approximately 300,000 pastoral family units occupy the arid regions of Alphabeta. Carrying capacities
in these regions are comparatively low and rainfall is erratic both within and between seasons. The
environment offers few opportunities for subsistence production apart from livestock rearing. The
majority of pastoralists prefer to subsist on products obtained from their herds (e.g. meat, milk).
Milk is the principal item of subsistence consumption. Average per caput intake is
approximately 25 kg/year. Average per caput consumption of meat from all sources (cattle and
smallstock) is 9 kg/year. These intakes are low. Researchers at Alphabeta University estimate that
the humanxattle ratio should be between 1:13 and 1:15 in order to meet full dietary requirements
from pastoral activities alone, without depleting herds. In Alphabeta, however, the average ratio, at
approximately 1:5, is substantially lower than this ideal (Table 9.8). Historical evidence suggests that
it has been declining slowly over the past several decades.
Table 9.8. Livestock units (LU) in relation to human population and land area.
Grazing area LU LU Land area/LU
Production system ('000 ha) N('000) per caput (ha)
Pastoralist 37,834 4,34 4.97 8.77
Agropastoralist 5,809 2,859 0.97 2.03
High potential smallholder 3,788 4,470 0.75 0.85
Large farm 1 .590 877 1.27 1.81
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Because of their inability to provide sufficient nutrition from their own herd resources, the
majority of pastoral households must provide supplements from other sources (Table 9.9). For most,
this involves sale or barter of livestock for maize or other grains and commercial products. Marginal
pastoral producers become increasingly dependent on community support to meet subsistence needs,
and/or alter their consumption habits by supplementing food with purchases from the non-pastoral
sector. The majority of Alphabeta pastoralists now sell or barter cattle or other stock to purchase
food and to pay for non-food requisites. Surveys have shown, for example, that even during the wet
season, pastoralists obtain up to 50% of their caloric intake from purchased food and that this figure
can increase to as much as 70% during the dry season. The expanding wage economy in urban
centres is also attracting temporary out-migration of some members of pastoral households,
particularly young men with a high wage potential (Table 9.10).
Tablf 9.9 gives data on cash consumption expenditure on non-pastoral commodities for a sample
of pastoral households in two different income classes. Table 9.10 provides similar household data
by income class on cash income received from different sources. It does not include imputed values
for home-consumed products (i.e. milk, meat, hides etc).
From these tables, the following general points should be noted:
• Maize is the main food consumption item. Class I households commit a slightly higher
proportion of total expenditure to food purchases than class II households.
• Cattle are the most important income source for both groups but cash received from




expenditure % total expenditure % total
Food
(A$) expenditure (A$) expenditure
Maize 4.50 16.0 6.00 15.8
Sugar 3.25 11.6 4.00 10.6
Tea 1.50 5.4 1.50 3.9
Hotel food & drinks 2.25 8.0 2.25 5.9
Other items 3.50 12.5 3.75 9.9
Subtotal 15.00 53.5 17.50 46.1
Non-food
Clothing 4.50 16.0 6.25 16.5
Consumables 1.25 4.5 1.25 3.3
Medical & transport 3.00 10.8 4.50 11.8
Household items 0.50 1.8 0.50 1.3
Money transactions 3.75 13.4 8.00 21.0
Subtotal 13.00 46.5 20.50 53.9
Total4 28.00 100.0 38.00 100.0
Table 9.9. Average pastoralist cash consumption expenditure per caput on food and non-food items by income
class (sample survey data).
1 Income classes are based on stock ownership levels per household. Class II (wealthier) households have 8-10 times more
cattle and 5 times more smallstock than class I (poorer) households. A middle class was also defined in the survey but results
are not included.
2 A$ 1 = US$ 3.00 (offical exchange rate).
3 The table includes purchases only.
4 At a mean household size of 6-7 persons, this implies an approximate annual expenditure on food and non-food items of
A$ 170-200 for class I households and A$ 230-270 for class II households.
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• Cash receipts for both income classes are normally in excess of expenditure. In good years
this permits the accumulation of additional stock. In bad years and during times of household
misfortune, this accumulation can be upon to meet extraordinary cash needs. In this way,
accumulation and disposal of stock help to maintain stability in the household standard of
living. Surpluses are also invested in school fees.
Despite the nutritional constraints imposed by inadequate (from the perspective of the individual
household) livestock herds, livestock ownership is highly skewed. Some pastoralists are in a
much better position than others to meet consumption requirements from their own pastoral
resources alone. Sample data indicate a distribution pattern that has 10% of livestock owners
owning approximately 50% of all livestock units (Figure 9.1).
Table 9.10. Sources ofpastoralist cash income per caput by income class (sample survey data).
Income class
I II
Source of Cash income Cash income Cash income Cash income
income A$) (%) (A$) (%)
Livestock sales
Cattle 33.10 58.4 71.65 74.4
Smallstock 1.50 2.6 2.50 2.6
Milk 0.85 1.5 0.85 0.9
Hides and skins 1.50 2.6 0.20 0.2
Subtotal 36.85 65.1 75.20 78.1
Other Income
Cash from labour 8.25 14.6 10.75 11.1
Money transactions 9.60 17.0 10.00 10.4
Beer brewing 0.95 1.7 0.20 0.2
Other income 1.00 1.7 0.20 0.2
Subtotal 19.80 35.0 21.15 21.9
Total2 56.65 100.0 96.35 100.0
1 Income classes are defined in Table 9.9.
2 For a mean household size of 6-7 persons, this implies a total cash receipt of A$ 340-395 annually for class I households and
A$ 580-675 annually for class II households.
Figure 9.1. Distribution ofcattle ownershipfor the pastoral subsector (sample survey).
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Note: Stock unit is equivalent to one or six small-stock.
This ratio approximates the commonly used Tropical Livestock Unit (Table 9.6)
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Herd production and composition parameters
Mature cows constitute approximately 40-45% of the average household herd. The average milk
yield per cow per lactation ranges from between 150 and 250 kg/year. Approximately 50% of the
milk produced is consumed by the calf. Herd composition figures for a sample of pastoral households
were as follows:








Calving rates average 60-65% but mortalities of 0-1 year old stock are high at 25-30%.
Mortalities for other classes of stock are in the order of 7-10%.
Steers (more than three years old) form the majority of the cattle sold. During periods of severe
scarcity (drought), few male calves are retained, in an attempt to maintain milk production and herd
productive potential.
Net offtake rates for cattle vary between 8 and 13%, the principal determinants being seasonal
range conditions and the terms of trade between livestock commodities and food consumption items.
In drier years, the offtake rate will tend to be higher to compensate for loss in herd productivity and
to reduce the risk of loss through death. In those years, purchased food will also tend be more
expensive (or scarce) and higher sales levels will be required in order to meet cash needs.
Pastoralism and environment
Given the overriding importance of producing food for human subsistence, preservation of the herd
is more important to the Alphabeta pastoralist than preservation of the environment. Preservation of
the herd is synonymous with preservation of wealth and household well-being. The larger the herd,
the greater the subsistence standard of living, the greater the household's security, the greater one's
wealth and the greater the likely social status. Reinforcing this is the fact that under the communal
grazing system, individual herd owners have no effective constraints on herd size except the amount
of vegetation on the range itself. Pastoralists show a strong tendency to expand herd size up to the
grazing capacity of the land. This tendency, along with human population growth, has put pressure
on the environment. As indicated earlier, pastoral grazing lands are considered to be 30% to 40%
overstocked and much of the pastoral area is judged to be under moderate to severe erosion hazard.
Data on livestock numbers in the pastoral regions are presented in Table 9.11.
Table 9.11. Livestock numbers in the pastoral regions.
Cattle Smallstock Other1 Total LU
Year ('000 LU) ('000 LU) ('000 LU) ('000 LU)
1 2852.3 333.4 857.6 4043.3
2 2896.7 340.2 872.5 4109.4
3 2912.4 345.1 875.6 4133.1
4 2932.6 350.3 879.4 4162.3
5 2965.8 353.5 883.1 4202.4
6 2998.5 357.2 888.3 4244.0
7 3054.5 354.3 891.3 4300.1
s 3086.2 355.2 895.8 4337.2
9 3080.9 354.7 891.1 4326.7
10 3075.3 354.1 890.4 4319.8
11 3069.0 353.3 889.7 4312.0
1 Includes donkeys and camels.
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9.6.2 The agropastoral system
Agropastoralists derive their living mainly from joint crop-livestock operations. The majority live
within the marginal areas of the country, on the fringe of the pastoral zone. Many would prefer to
be pastoralists, but are forced by agro-economic circumstances to practise cropping in order to
supplement food needs.
Cattle and cropping are complementary enterprises in the agropastoral system. Cattle provide
milk, meat, draft power and manure. As in the pastoral community, large herds are a repository of
savings and confer status and security on the owner. Crops, on the other hand, provide residues which
are used to feed cattle in drier periods of the year.
Agropastoralism
Cattle and smallstock play a critical role in the agropastoralist household economy. Thus, their
accumulation is sought. Unfortunately, as with pastoralists, such behaviour has resulted in serious
overgrazing and overstocking of grazing lands in these regions. One result is poor average herd
performance, as can be seen from the following herd parameters statistics:
• Mortalities
Calves 25-30%
Stock < 3 years old 9-10%
Adult stock (cows, bulls, oxen) 6-7%
• Calving rates 60-65%
• Milk production 250 kg/year
The distribution of cattle ownership by household is skewed and uneven. About 32% of
households own no cattle and approximately 10% own no stock at all. In the sample area, 10% of
households owned approximately 50% of the cattle while also owning significantly more smallstock.
Table 9.12 provides statistics on the distribution of cattle by household and by owner.
Table 9.12. Distribution ofcattle herd size by household and cattle owner/category (agropastoral sample survey
data).
Distribution by household Distribution by owner
No. of % of Cumulative % of No. of % of Cumulative % of
cattle households households cattle owners owners
0 31.7 31.7
1-3 7.7 39.4 1-3 11.3 11.3
4-7 11.4 50.8 4-7 16.7 28.0
8-10 7.7 58.5 8-10 11.3 39.3
11-14 12.7 71.2 11-14 18.4 57.7
15-17 5.3 76.5 15-17 7.7 65.4
18-20 7.7 84.2 18-20 10.7 76.1
21-30 8.2 92.4 21-30 11.9 88.0
31^0 3.7 96.1 31-40 5.4 93.4
40 3.9 100.0 40 6.6 100.0
1 The average household owns 10 cattle, 6 goats, 2 sheep and 8 chickens.
The following mean cattle herd size and structure statistics per household were recorded for
agropastoralists in the semi-arid regions of Alphabeta:
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(Mean/household) % of total
Calves 2.34 23.5




Total herd 9.97 100.0
As with pastoralists, agropastoralists tend to retain female stock to produce milk and to maintain
the reproductive potential of the herd. Oxen are also important for draft so that stock sold tend to
be oxen and cows which have lost their productive capacity. However, because average herd size is
generally low, many herders are increasingly forced to sell young males and even females of
reproductive age.
Crop-livestock complementarity
Crops occupy an important place in the agropastoral economy. Unfortunately, crop yields tend to be




Grain sorghum 400 kg
Millet 400 kg
As a result, farmers grow a wide range of crops in an attempt to minimise the risk of failure
for any one. Despite this, subsistence needs can rarely be met by cropping alone and there is a regular
need to buy food to supplement domestic production. Cattle and smallstock sales are an important
source of cash for regular food purchases. In addition, many, especially those without cattle
(hereinafter referred to as "non-owners"), must meet short-term cash needs from the sale of smallstock,
handicrafts, brewing products, crop outputs and/or by the use of off-farm remittances. Even more so
than with pastoralists, these latter are becoming increasingly important to agropastoralists. In extreme
cases, where alternative sources of cash are not available, households must depend on community
support for survival whenever crops fail.
The marketed offtake rate for cattle in the short term (+10%/year) tends to be inversely related
to seasonal conditions (as with the pastoral economy), the inflow of cash from alternative sources
and to short-term movements in the sale price of cattle. Conversely, cattle purchases (if and when
they occur) will tend to be directly related to seasonal conditions and/or to the inflow of money from
alternative non-farm sources.
Cash consumption expenditure and sources of cash income
Tables 9.13 and 9.14 provide relevant data for average cattle and non-cattle owning agropastoral
households. The following should be observed:
• Cattle owning households are generally wealthier. This is reflected in higher levels of income
and higher overall levels of expenditure on food and non-food items. Surplus savings tend to
be invested in school fees but are inadequate for stock purchases in normal years. Herd
accumulation therefore depends largely on natural increase.
Non-owner households compensate for low livestock income by engaging in activities such as
the sale of handicrafts and brewing products. Consumption expenditure on most food and
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non-food items is also less than for cattle owning households. Surpluses are negligible and
stress in times of crop failure is severe. Remittances are a particularly important complement
to on-farm income producing activities. For those without remittances, there is a regular need
to borrow money in order to survive.
Overall, cash consumption expenditures for agropastoralists are marginally higher than for
pastoralists. This is probably a reflection of the fact that farmers are more exposed to the
monetary economy.
Standards of living for agropastoralists tend to be lower than for the average pastoralist. This
is reflected in lower average savings levels per capita.
Ownership category
Commodity
Cattle owners Non- owners
Total Total Total Total
expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure
Food
(A$) (%) (A$) (%)
Maize 6.00 13.20 7.20 21.2
Sugar 4.50 9.9 3.50 10.3
Tea 2.00 4.4 1.50 4.4
Hotel food 3.50 7.7 2.25 6.6
Other 4.50 9.9 4.00 11.8
Subtotal 20.50 45.1 18.45 54.3
Non-food
Clothing 7.00 15.4 6.00 17.7
Consumables 1.50 3.3 1.50 4.4
Medical & transport 4.50 9.9 3.00 8.9
Household items 2.00 4.4 1.00 2.9
Money transactions 10.00 21.9 4.00 11.8
Subtotal 25.00 54.9 15.50 45.7
Total 45.50 100.0 33.95 100.0
Table 9.13. Average agropastoralist cash consumption expenditure per caput onfoodand non-food items by cattle
ownership category (sample survey data).
1 Higher food expenditure for non-owners reflects the fact that owners tend to have larger families and are able to crop more
effectively with available labour. Cattle ownership also permits more timely planting. Yields tend to be higher and consumption
purchases lower. For the average household of 6-7 people, owners will spend A$ 270-320/year on consumables. Non-owners
will spend A$ 200-235/year.
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Table 9.14. Sources of cash income per caputfor agropastoralists by cattle ownership category (sample survey
data).
Source of income
Cattle owners Non- owners
Cash income Cash income Cash income Cash income
Livestock sales
(A$) (%) (A$) (%)
Cattle 20.00 35.2 - -
Smallstock 1.50 2.7 1.50 4.3
Milk 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0
Hides and skins 0.20 0.4 0.10 0.3
Subtotal 21.70 38.3 1.60 4.6
Other income
Cash from labour 20.00 35.2 18.00 51.3
Money transactions 10.00 17.6 8.00 22.8
Beer brewing 3.00 5.3 4.00 11.4
Handicrafts 1.00 1.8 3.00 8.5
Other income 1.00 1.8 0.50 1.4
Subtotal 35.00 61.7 33.50 95.4
Total 56.70 100.0 35.10 100.0
9.6.3. Smallholder production system in high potential regions: The
case of the smallholder dairy producer
Approximately 80% of smallholder units are concentrated in the medium-to-high potential zones of
the country. Two types of smallholders can be distinguished. One practises mainly subsistence
agriculture and concentrates on the production of crops such as maize, beans and groundnuts. Land
holdings for this group are small and management practices are basic. The other group of smallholders
is actively involved in the cash economy, producing cash crops such as maize, pyrethrum, tea and
coffee and utilising grazing resources for the production of beef or milk from zebu or grade animals.
Areas controlled by these smallholders typically range from 2-5 ha in non-settlement areas and up
to 56 ha (average 12 ha) in settlement schemes.
One of the major successes in Alphabeta since independence has been the development of a
productive small-scale dairy subsector. This subsector now accounts for about 60% of the grade dairy
animals in the country and produces over 30% of recorded milk sales through official channels. This
latter figure, however, does not account for localised sales through co-operative societies or sales by
private arrangement within rural areas. Nor does it account for milk used for home consumption.
Production systems
Within the small-scale dairy subsector, five production systems, broadly classified according to the
intensiveness of production and the use of grade dairy cattle, have been identified:
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System I
An extensive milk production system based on the use of local zebu cows, grazed on communal
pastures.
System II
A low intensity production system based on the use of cross-bred cows grazed on natural
pasture, owned by individual farmers.
System III
A moderately intensive production system based on the use of higher grade stock which are
grazed on well managed or cultivated pasture land.
System IV
A highly intensive production system identified by the use of pure exotic grade cattle which
are grazed on improved pasture with supplementation from fodder crops and/or concentrates.
System V
A highly intensive zero-grazing system based on the use of exotic grade cattle which are stall
fed with fodder and concentrates.
Households in systems II-V normally also practise cash cropping. Crops grown in conjunction
with dairying include tea, coffee, maize and pyrethrum. Potatoes and other vegetables may also be
grown for home consumption. In System I, cotton is often grown as a cash crop. A detailed summary
of the dairy management and cash crop production characteristics of each system is presented in
Tables 9.15 and 9.16.
Returns to dairying, particularly under intensive systems, are comparatively attractive. This,
coupled with policies designed to assist smallholders in the acquisition and management of grade
dairy animals, has been a key factor in the rapid expansion of this enterprise in suitable ecological
zones. With continual land pressure resulting from population growth, there has been a growing
interest in intensified systems of production using napier grass or green maize for supplementary
feeding. In the high altitude zones, oats and fodder beets substitute for these crops.
Dairying has also proved to be competitive with other cash crop enterprises in the
medium-to-high potential zones. Its attraction has been enhanced by the fact that the operation does
not entail such peaks in labour demand as many of the cash crops do. Dairy prices, fixed by
government, are also stable in comparison with prices for crops such as tea, coffee and pyrethrum.
Approximately 45% of the nation's grade dairy animals are found within systems I—III, 12%
within system IV and only 3% within system V Herd performance parameters vary with the
management intensity. However, the differences are not marked, as can be seen below:
Systems
Parameters I II III IV V
Calving rate (%) 65 - - 70 70
Calf mortalities (%) 25-30 - - 20 20
Calving intervals (months) 17 17 17 16 15
Age at culling (years) >9 >9 9 9 9
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Table 9.15. Characteristicfeatures ofsmall-scale dairy management systems.
Moderately Highly Zero
System type Extensive Low intensive intensive intensive grazing
System no. I II III IV V
Breeds and • Local breeds • Cross cow (Fi) • Low upgraded • High grade High grade dairy
breeding •Use of bull in • Use of AI or cow dairy




Rearing • Male and • Male and • Bucket or hand • Rearing female • Rearing female
methods female calves female calves rearing, feeding calves only calves only
suckle dams part-time suckle of whole milk, • Concentrate • Bucket feeding
during lactation a restricted late weaning, • Only weaning • Use milk
• Cow cannot be amount of milk 3^4 months 2-3 months substitutes
milked without a over a 4-7 • Cow can be • Bucket feeding • Concentrate
calf month period






Forage • Communal • Individual • Individual • Grazing • Growing arable
production and grazing of grazing of grazing on cultivated land fodder
feeding methods natural grass and naturally fenced and and • Forage is cui
bushland regenerated cultivated or •Feeding of and carried to
pasture in a improved pasture arable fodder animals
fallow system • Use of fertiliser crops • Fertiliser and
manure are used•Use of fertiliser
Cow feeding and • Grazing during • Grazing during • Grazing day • Partially • Stall feeding
management day and day and and night grazing • Cattle kept
enclosing during enclosing during • Feeding • Feeding arable permanently
night night minerals fodder crops in indoors
• Feeding salt • Feeding • Supplementary confined areas • Feeding
minerals minerals feeding • Feeding minerals
















Possible cash • Cotton Maize, coffee, Maize, coffee, ditto
cropping tea and tea and
enterprises pyrethrum pyrethrum
A cow unit (CU) is defined as a cow plus followers.
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System no. I II III IV V
Milk production/cow per year (litres) 330-880 800-1600 1600-2400 2000-4000 2000-4000
Meat production/cow unit per year (kg) 40-60 60-120 60-120 70-110 70-110
Calving interval (months) 15 15 15 14 13
Stocking rates (ha/CU) 0.5-1.0 0.6-1.2 0.6-1.2 0.4-0.8 0.2-05
Concentrates (kg/cow per year) nil 0-100 100-200 200-300 200-500
Labour demand/CU (hours/year) 450 325 375 440 500-800
Capital investment (A$) 5 20 30 40 50
Gross margins (A$)
2
per cow unit 10-20 12.5-25 21-42 94-188 240-600
per person hour 0.02-0.04 0.04-0.08 0.06-0.12 0.21-0.42 0.48-1.0
per ha 10.00 15.00 25.00 75.00 120.00
1 Refers to milk available for sale or consumption. Between 20 and 60% of milk is consumed on farm, with the proportion
consumed decreasing as scale of intensity increases.
2 Gross margin is defined as the value of output (-) associated variable costs annually.
Cash income and expenditure patterns
Table 9.17 provides relevant data for high, medium and low income earners within the small-scale
dairy sector. Income earning capacity and consumption expenditure levels are not necessarily
correlated to size of holdings but depend on crop and herd management practices and the combination
of enterprises found on farm. One would expect, however, that incomes will be higher in those
regions where the cultivation of crops such as tea and coffee, in conjunction with intensive dairying,
can be practised. Some important points emerging from the data are:
• Higher overall income levels are associated with higher proportions of total income earned
from farm activities. On the other hand, remittances and other sources of off-farm income
become relatively more important as income levels decline.
• Consumption levels increase in absolute terms as income increases but the relative proportion
spent on consumption goods is highest for the lower income group. For this income group,
savings are negative (i.e. consumption exceeds income) and households in this category
regularly need to resort to borrowing in order to survive.
With increasing population density in the medium-to-high potential areas of the country,
small-scale dairying, with its potential for intensification, offers considerable scope for maintaining
or improving living standards, as average holding sizes decline. This capacity for income improvement
has undoubtedly been a major reason for the rapid growth of small-scale dairy operations in the
period since independence.
9.6.4 Large-scale livestock production system
Beef cattle
Assisted by a number of donor agencies, Alphabeta has developed a National Livestock Development
Programme (NLDP). Its principal objective is to increase beef production by providing credit to four
different types of ranching enterprises: group ranches, commercial ranches, company and co-operative
ranches in unoccupied areas and individual ranches in pastoral areas. The programme provides
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facilities and services for livestock marketing, range water development on communal land and disease
control. The underlying belief is that stock fattened on these ranches and purchased from rangeland
pastoralists would both increase the national offtake and expand the export trade. Other stated
objectives of the NLDP include increasing employment in rural areas, particularly in the arid regions
of the country, thereby encouraging a more equitable distribution of income and contributing to the
conservation of national range resources through the adoption of improved management practices by
the ranches.
Table 9. 1 7. A verage value and composition ofincome, cash expenditure andsavings by household income earning
category (small-scale dairying).
Low income class Medium ncome class 3High income class
% total % total % total
Item Amount income Amount income Amount income
Farm operating surplus 49.4 49.5 121.0 58.7 300.0 62.8
Non-farm operating
surplus
10.5 10.5 24.5 11.9 45.0 9.4
Regular employment 6.7 6.7 22.9 11.2 90.0 18.7
Casual employment 14.2 14.2 12.2 5.9 18.0 3.8
Remittances from relatives 16.3 16.4 20.8 10.0 18.2 3.8
Other gifts 2.7 2.7 4.7 2.3 7.2 \.5
Total household income 99.8 100.0 206.1 100.0 478.4 100.0
Total consumption outlays 122.2 122.0 181.4 59.3 303.0 63.0
Current savings (22.4) (22.4) 24.7 8.0 175.4 36.7
1 Low income class = A$ 50-150/year.
2 Medium income class = A$ 1 50-300/year.
3 High income class = greater than A$ 300/year.
4 Parentheses indicate negative savings.
NLDP funds are provided through the National Finance Corporation (NFC) for:
development of water resources
stock handling facilities
development of feedlots
purchase of steers and breeding stock
stock dipping facilities
stock fattening or breeding operations
development of housing, tracks and firebreaks
provision of incremental working capital under the terms of the programme.
A more detailed description of the four types of ranch enterprises planned for development
follows.
Group ranches. These have been established on trust land in the pastoral regions of the country.
The ranches are adjudicated and title deed is vested collectively in groups of 30-450 pastoralists who
are the traditional users of the land. Members retain rights for individual ownership and management
of their herds but the group must agree to maintain a given stocking rate and to co-operate in livestock
marketing if loan assistance is to be given.
Commercial ranches. These are held on lease or owned mainly on a freehold basis by
individuals, although partnerships of small farmers may also operate commercial ranches. Ranches
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which are under original ownership tend to be well managed and well developed and include a
number of feedlot operations producing prime beef for export trade and the urban sector. These
ranches are primarily located in the medium potential regions of the country.
Company and co-operative ranches in unoccupied areas. The establishment of company,
co-operative and, to a lesser extent, individual ranches has been the approach used by the government
to develop unoccupied semi-arid range areas where lack of water and the presence of the tse-tse fly
have been the major factors inhibiting migration of people from more densely settled parts of the
country.
Company ranches are enterprises on state land, leased from the national government or from
local councils, where shareholders supply cattle, or a cash equivalent, to gain membership.
Co-operative ranches are similar in operation, differing only in the form of shareholding offered.
Under both systems the cattle herd is managed collectively with profits being shared according to
formal legal arrangements.
Individual ranches in pastoral areas. Small individual ranches have been established in some
of the pastoral areas of the country with loans from the NFC. Individual pastoralists may apply for
adjudication for a prescribed grazing area. The size of each individual area is dependent on natural
conditions as well as on the ability of the individual to convince the authorities of the extent of his
traditional claims to land. Average ranch sizes are about 650 ha and loans have been made available
for stock purchase and land and water development. Most individual ranchers in this category have
large herds and a portion of their stock is retained in the traditional communal areas, thus relieving
pressure on their own ranches. As in Botswana (module 7), however, this relaxes the stocking
constraint ordinarily supplied by private ownership of land and permits overstocking.
Table 9.18 summarises data on incremental capital costs required for development and steer
purchases in the different ranching systems listed above. Development costs include outlays for
watering, fencing, bush clearing and dipping facilities. In all cases, provision of water supplies
constitutes the main item of development expenditure (approximately 40%).
Table 9.18. Incremental capital per hafor average size ranch operations by category ofoperation (A$).
Ranch type Development capital Steer purchase Total capital
Commercial 3.00 2.00 5.00
Group 1.60 0.90 2.50
Company/co-operative 2.50 2.50 5.00
Individual 2.00 1.50 3.50
1 Average sizes were given as follows: commercial = 3250 ha; group = 15,000 ha; company = 26,000 ha; individual = 800 ha.
Performance on group and individual ranches. Performance on different ranch types has
varied according to ecological zone, management practices and operation. Group and individual
ranching operations in pastoral areas have not performed well. Sample surveys indicate that the NLDP
has had minimal impact in persuading pastoralists to move towards commercial beef production. This
is indicated by the fact that:
• Cattle herd structures remain similar to those in pastoral areas for both group and individual
ranches, when bought-in steers are excluded.
• Sales and offtake rates from the basic herd are also similar. Since herd structures are unlikely
to alter in the short-to-medium term, the scope for increasing commercial offtake from these
ranches is limited. Table 9.19 presents statistics on herd structures, sales and offtake rates which
demonstrate the similarities between developed group, individual and undeveloped group
ranches. The latter probably do not differ significantly from traditional pastoral areas and are
therefore taken as an indication of performance data in those areas.
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The programme has, however, had a significant impact on tick control, with ranches dipping
stock more regularly than before. The standard of animal health care appears otherwise little changed
and the purchase of drugs, vaccines and mineral supplements by group ranch households is low.
Individual ranchers, however, appear to be spending more per livestock unit on animal health measures
than group ranch households, particularly those with a predominance of exotic blood in their cattle
herds. Evidence also suggests that improved dipping and watering facilities have, in some areas,
permitted the introduction of exotic stock with higher milk production potential and this must be
viewed as a positive benefit resulting from ranch development.





Cattle offtake rate (base herd)
















Performance on commercial and co-operative/company ranches: Another survey
concentrating on ranches of these types provided the following information on performance
parameters.
• Calving rates: These ranged from 52-80%, with the lower rates recorded on company and
co-operative ranches.
• Mortalities: For the sample of commercial and company ranches, the following mortality

















Commercial ranches 9.2 3.2 3.2
Commercial enterprises appear to manage stock better than co-operative or company ventures.
Mortality rates for the latter were high during the period of the survey, probably due to inexperienced
or inferior management. In addition, company and co-operative ranches in the sample were located
in the semi-arid regions of the country while commercial operations were concentrated in the medium
potential regions. In comparison with mortality statistics from the traditional sector, however,
co-operative and company ranches appear to perform no better and adult mortality rates would seem
to be even higher. This occurs despite considerable investment in veterinary facilities under the NLDP.
With respect to offtake rates, commercial and company ranches performed similarly, the average
offtake rate being 15-17% during the survey period (four years). Herd structure statistics vary
depending largely on the nature of the ranch operation and the age at which stock are sold.
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Dairy cattle
Large-scale dairy operations account for only 40% of the country's grade dairy stock but are
nevertheless important as suppliers of milk to the main urban centres and suppliers of quality grade
animals to the small-scale dairy subsector.
Within this category, three sorts of operation can be identified on the basis of the management
system practised and ecological location of the operation. They are:
Dairy ranching in medium potential regions. Farmers in this category provide less than 10%
of marketed milk production and operate a complementary dairy activity in conjunction with beef
production. Breeds are commonly dual purpose or crossed with dual-purpose stock. Male progeny
and cull animals are sold as beef. Production is seasonal to avoid the heavy cost of purchasing
concentrate feed and labour demands per cow are low. Favourable milk prices, relative to those
obtained from beef, have induced ranchers in these regions to practise this form of extensive seasonal
production, despite average annual milk yields of only 1500 kg/cow.
Extensive dairy farming in high potential regions. Farmers in this group manage dairy cattle
on extensive natural pasture/ley systems (50:50) with supplementary feeding of concentrates and
fodder crops. Milk yields per cow average only 2000 kg/year and stocking rates of 1.0-1.2 ha/cow
unit are most common. Management is of a modest standard and rising input costs have forced a
substantial number of producers out of production. Improved exotic dairy breeds are used for
production and calving intervals average 15 months.
Intensive dairy production in high potential regions. Systems within this group are mainly
stall-fed operations with a limited amount of supplementary grazing. Management is generally of a
high calibre and stocking rates of 0.75 ha/cow unit are common. Emphasis is given to supplementary
feeding with hay and/or silage and concentrates (300 kg/cow annually). Milk production per cow is
normally in excess of 3000 kg/year and exotic grade cattle (Jersey, Guernsey, Friesian) are used for
production. The calving interval is 14 months and the calving rate is between 80-90%.
Poorly managed systems in the high potential zones are not competitive with crops such as
maize and wheat on a gross margin basis. Thus, some extensive dairy operations are being phased
out. However, since management is often sub-standard, a better option for some of these operations
may be to improve management practices and remain within the industry. It is estimated that yields




• Pastoralists occupy arid regions and depend primarily on livestock for their subsistence.
• Because of low carrying capacities and population pressure in these areas, pastoralists
supplement their food needs by purchasing or bartering from other sources.
• In the arid regions optimum humanxatfle ratios to meet full dietary requirements from
pastoral activities alone should be between 1:13 and 1:15 as against the present average
ratio of 1:5.
• Mature cows comprise approximately 40-45% of the average pastoralist household herd.
• Overstocking and overgrazing along with human population growth have put pressure on
the pastoral environment.
Important points (9.6) cont...
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 Important points (9.6) conk..
The agropastoral system
• Agropastoralists occupy marginal areas of the country, deriving their living mainly from
complementary livestock and cropping activities.
Agropastoralists resemble pastoralists in their herd structure, performance and ownership
patterns and in their desire to accumulate stock.
• Food crop yields in agropastoral areas tend to be low.
The smallholder system
The majority of smallholders are concentrated in the medium-to-high potential areas.
Smallholders are of two types: one which is subsistence-oriented and another which is
actively involved in the cash economy and in beef and dairy enterprises.
• The small-scale dairy subsector accounts for almost 60% of the grade dairy animals in the
country.
• Within the dairy subsector, production systems of five degrees of modem or intensive
management practice can be identified.
• Returns to dairying in intensive systems are attractive and this offers great scope for
improving smallholder living standards.
Large-scale production systems
Beef
• Improving beef production is the main objective of the NLDP.
• NLDP funds are provided through the NFC to four types of ranches for the development
of various facilities related to beef production.
• Commercial and company/co-operative ranches have performed weU while performance on
individual and group ranches has remained close to that observed on undeveloped eroup
ranches. r t> r
Dairy cattle
Large-scale dairy operations account for only 40% of the country's grade dairy stock.
• J™Jarge-scale dairy enterprises to remain economically viable, milk yields must exceed
2500 kg/cow annually.
Economic inferences
• Decisions about herd size and livestock sales are motivated principally by economic factors
and constraints.
• Pressures of the cash economy and the expansion of the urban-based wage economy are
stimulating temporary out-migration from agriculture. As a result, farm labour is constrained
and labour-intensive options for productivity improvement are restricted.
• Farmers are attempting to allocate their resources (grazing land, livestock, family labour)
to those uses with the highest net returns.
_-_-____-_____ Important points (9.6) cont...
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 Important points (9.6) cont...
• Pastoralists and agropastoralists are constrained from expanding their herds by poor herd
dynamics parameters and low savings. Thus, herd sizes tend to fluctuate in response to
natural conditions.
• Decisions about choice of enterprise are governed by gross margin calculations.
• A lack of concern for the environmental implications of their actions is not necessarily an
inherent feature of pastoralists, agropastoralists or subsistence-oriented smallholders. Rather,
it is imposed by the relative marginality of their existence, household resource constraints
and the imperatives of an increasingly free-access range.
9.7 The marketing of beef and dairy products
9.7.1 Beef products
Marketing organisations and control
Marketing beef in Alphabeta has been subject to extensive state control since independence. Control
is through the Meat Marketing Commission (MMC) and the Cattle Marketing Division (CMD) of
the Ministry of Agriculture. Through the MMC, the Government controls slaughter for export and
urban markets. Through the CMD it owns and operates all primary market outlets, stock routes,
holding grounds and quarantine facilities. The CMD is active in marketing stock from the arid range
areas and in maintaining a system of floor prices for cattle marketed in these areas.
The Government's principal objectives in the controlled marketing of beef products are: to
generate a flow of improved grades of meat for urban and export markets; reduce the cost of living
for the urban consumer; and limit the spread of disease, particularly foot-and-mouth, in order to
improve export prospects.
The MMC operates two large abattoirs and licenses an additional 16 private or council abattoirs
to operate within urban areas.
Beef marketing policy
Beef prices are controlled at producer, wholesale and retail levels but prices for smallstock are not
controlled. Producer prices for beef have remained well below export parity levels despite periodic
increases announced by the MMC in recent years. This has four important effects:
• illegal trading and slaughtering operations
• increase in urban demand for high and low grade beef
• increase in rural demand for low grade beef
• static production in prime quality beef from commercial and other ranches.
Illegal trading and slaughtering within, and adjacent to, urban areas have effectively eroded
MMC's monopoly of the urban market and resulted in declining amounts and proportions being sold
through official channels (Figure 9.20). As a result, MMC's slaughtering capacities have remained
under-utilised.
The pricing system adopted has also contributed to an increase in urban demand for high and
low grade beef (Table 9.20). Beef prices have, in fact, declined in real terms (Table 9.21) and relative
to prices paid for other commodities (Table 9.20). On the other hand, average urban incomes have
increased in real terms, particularly for the upper and middle income groups, as a result of wage
agreements.
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Table 9.20. Urban demand and retail price indices for beefcompared with cost of living indices (Year 4 = 100).
Urban Ind ces of price and cost of living (food)
demand Per capita Total High grade Middle income Low grade Low income
Year (kg) ('000 t) beef price beef price C.O.L.
4 20.0 15.1 100 100 100 100
5 18.0 14.3 109 103 101 103
6 19.0 15.8 101 111 111 112
7 20.5 18.0 101 115 111 113
8 23.0 21.2 113 126 121 126
9 24.5 23.7 116 150 121 155
10 26.0 26.4 123 179 140 186
11 26.0 27.7 139 188 140 195
1 Main urban centres only.
Table 9.21. Urban beef retail price y in constant and current dollar termsfor low and high grade cuts.
Year
Current prices (A$/kg) Constant prices (A$/kg)
Low grade High grade Low grac e High grade
in bone boneless in bone boneless
4 0.26 0.54 0.26 0.54
5 0.27 0.59 0.26 0.57
6 0.29 0.55 0.26 0.50
7 0.29 0.55 0.25 0.48
8 0.32 0.61 0.25 0.48
9 0.32 0.63 0.21 0.42
10 0.36 0.66 0.19 0.37
11 0.37 0.75 0.19 0.40
1 Deflated by the middle income urban cost of living index (year 6=100).
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Barring changes in preferences, beef prices and prices of substitutes (e.g. mutton and milk),
the demand for beef will increase with increases in incomes and population according to the following
formula:
D p + ng
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where: D = percentage change in demand
p = the population growth rate
g = the growth in real per capita incomes
n = the income elasticity of demand for beef.
Studies of beef demand in Alphabeta's urban centres have found the following elasticities:
Income elasticity of demand for beef (urban): 1 .00
Price elasticity of demand for beef (urban): -1 .20
Estimates of cross price elasticities of demand for mutton and milk were not made. However,
these are certainly positive (i.e. mutton and milk are substitutes).
Given the 2% annual real increase in urban per capita incomes and the estimated 5% annual
increase in urban population, urban beef demand has been increasing by 7% (5 + 1x2) annually.
Falling real beef prices and high prices for substitutes have caused additional demand.
Less is known about beef demand (as distinct from consumption) in rural areas. However,
apart from beef and meat products consumed on farm, there is a rural demand for purchased beef,
particularly in the medium-to-high potential regions of the country. The actual amounts sold in these
areas are, however, not known. Various estimates of income and price elasticities of demand for beef
in rural areas have been made but these can only be treated as approximations. One such estimate
is as follows:
Income elasticity of demand for beef (rural): 1.0-1.20
Price elasticity of demand for beef (rural): -1.30
In addition, it has been estimated that the average per capita rural consumption of beef is
between 5-8 kg/year. This average conceals substantial variation within and between ecological
regions. This is dependent on such factors as income level, household size and structure, consumption
habits, seasonal conditions and prices of other food commodities. Consumption per caput of purchased
beef has remained static for some time. With rising rural populations, this implies that the demand
for low quality beef in rural areas has increased at the rate of population increase (i.e. 4%/year). As
a result of this increased demand, inferior quality stock are being marketed in increasing numbers in
rural areas. This reduces the stock available for finishing at group, individual and co-operatively
owned ranches and, thus, affects the supply of beef to urban areas.
Government pricing policies have also affected the production of prime quality beef from
commercial and other ranches. The MMC price to the producer has consistently been kept below
export parity levels, and price differentials between different grades have been comparatively narrow
(Table 9.22).
Because of rising input costs coupled with relatively low prices for beef compared with other
enterprise alternatives, there has been little incentive for the production of prime quality beef. This
is reflected in the statistics on chilled or frozen beef exports in Table 9.7. The quantity of beef
exported in these categories has remained relatively static for the past eight years and the proportion
of superior grades delivered to the MMC has also remained comparatively unchanged during the
same period (Table 9.23). Since commercial ranches account for approximately 50% of official MMC
sales for slaughter, the inference is that over half the sales from the commercial ranching sector must
have been of standard or poorer grade cattle.
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Table 9.22. Beefproducer prices and grade differentials (CDW).
Year
Current prices (A$/kg) Constant prices (A$/kg)
GAQ2 FAQ3 3rd Grade 4th Grade
4 0.170 97 81 70
5 0.175 95 78 68
6 0.203 93 70 61
7 0.222 92 68 59
8 0.239 93 73 63
9 0.265 94 78 67
10 0.299 93 79 69
11 0.334 97 72 63
1 CDW = cold dressed weight.
2 GAQ = good average quality.
3 FAQ = fair average quality.
Table 9.23. Proportion ofdeliveries in different grades delivered to MMC (%).






















1 FAQ = fair average quality.
Beef marketing efficiency (MMC)
Information on meat processing costs incurred by the MMC over time demonstrates serious
inefficiencies within the formal marketing structure for beef products. The following evidence supports
this statement:
• Between years one and six, MMC's total costs rose by 31% compared with the Wage Earners'
CPI which rose by 13% and the implicit GDP deflator of Manufacturing and Repairs which
rose by 22% during the same period.
Between years 7 and 11, total MMC costs increased by 139% compared with a corresponding
GDP deflator growth of 38% and a CPI growth of 63%.
• When costs are compared with licensed private slaughtering operations in urban areas, it can
be seen that the latter operate on a margin of 5 cents/kg CDW compared with an MMC margin
of 7.5 cents/kg CDW (i.e. 50% higher). Private operators can therefore afford to offer a higher
price to the producer and/or offer a lower price to the consumer. This is one explanation of
the diversion of urban supplies from the MMC in recent years. However, larger producers of
high grade export quality beef continue to sell through the MMC largely because they prefer
to operate through established and regular marketing channels.
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Cattle marketing
Little is actually known about supply-price response relationships in cattle marketing from the
traditional sector (particularly the pastoral and agropastoral subsectors). Only a small proportion of
stock sold from these areas go through official channels. The major portion is sold to rural butcheries
and traders or to other rural households. However, the following general comments on the supply
response of traditional cattle owners, based on studies within and outside Africa, can be made:
• There is conflicting evidence within Africa on short-term price-supply relationships. Surveys
conducted in Sudan argue that the price elasticity of supply in the short-term is positive. On
the other hand, time series studies done in Swaziland and Zimbabwe indicate that the response
to price changes is negative. Another time series study in Botswana shows a positive short-run
relationship and only one study in Swaziland has shown a long-run negative supply response
between the cattle offtake rate and price.
• A negative short-term price-supply response relationship has also been observed for beef
ranches in North and South America. Producers in these countries may withhold sales (in
anticipation of a long-term price rise) in order to maximise long-run profits. Steer sales, for
example, may be withheld to increase body weight and thereby increase the average price
received on sale. Cows designated for culling may likewise be withheld from sale in an attempt
to increase herd size through additional calvings.
• One explanation for the observed negative supply response relationship for African cattle
owners is that cattle are held as a store of wealth and are required for consumption and
production purposes. Owners will therefore be reluctant to sell, but if forced to do so to meet
cash needs, will sell the minimum number of cattle. A real price increase for cattle may therefore
result in an overall decline in the offtake rate, since cash needs can be met by the sale of
fewer cattle. Although they are difficult to discern, price-supply relationships for African
herders are of critical significance to livestock development policy.
9.7.2 Dairy products
Marketing organisation and control
The processing and urban sale of milk is controlled by the National Dairy Co-operative (NDC) which
normally handles an estimated 25% of total milk production and 96% of all milk passing through
commercial channels. The NDC is a commercial company; it is also a producer co-operative.
Membership has grown since independence, largely resulting from expansion of the small-scale sector.
There are now 294 registered co-operative societies, 3100 individual members and approximately
2500 temporary member suppliers. Retail prices for all goods marketed through the NDC and prices
it pays to farmers are controlled by the government.
Important trends in raw milk deliveries to NDC and milk demand patterns over a period of
11 years have been as follows:
• NDC liquid milk sales have steadily increased since independence but deliveries have recently
declined despite an eight year upward trend in producer prices (Figure 9.3).
There has been a rising demand for liquid milk in urban areas (Table 9.24). The proportion of
total deliveries by NDC consumed as fresh milk and cream has thus risen from 40% in year
one to 72% in year 11. This has reduced the amount available for manufacturing purposes.
With rising population and urban income levels, this trend is likely to continue, reducing the
amount available for manufactured export products (Table 9.1). The pattern of overall demand
for milk is unknown however, because informal sales in the rural sector account for a substantial
proportion of the milk sold.
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Milk pricing systems
Milk production in Alphabeta is highly seasonal, and difficulties have arisen in maintaining supplies
during the off-season when urban shortages become a problem. In an attempt to iron out such seasonal
fluctuations, NDC initially used a differential pricing system. Under this system, premiums were paid
to large-scale producers who maintained supply levels throughout the year, and lower prices were
paid to seasonal producers who reduced their supplies during the off-season (December-March). Milk
produced in remote areas was only accepted in the form of butter fat to reduce the NDC's transport
commitments.
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However, political pressure in year five forced the government to abolish this differential pricing
system and to announce a uniform price for all milk, irrespective of season or distance from
manufacturing facilities. This price was equivalent to the premium price paid to large-scale producers
under previous pricing arrangements. In effect, all small-scale producers benefited from a price rise
of 45%. Figure 9.4 demonstrates the impact of the price increase on seasonal supplies to the NDC
before and after the policy.
With the availability of grade dairy stock in medium-to-high potential areas of the country,
smallholders responded to the new pricing system by increasing production. But, limited dry season
supplies were diverted to higher priced (informal) local markets in rural areas, and surpluses during
the flush period (normally April-October) were sent to the NDC.
The NDC was then faced with a serious over-supply problem during the flush period, and the
requirement that it purchase all supplies offered at the established price strained its financial resources.
Moreover, to cope with seasonal gluts in supply, additional manufacturing capacities were needed
and built, but these were under-utilised during the off-season.
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Table 9.24. Deliveries of raw milk to and production by NDC.
Milk
Recorded Whole & equivalent Proportion of
milk Milk & Butter & Evaporated skim milk for manu- total consumed as
deliveries cream ghee Cheese milk powder Other facturing fresh milk &
Year (M litres) (M litres) (M kg) (Mkg) (M kg) (M kg) (M kg) (M litres) cream (%)
1 196.3 79.1 4.2 0.4 - 0.8 1.2 107.3 40
2 200.0 85.0 4.8 0.4 - 1.2 0.9 115.0 43
3 213.6 87.3 4.5 0.5 - 2.3 0.9 126.4 41
4 210.9 92.3 4.8 0.5 0.1 2.6 0.6 118.6 44
5 232.0 103.1 5.5 0.5 2.7 4.7 0.3 128.9 44
6 220.4 103.4 4.1 0.5 2.7 5.5 0.4 112.0 49
7 268.4 124.6 4.7 0.7 4.8 7.0 0.2 143.8 46
8 279.7 148.8 5.5 1.0 5.1 7.5 0.2 130.9 53
9 249.8 160.0 4.4 0.5 3.2 5.6 0.1 89.8 64
10 230.6 158.0 4.2 0.5 1.6 5.1 - 72.6 69
11 208.7 150.4 3.1 0.2 2.1 4.5 - 58.3 72
1 Computed by subtracting fresh milk and deliveries (i.e. availability for manufacturing).
The pricing system adopted in year five also encouraged production from remote areas,
effectively concealing the transport costs involved in supplying milk to consumers. As a result, the
NDC's marketing costs increased and were passed on to consumers (Figure 9.5). Consumers were
taxed in other ways. The consumer pricing system adopted by the NDC is based on using profits
generated from liquid milk sales to subsidise the sale of manufactured products. Whole milk which
requires minimal processing (cartons or bottles) is sold at more than double its purchase price (Figure
9.5). In contrast, processed products are sold at prices which do not cover the costs of purchase,
transport and processing. Surpluses of manufactured products intended for the export market are
therefore subsidised by the Government's price policy. Furthermore, as consumption of liquid milk
has increased, the production of manufactured goods has declined (Table 9.24), resulting in excess
capacity in NDC's processing plants. This, in turn, has raised the cost per unit of manufactured goods,
increasing the subsidy required on these items.
Factors behind rising urban milk demand and decreasing NDC deliveries.
Since year seven, the CPI for milk has remained relatively stable compared with increases for all
other important urban food commodities (Table 9.25) and this partially accounts for the rise in urban
milk demand from year seven onwards (Table 9.24).
Despite recent price increases for whole milk, supplies marketed through the NDC have
declined (Figure 9.3 and Table 9.24). The following reasons have been given:
Input prices for the dairy sector increased more rapidly than producer prices during this period.
Oil price increases directly affected prices of inputs such as chemical fertilisers and insecticides.
Therefore, the real price paid to the producer declined.
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Table 9.25. Index ofconsumer pricesfor milk compared to otherfood items (Year 7=100).
Low grade
Year Milk Maize meal Wheat flour beef Sugar Rice
7 100 100 100 100 100 100
8 100 100 100 110 130 100
9 100 129 148 110 130 130
10 100 165 189 no 189 139
1 1 119 165 189 127 243 182
• At the same time, output prices for competing farm enterprises increased relative to milk. This
was particularly the case for coffee and maize, which are produced as cash crops in the high
potential zones of the country where dairying is also practiced on an intensive basis. Resources
(labour and land) were therefore transferred out of dairying into cash cropping. The rise in
maize prices also increased concentrate costs (refer to Table 9.26 for a comparison of price
indices for maize, milk and coffee).
• Rising prices for these crops increased rural incomes for cash croppers in these areas and this,
given a high income elasticity of demand for milk in rural areas, probably resulted in a diversion
of supplies from the NDC (Table 9.24).
The farm-gate price for whole liquid milk paid to the producer is significantly less than the
border price per unit at the official exchange rate. Adjustments for overvaluation of the local currency
widen this gap even more (Table 9.27).
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Table 9.26. Index ofproducer pricesfor coffee, maize and whole liquid milk (year 4 = 100).
Year Coffee Maize Milk Milk: Maize Milk: Coffee
4 100 100 100 100 100
5 119 100 100 102 86
6 101 121 133 110 132
7 124 141 148 105 119
8 146 141 148 105 101
9 160 168 148 88 93
10 170 253 163 64 96
11 410 278 202 73 50













































Response to price changes
Estimates of the short-term (less than one year) supply response of the small-scale dairy sector are
not available, but the evidence cited in the previous section suggests that it is elastic. In the short
term, when production cannot easily be augmented or reduced, supply changes will mostly result
from changes in home consumption. Peasant dairy producers consume milk produced on farm. Given
that local markets are saturated, increases in milk prices relative to other products will normally result
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in increased sales to the NDC and reduced levels of home consumption. With a reduced price,
however, sales to the NDC are less attractive and more milk is retained for home consumption.
Households' ability to adapt milk supplies to changing economic circumstances also means that
supplies to the NDC may be irregular. In the medium term, adjustments to a long-term milk price
rise may be made by increasing or decreasing the size of grade dairy herds. The effectiveness of this
strategy will be limited by the availability of grade dairy animals from the large-scale sector.
In rural areas, the price and income elasticity of demand for milk is high and comparable to
beef. Rural per caput consumption has been estimated at approximately 50 litres/year. This will vary
with levels of cattle ownership, cultural practices, age structure of the household and seasonal
conditions. The vast bulk of milk is consumed on farm and never sold, so that it is estimated that
only 25% of the total ever reaches the market.
In conclusion, rising urban and rural demand for whole milk is eroding surpluses available for
production of manufactured products and exports. Such a trend is obvious from Tables 9.1 and 9.24.
This, in itself, is not too problematic but trends in production and consumption also indicate that
local production may soon be inadequate to meet local demand. Alphabeta would then be forced to





• Beef marketing in Alphabeta is subject to extensive state control.
• Through the MMC, government controls slaughter for the urban and export markets and
through the CMD it controls the domestic marketing of stock.
• Two main characteristics of the beef pricing policy are: beef producer prices have remained
well below export parity levels, and beef prices have declined in real terms and relative to
prices paid for other commodities.
• The marketing and pricing policies pursued by the Government have resulted in:
♦ illegal trading
♦ increased urban demand for beef
♦ static export trade
♦ increased rural demand.
• MMC's economic performance in beef processing is unsatisfactory.
Dairy products
The processing and urban sale of milk is controlled by the NDC.
The NDC handles 25% of total milk production and 96% of all milk passing through
commercial channels.
Urban demand for milk is rising.
Political pressure forced the government to abolish the differential pricing system and to
adopt a uniform pricing system for all milk products.
The policy revision placed NDC in financial difficulties and a serious over-supply problem.
Consumer prices also increased.
Other consequences of the revised policy are: subsidisation of the price of manufactured
dairy products and increased cost per unit of manufactured products.
Important points (9.7) cont...
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 Important points (9.7) cont...
• Rising urban and rural demand for whole milk is likely to reduce the export of manufactured
products and increase their import.
Economic inferences
• Government attempts to control prices are seldom ultimately successful, especially if controls
are not in line with underlying demand and supply conditions. Controls on consumer prices
lead to shortages and illegal markets. Most consumers pay more for controlled items in
terms of time spent in obtaining the items, bribes or premiums and inflated black market
prices—if they can find the items at all. The effect is often worse than if no controls had
been in existence in the first place. Ceiling prices for producers cause them to abandon
production and substitute an uncontrolled output, sell on the black market where returns are
higher or smuggle their output across the border. These outcomes were observed in
Alphabeta's meat and milk markets.
• A properly functioning price system should convey information about relative resource
scarcities to consumers and producers. This helps ensure efficient resource utilisation as
items in comparative abundance (and relatively cheap) are used, and items in comparative
scarcity (and relatively expensive) are conserved. As was the case in Alphabeta, when
relative prices change, consumers will substitute other items in consumption and producers
will shift to other output. The differential milk pricing system in Alphabeta helped with
this. When it was abandoned, milk processing and marketing resources were less efficiently
used. In addition to resource allocation, prices that accurately reflect resource scarcity will
often stimulate technological innovations to overcome it.
• A price system will only operate to allocate goods and resources efficiently if it does not
contain gross distortions. In addition to government controls on prices or outputs, these
distortions may be due to monopsony or monopoly factors, inadequate market information,
high transaction costs or excessive and unforseeable risk. In all of these instances, there
may be a legitimate role for government to play in ameliorating or eliminating the distortions.
The key is finding the proper balance between lack of regulation and excessive regulation.
In most African countries, including Alphabeta, the balance has tipped towards excessive
regulation.
• Marketing entails costs. These costs involve transport and storage charges, costs of acquiring
market information, financing charges and risk premiums. The presence of a large number
of middlemen is not sufficient evidence to conclude that marketing charges are excessive.
Under African conditions, with poor infrastructure and high risk, marketing costs are often
intrinsically high. It is better to look at the degree of competition amongst middlemen.
• Changes in the amount of an item demanded are affected principally by changes in its price.
Changes in income, the price of substitutes and complements, and changing tastes and
customs may also affect demand. Planning and projections of future supply requirements
must try to account for these factors.
9.8 Feedback exercises








b. Factors contributing to the decline of Alphabeta's economy are grouped as external and







2. Fill in the blanks.
i) The contribution of livestock products to the gross value of marketed agricultural
production in Alphabeta amounts to %.
ii) Among livestock, cattle account for % of livestock exports.
iii) Two major constraints to livestock development in pastoral and agropastoral
production systems are
and .
iv) In the calculation of Livestock Unit (LU) the value 1 is assigned to zebu cattle, 0.13
is for goat and is for dairy cattle.
3.a. Of the following statements, which are true for pastoralists, which for agropastoralists and
which for both. Circle for P for pastoralists, A for agropastoralists
and PA for both.
i) They derive their livings from crop and livestock operations jointly.
PA PA
ii) The distribution of cattle ownership by household is skewed and uneven.
PA PA
iii) They devote their working time and energy more to looking after livestock than to
other economic activities.
PA PA
iv) They are strongly inclined to retain female stock to produce milk and to maintain the
reproductive potential of the herd.
PA PA
v) Preservation of the herd is synonymous with preservation of wealth and household
well-being.
PA PA
vi) Cattle and smallstock sales are important sources of cash for regular food purposes.
PA PA
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vii) Cattle-owning households are generally wealthier.
PA PA
b. To meet the full dietary requirements from pastoral activities alone, what is the suggested
humanxattle ratio? Tick ( • ) one.
1.5 1.10 1.15 1.20






b. In what major components do group, commercial, company and co-operative ranches and
individual ranches differ in Alphabeta?
5.a. NLDP provided credits to different types of ranches for increasing beef production. Give four





b. The extensive dairy operations in the high potential zone of Alphabeta are not competitive
with crops. Average milk yield per cow is about 1500 kg/year. At what levels of milk
yield per cow will the dairy operation be made economically viable?
6.a. Differentiate between functions of the Meat Marketing Commission and the Cattle Marketing
Division of Alphabeta.
b. Name one major defect in marketing policy of the MMC for beef and its consequences on




7 .a. List two main components of the differential pricing policy of the National Dairy
Co-operative to alleviate milk delivery shortages during the off-season.
b. The amount of total delivery of milk to NDC kept declining despite increases in the producer
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